Privacy-Friendly Photo Sharing and Relevant Applications Beyond by Yuan, Lin
POUR L'OBTENTION DU GRADE DE DOCTEUR ÈS SCIENCES
acceptée sur proposition du jury:
Dr J.-M. Vesin, président du jury
Prof. T. Ebrahimi, directeur de thèse
Prof. S. Voloshynovskiy, rapporteur
Prof. P. Schelkens, rapporteur
Prof. J.-Ph. Thiran, rapporteur
Privacy-Friendly Photo Sharing 
and Relevant Applications Beyond
THÈSE NO 7828 (2017)
ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE
PRÉSENTÉE LE 28 JUILLET 2017
 À LA FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES ET TECHNIQUES DE L'INGÉNIEUR
GROUPE EBRAHIMI
PROGRAMME DOCTORAL EN GÉNIE ÉLECTRIQUE 
Suisse
2017
PAR
Lin YUAN

Look deep into nature,
and then you will understand everything better.
—– Albert Einstein
To my parents and family. . .

Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Touradj Ebrahimi
for the continuous support of my PhD study and related research, for his patience,
motivation, and immense knowledge. His guidance helped me in all the time of research
and writing of this thesis.
Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Prof. Jean-
Philippe Thiran, Prof. Peter Schelkens, Prof. Slava Voloshynovskiy, and Dr. Jean-Marc
Vesin, for the time they have taken to review my manuscript, and for their valuable
comments.
I would like to thank all my current and former colleagues from the Multimedia Signal
Processing Group: Martin, David, Anne-Flore, Irene, Evgeniy, Evangelos, Ashutosh,
Christine, Philippe, Pavel, Ivan, Grégoire, Margherita, He and Hiromi. We always share
ideas as well as stories during our lunch time, which kept me motivated and enthusiastic.
I would like to thank the students I have worked with, Joël, Thierry, Thomas, Vincent
and Pablo, for helping me in development and implementation of important softwares
used in this thesis. A special thank goes to Dr. David McNally for providing supports in
IT infrastructures and helpful discussions.
My sincere thanks also go to all my Chinese friends for providing me with a lot of mental
supports, knowledges and happiness: Yuanhao Bi, Yizhong Liang, Yan Zhou, Xin Tang,
Qiang Wang, Xin Lu, Su Li, Lin Bai, Yuliang Zheng, Junrui Zhang, Zhisheng Yang,
Ming Li, Xiaoyan Wang, Tao Guo, Feng Zhang, Hong Jian, Huan Liu, Guanchun Li,
Shiqi Wang, Tao Yu, Guobi Zhao, Yu Yu, Xiaojiang Peng and Yang Wang.
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family: my parents, grandfather, aunts,
uncles, sisters and especially my girlfriend Xiao, for supporting me spiritually throughout
writing this thesis and my life in general.
Lausanne, 21 June 2017 Lin Yuan
i

Abstract
Online photo sharing has become everyday life for many, but has also raised concerns for
privacy. Online social networking (OSN) sites usually oﬀer a limited degree of privacy
protection and the most common solution is conditional access control. Researchers have
studied various approaches to enable image privacy in photo sharing, mostly focusing on
encrypting or distorting image visual content, which may compromise utility and user
experience of photo sharing. This thesis investigates novel solutions to protect image
privacy with a particular emphasis on the scenario of online photo sharing. To this end,
we investigate not only algorithms to protect visual content in image but also design of
architectures for privacy-preserving photo sharing. Beyond privacy, we also explore the
additional impacts and potentials of employing daily images being captured and shared
for other relevant applications.
First, we propose and study two image encoding algorithms to protect image visual
privacy, within a framework named Secure JPEG. The ﬁrst method scrambles a JPEG
image by randomly changing the signs of its quantized DCT coeﬃcients based on a
secret key. The second method, called JPEG Transmorphing, allows one to obfuscate
arbitrary image regions, while secretly preserving information about the original regions
in application segments of the obfuscated JPEG image. Both algorithms are backward
compatible with JPEG, meaning that the protected image is readable by any JPEG
decoder in its visually protected form; The original image can only be recovered by a
dedicated JPEG decoder with the right secret key provided. Evaluations (both objective
and subjective) reveal a good degree of storage overhead and privacy protection capability
using both methods. Particularly, JPEG Transmorphing proved to be able to preserve
the maximum pleasantness from both perception and usage perspectives.
Second, we investigate the design of two architectures for privacy-preserving photo
sharing. The ﬁrst architecture, named ProShare, aimed to enable secure and eﬃcient
access to user-posted images protected by Secure JPEG, is built based on a public
key infrastructure (PKI) integrated with a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE). We implemented and demonstrate the correct and eﬃcient functioning of the
ProShare architecture based on both iOS and Android mobile platforms. The second
architecture is called ProShare S, in which a service provider helps users make photo
sharing decisions automatically based on their past decisions made in diﬀerent contexts.
Based on machine learning, the photo sharing service analyzes not only the content of a
user’s photo, but also the context information about the image capture and a prospective
iii
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requester, and ﬁnally decides whether or not to share the particular photo with that
requester, and if yes, at which granularity. We validated the ProShare S architecture with
a user study of 23 subjects and extensive evaluation analysis.
As the last part of the thesis, we research into three relevant topics in regard to daily
images captured or shared by people, but beyond their privacy implications. In the ﬁrst
study, we adopt the idea of JPEG Transmorphing and propose aJPEG, an animated
image format based on JPEG compression. The aJPEG provides smaller ﬁle size and
better image quality compared to conventional Graphics Interchange Format (GIF). In
the second study, we attempt to understand the impact of popular image manipulations
applied in online photo sharing on evoked emotions of photo observers. It reveals that
image manipulations indeed inﬂuence people’s emotion, but such impact highly depends
on image content. By learning from image features such as color and texture, we train and
evaluate a simple regressor that is able to accurately predict emotions induced by image
manipulation. In the last study, we target on the problem of dietary management using
daily photos captured by people. To this end, we employ a deep convolutional neural
network (CNN), the GoogLeNet model, to perform automatic food image classiﬁcation and
categorization. The promising results provide meaningful insights in design of automatic
dietary assessment system based on multimedia techniques, e.g. image analysis.
Keywords: privacy, security, social network, photo sharing, JPEG, Secure JPEG,
Scrambling, Transmorphing, aJPEG, backward compatibility, public key infrastructure,
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption, machine learning, context, decision making,
emotion, deep learning
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Résumé
La vulgarisation et la facilitation du partage d’images en ligne soulève des préoccupations
concernant la conﬁdentialité des informations partagées. Les chercheurs dans les domaines
du traitement d’image et de contenu multimédia ont proposé diverses approches pour
permettre la protection des images lors du partage de photos. Cependant, la plupart
de celles-ci concentrent leurs eﬀorts sur l’encryptions et les distorsions visuelles. Dans
cette thèse, nous étudions de nouvelles solutions pour protéger la conﬁdentialité des
images dans le contexte du partage de photos en ligne. Pour ce faire, nous proposons non
seulement des algorithmes pour protéger la conﬁdentialité visuelle du contenu d’image,
mais aussi des modèles d’architecture pour la conservation des données privées. De plus,
des applications potentielles et pertinentes, ne relevant pas de la protection de données,
furent aussi envisagées.
Tout d’abord, nous proposons et étudions deux algorithmes de compression d’image pour
protéger la conﬁdentialité des informations visuelles de l’image, dans le contexte de Secure
JPEG. La première méthode bruiter une image JPEG en modiﬁant aléatoirement les signes
de ses coeﬃcients DCT en fonction d’une clé secrète. La deuxième méthode, nommée
JPEG Transmorphing, permet de protéger une région d’image en lui appliquant n’importe
quelle manipulation, tout en préservant secrètement les régions d’image originales dans
les segments d’application de l’image JPEG protégée.
Deuxièmement, sur la base des algorithmes de protection de données Secure JPEG,
nous étudions la conception de deux architectures pour la conservation des données
conﬁdentielles. La première architecture s’appelle ProShare, construite en fonction d’une
infrastructure de clé publique (PKI) intégrée à un cryptage basé sur des attributs de
polices chiﬀrées (CP-ABE). Dans ProShare, une photo est protégée par un algorithme
de protection Secure JPEG avec une clé secrète. La photo à protéger peut alors être
gardée en toute sécurité sur un service non sécurisé (serveur, nuage, etc.). Aussi, la clé
secrète est partagée secrètement avec d’autres personnes avec l’aide de la PKI et du
CP-ABE. La deuxième architecture s’appelle ProShare S, dans laquelle un fournisseur
de services de partage de photos aide les utilisateurs à prendre des décisions concernant
le partage de photos automatique en fonction de précédentes décisions. Le service de
partage de photos analyse non seulement le contenu de l’image d’un utilisateur, mais
aussi les informations contextuelles sur la capture d’image et le potentiel destinataire.
En utilisant l’apprentissage supervisé, le système prend la décision de partager ou non
une photo particulière d’un utilisateur avec un certain destinataire et, si oui, selon quelle
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mesure de protection.
Finalement, nous investiguons trois applications pertinentes concernant les image cap-
turées ou partagées par des personnes, mais au-delà du cadre de la protection de données.
Dans la première étude, nous nous inspirons du JPEG Transmorphing et proposons un
format de ﬁchier JPEG animé, nommé aJPEG. aJPEG préserve les marqueurs APP des
images animées dans une image JPEG et réduit la taille du ﬁchier en plus d’assurer une
meilleure qualité d’image par rapport au GIF conventionnel. Dans la deuxième étude, nous
essayons de comprendre l’impact des manipulations d’images appliquées lors du partage
de photos en ligne sur les émotions des destinataires. L’étude révèle que les manipulations
d’images inﬂuencent eﬀectivement l’émotion des personnes, mais cet impact dépend aussi
du contenu de l’image. Nous utilisons un réseau de neurones convolutif (CNN), le modèle
GoogLeNet, pour eﬀectuer une détection et une catégorisation automatique d’images
alimentaires. Les résultats obtenus lors de la classiﬁcation des images alimentaires/non-
alimentaires et la catégorisation de l’image alimentaire sont prometteurs et fournissent des
informations intéressantes concernant la conception d’un système d’évaluation alimentaire
automatique basé sur des techniques multimédias, comme l’analyse d’image.
Keywords : conﬁdentialité, sécurité, médias sociaux, partage de photos, JPEG, JPEG
sécurisé, Scrambling, Transmorphing, aJPEG, compatibilité ascendante, PKI, CP-ABE,
apprentissage automatique, contexte, prise de décision, émotion, deep learning
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1 Introduction
Thanks to advancements of smart mobile phones and social media platforms, sharing
photos and experiences has signiﬁcantly bridged our lives, allowing us to stay connected
despite distance and other barriers. The number of images shared from mobile devices
has reached scales which were unimaginable only a decade ago: Every day over two
billion images are posted to online social networks (OSNs) or exchanged through instant
messaging and cloud-based sharing services. This fact has transitioned the challenges we
faced before like improving image quality into challenges such as how to store them, how
to preserve them in long term, how to annotate or tag them properly, how to access them
eﬃciently (search and retrieval), how to utilize them to create added value, and of course
how to share this huge amount of content in the educational, consumer and professional
sectors, not only eﬃciently but also in trustworthy manners, taking into account security
issues, including privacy matters which are involved. Many photo and video sharing social
networks or services have developed various features and advantages to help users share
their photos or videos more easily and conveniently. This has positioned photo or video
sharing in social networks among the most popular and fastest growing applications in
the World Wide Web.
Despite an unquestionable value in terms of new experience such applications oﬀer to
their users, sharing these media in social networks has created a number of new problems.
Most critical issues concern lack of trust and problems regarding privacy of the shared
content. In addition, with the latest progress in image analytics, pattern recognition,
deep learning, in combination with multi-modal data mining of personal information
from mobile and social networks, the world of Orwell’s 1984 [1] seems to become a sober
reality in the near future, if not already now. Such disconcerting situation with privacy
protection does not only result in a growing number of media scandals (leaking of celebrity
and politicians private photos), but also hurts normal people, when their exposed personal
photos or video aﬀect their work, life, and even health. The number of sharing services
has rapidly grown over the past few years making users more concerned about these issues.
Although sharing services have assisted resolving these challenges by allowing users to
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restrict content access and making them available to speciﬁc list of users, it is not in
their best interest if users restrict access to their shared pictures and these challenges
are still prevailing. The stellar success of Snapchat1, an instant photo messaging service,
demonstrates the pent-up demand for privacy. Here a sense of privacy is created through
an ephemeral service model [2] where shared pictures remain visible for a short period of
time after which they “disappear”. Irrespective of a service provider’s sincerity in matters
of privacy, all image sharing platforms exhibit the same basic ﬂaw: Once an image has
left the device it was created on, its owner loses control over who will have access to his
image, when and where.
Researchers have proposed and developed various approaches to enhance privacy in
photo sharing. A substantial eﬀorts have been devoted to design of access control protocols
in more intelligent or adaptive manner. Essentially, most approaches have no diﬀerence
with most conditional access mechanisms applied by popular social networking services.
Another branch of studies have been focused on methods for secure protection of image
content itself, by means of encryption or distortion-based image processing or encoding.
An advantage of secure protection of image content over access control lies in the fact
that the original content is not even available to internal service providers such that
users can leverage less trust on them. However, such approaches usually raise higher
requirements for ﬁle management system and generate distorted visual eﬀect in protected
content, which may compromise the utility, pleasantness and user experience of photo
sharing. Such impact has not yet been well understood.
Given today’s social media challenges, a desired method for protecting photo privacy
needs to provide the following characteristics: (i) security (powered by state-of-the-art
cryptographic tools), (ii) low complexity (fast, easy and intuitive to use), (iii) reversibility
(possibility to undo protection), (iv) compatibility (compatible with standard image
compression and ﬁle format), (v) robustness (possibility to be recovered even after being
manipulated), (vi) variable granularity (ﬂexibility to protect data in diﬀerent regions,
portions or with diﬀerent degrees of strength) and (vii) pleasantness (giving a sense of
friendliness or enjoyment or at least not annoying). However, most existing solutions
cannot fulﬁll all the mentioned properties.
In this thesis, we investigate novel solutions to protect image privacy with a special
emphasis on the scenario of online photo sharing. Our solutions include not only the
algorithms to protect visual information in image but also designs of architectures for
privacy-preserving photo sharing. Beyond privacy, we also explore the potentials and
additional impacts of using daily images in other three relevant applications. Therefore,
the thesis is structured in three parts: the ﬁrst part on image privacy protection algorithms,
the second on photo sharing architectures, and the third on relevant applications beyond.
The rest of the thesis is structured in detail as follows.
1https://www.snapchat.com/
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1.1 Thesis Outline
First in Chapter 2, we review related studies on image privacy protection, privacy-
preserving photo sharing, and contextual information sharing in general. Then, the main
body of the thesis is constructed by the following three major parts.
In Part I, we propose and study two image visual privacy protection algorithms based
on JPEG compression. We ﬁrst provide a brief overview of JPEG compression and a
conceptual framework named Secure JPEG in Chapter 3. Then in Chapter 4, we elaborate
a scrambling-based algorithm for protecting image visual content, by randomly changing
the signs of quantized DCT coeﬃcients of a JPEG image. In Chapter 5, we propose the
second method named JPEG Transmorphing. Designed in a diﬀerent philosophy from
any existing privacy protection algorithm, JPEG Transmorphing allows one to obfuscate
arbitrary image region(s) while secretly preserving the original information corresponding
to that region(s) in application segments of the obfuscated JPEG image. Therefore, JPEG
Transmorphing is not restricted to any type of visual obfuscation. Instead, most regional
image manipulations can be applied to protect visual privacy within the framework of
JPEG Transmorphing. We conducted objective and subjective experiments to evaluate
the performance of both methods in regard to diﬀerent aspects, including the storage
overhead created, reconstruction quality, privacy protection capability and pleasantness.
In Part II, we investigate two diﬀerent photo sharing architectures with privacy protec-
tion in mind. Chapter 7 presents the ﬁrst architecture named ProShare, designed based
on a public key infrastructure (PKI) with a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) integrated. We implemented and demonstrate the ProShare architecture in
both the iOS and Android mobile platforms. Chapter 7 presents the second architecture
named ProShare S, a photo sharing decision making system by analyzing image semantics
and context information based on machine learning. We conducted a user study along
with extensive performance evaluations to validate the ProShare S architecture.
In Part III, we research into three relevant topics in regard to daily images captured
or shared by people, but beyond their privacy implications. Chapter 8 adopts the idea
from JPEG Transmorphing and presents an animated JPEG ﬁle format, called aJPEG,
which could serve as a better alternative to conventional GIF. Chapter 9 attempts to
understand the inﬂuence of popular image manipulations applied in online photo sharing
on evoked emotions of photo observers. By learning from image features such as color
and texture, we build and evaluate a classiﬁer that can accurately predict the emotions of
a manipulated image given as input only the original image and the desired manipulation.
In the last study (Chapter 10), we target on dietary assessment using daily images
captured by people. To this end, we employ a deep convolutional neural network (CNN)
to perform automatic food image detection and categorization, as the initial but key step
to automatic dietary assessment based on multimedia techniques, e.g. image analysis.
Finally, Chapter 11 summarizes the thesis and discusses future work.
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1.2 Summary of Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel encoding/transcoding algorithm for protecting regional visual
privacy in JPEG image, named JPEG Transmorphing. We show the signiﬁcant
advantages of using the proposed algorithm for privacy protection, in terms of storage
overhead, reversibility, privacy protection capability and particularly pleasantness
in both perception and usage perspectives.
• We propose and demonstrate an architecture for privacy-preserving photo sharing,
ProShare, based on the proposed Secure JPEG privacy protection algorithms. The
architecture employs a combination of traditional public key infrastructure (PKI)
and cipher-policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) to enable conditional access
to original images in a secure and eﬃcient way. Particularly, using the ProShare
architecture, protected images can be safely stored on any “untrusted” server.
• We propose and study another conceptual architecture (ProShare S) for privacy-
preserving photo sharing based on analyzing image semantics and access context
using machine learning. This architecture (semi-)automatically makes photo sharing
decisions based on not only the content of image but also the contextual information
about the requester and image capture. This is the ﬁrst attempt to understand
photo sharing privacy preferences in context-dependent way. We conducted a user
study and contribute a personalized dataset with user-annotated image semantic
features and contextual sharing decisions.
• Inspired by our JPEG Transmorphing algorithm, we propose aJPEG, a new anima-
tion image format within the framework of JPEG compression. aJPEG encodes
a default frame of an animation sequence, while compressing and preserving the
other frames in application segments of the default frame JPEG image. This format
proved to oﬀer smaller ﬁle size and higher image quality compared to conventional
GIF, and therefore could serve as a better alternative to GIF.
• We investigate the inﬂuence of popular image manipulations applied in photo
sharing on evoked emotions as perceived by people. This study reveals that image
content and applied manipulation both aﬀect the evoked emotion. In addition, we
create and study a regressor that can accurately predict the expected emotions of
a prospective manipulated image given as input only the original image and the
desired manipulation to apply.
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Early approaches to image or video privacy protection mainly aim to protect personal
privacy in video surveillance or television. Typically, the goal is to distort video or image,
remove or hide visual information, which can be used for people and location identiﬁcation
or any sensitive information disclosure (see Figure 2.1 for examples). Recent popularization
of online social media (e.g. photo sharing) has raised diﬀerent requirements for privacy
protection due to its diﬀerent nature compared to video surveillance. Researchers in
ﬁelds of image processing, multimedia, security and cryptography have proposed diﬀerent
solutions to enable privacy for diﬀerent use cases, including video surveillance and social
media. These solutions are diﬀerent in terms of working principle, complexity, eﬀectiveness
of the privacy protection, reversibility, usage ﬂexibility and pleasantness. We review some
of them in this chapter.
2.1 Privacy Protection in Image Visual Content
Since visible identiﬁable face is a major threat to privacy, many researchers have focused
on face de-identiﬁcation techniques. For instance, in [3] people’s identities are protected
by obscuring their face with a colored ellipse. The authors argue that such protection
allows observation of the people actions in full details while hiding their identity. Other
naïve approaches also include blurring and face masking for hiding the faces of the people
in the video. Arguing that de-identiﬁcation of faces is not enough for an adequate privacy
protection, the technique for obscuring of the whole body silhouette is proposed in [4],
which is based on the edge and motion model. Going further, in [5] and [6] it is proposed to
completely remove the silhouette of the moving person from the scene to hide its identity.
Both approaches rely on RFID tags for pinpointing of the people locations, with [6]
focusing on an eﬃcient inpainting algorithm and encrypting the removed silhouette inside
the original video bitstream. However, all these ﬁlters irreversibly distort video data at
the pixel level, making it impossible to use video in situations, when, for example, due to
a court order, an identity of the hidden person needs to be revealed.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d) (e)
Figure 2.1 – Examples of diﬀerent visual privacy protection approaches: image pixelation
in (a) video surveillance and (d)(e) television or newspaper; (b) image blur in Google Maps
street view; (c) image scrambling in video surveillance.
Aiming to avoid constraints of the distortion-based methods, more advanced scrambling-
based privacy ﬁlters are proposed in [7, 8] and [8]. These techniques are based on
randomized (seeded with a secret key) modiﬁcations of the compressed video stream
encoded as a series of JPEG and JPEG 2000 images. The main advantage of scrambling-
based privacy protection techniques is that they are reversible. By knowing a secret
key, which could be stored and transmitted securely, one can decode the video back to
undistorted state. Another advantage is that the appearance of the scrambled regions are
not completely distorted, making the viewing experience less distractive (compared to a
black box covering an area of the picture for instance).
Another way to protect a sensitive region securely is to encrypt it. With a system
named PICO proposed in [9], data corresponding to face regions is encrypted in order to
conceal identity. The process is reversible for authorized users in possession of a secret
encryption key. Similarly, a permutation-based encryption technique in the pixel domain
is introduced in [10]. TrustCam is presented in [11], which is a video camera with onboard
hardware security solution Trusted Platform Module (TMP), which implements trusted
computing. This built-in chip allows establishing secure connection between cameras and
observing stations, as well as applying SHA-1 based encryption to the sensitive regions,
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such as faces and license plates. The idea of encrypting or scrambling face regions was
developed further by [12], where the authors argue that the conventional encryption
methods are not suitable due to the real-time constraints, limited computational and
network resources. Instead, they suggest adding a special parameter inside an encoder
compression block, which would enable encryption and secret key generation.
A substantial number of studies have focused on encryption-based protection of JPEG
images, as JPEG is the most widely used image format. As the core of JPEG compression
is Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), most methods encrypt the transformed image
data, namely the DCT coeﬃcients of a JPEG image, in diﬀerent ways. Niu et al. [13]
propose a JPEG Encryption scheme without signiﬁcantly increasing the image ﬁle size.
In the proposed method, the DC diﬀerential residues are encrypted through XOR with
a secure key of the same length as the data stream. DCT blocks are scrambled using a
key-controlled chaotic map and the information of pre-steps is encrypted by cipher and
embedded in the second category of AC coeﬃcients. Unterweger [14] proposes a method
to encrypt baseline JPEG bit streams by swapping selective Huﬀman code words and
scrambling DCT coeﬃcient values based on AES encryption. Wright et al. [15] propose a
special image encryption scheme that permutes pixels in each image block individually.
The proposed technique allows eﬃcient reconstruction of an accurate low-resolution
thumbnail from the ciphertext image, but aims to prevent the extraction of any more
detailed information. This will allow eﬃcient storage and retrieval of image data in the
cloud but protect its contents from outside hackers or snooping cloud administrators.
Recently, [16, 17, 18, 19] propose diﬀerent encryption protocols to encrypt the quantized
DCT coeﬃcients of JPEG image and all these methods proved to well support common
image manipulations performed by social networking sites such that decrypted images
are still highly similar to the original image.
2.2 Privacy Protection in Online Photo Sharing
Most social networks provide users with some privacy access control mechanisms, which
are essentially a set of ad hoc rules that restrict the access to users content, thus creating
an illusion of privacy protection. The stellar success of Snapchat1, an instant photo
messaging service, demonstrates the pent-up demand for privacy. Here a sense of privacy
is created through an ephemeral service model where shared pictures or video remain
visible for a short period of time after which they “disappear”. The research studies on
solutions to privacy protection in social media, especially for online photo sharing, are
mainly focused on two directions: (i) design of access control protocols such that the
shared photos can only be accessed by a selected group of users; (ii) algorithms for secure
protection of image content (encryption, scrambling, permutation, etc.) while photo
sharing. We outline selected studies on the two directions respectively in the following.
1https://www.snapchat.com/
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2.2.1 Access Control
Squicciarini et al. [20, 21] propose an Adaptive Privacy Policy Prediction (A3P) system
to help users compose privacy settings for their images. In their method, image content
and metadata are examined by indicators of users privacy preferences. A two-level image
classiﬁcation framework is created to obtain image categories which can be associated with
similar policies. Then a policy prediction algorithm that can automatically generate a
policy for each newly uploaded image is designed. Most importantly, the generated policy
can follow the trend of the user’s privacy concerns evolved with time. Cutillo et al. [22]
propose a preliminary usage control mechanism targeting decentralized peer-to-peer
online social networks where control is enforced thanks to the collaboration of a suﬃcient
number of legitimate peers. In the proposed solution, all faces in image are automatically
obfuscated when being upload to the system and the enforcement of the obfuscation
operation is guaranteed by the underlying privacy-preserving multi-hop routing protocol.
The disclosure of each face depends on the rules set by the face owner when she is informed
and malicious users can never publish this content in clear even if they have access to it.
In [23], the feasibility of using image tags to create eﬀective access-control rules is studied.
The study conducted a subjective user study and results reveal that organizational tags
can be repurposed to create reasonable access-control policies, and that policies based on
these tags are yet more accurate when subjects actively create tags for access control.
The paper suggests that it would be possible to create a usable access-control system
with tag-based rules and minimal tagging overhead. It may be possible to additionally
aid users with appropriate support for automated rule generation, exception handling,
intuitive policy management, and automated tag generation and correction. Recently,
Lee et al. [24] propose a ﬁne-grained multiparty access control model, which aims to
change the granularity of access control from photo level to face level. The proposed
model evaluates the policy of each user recognized in given photo, based on relationship
intimacy, photo context about spatial-temporal information and co-occurrence users,
and ﬁnally generates policy for each face. Similarly, Ilia et al. [25] propose a system
that allows users to eﬀectively prevent unwanted individuals from recognizing faces in
a photo. The core concept behind the proposed approach is to change the granularity
of access control from the level of entire image to that of a user’s personally identiﬁable
information (PII), i.e. the face in the case of the study. When another user attempts to
access a photo, the system determines which faces in image the user does not have the
permission to view, and then presents the photo with the restricted faces blurred out.
In addition to the above, a great number of studies have been carried out for enhancing
privacy in social networks, e.g. Persona [26], EASiER [27], NOYB [28], FlyByNight [29]
and Lockr [30], most of which rely on encryption protocols to enable access control in
social networks or secure sharing of general data (status, message, proﬁle, image, etc).
Though not particularly focused on privacy of photo content sharing, these studies also
closely relate to our design of photo sharing architecture.
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Figure 2.2 – P3 privacy protection algorithm (a) and photo sharing architecture (b).
2.2.2 Secure Protection of Image Content
Another groups of methods focus on secure protection of image content itself to able
privacy from a content level in photo sharing. Poller et al. [31] present two approaches to
robust image obfuscation based on permutation of image regions and channel intensity
modulation both in image spatial domain. The proposed approaches take into account
the fact that images uploaded to Web 2.0 applications pass several transformations, such
as scaling and JPEG compression, and therefore enable the reconstruction of unprotected
images in high quality. Instead of providing the maximum of security, the proposed
methods focus more on usability and try to obtain an acceptable trade-oﬀ between security
and resulting image quality. Ra et al. [32] propose a privacy-preserving photo encoding
algorithm named P3 that extracts and encrypts a small, but signiﬁcant, component of
the photo, while preserving the remainder in a public and standards-compatible part.
These two components can be separately stored. The P3 technology signiﬁcantly reduces
the accuracy of automated detection and recognition on the public part, while preserving
the ability of the provider to perform server-side transformations to conserve download
bandwidth usage. The prototype privacy-preserving photo sharing system powered by P3
works with Facebook, and can be extended to other services as well. However, the major
drawback of P3 is that the protected public portion can still reveal certain degree of visual
information, which might compromise privacy. The encoding protection process of P3
and a secure photo sharing architecture based on P3 is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Tierney
et al. [33] propose a system named Cryptagram, which enables users to encrypt photos
with traditional block ciphers and embed the encrypted bitstream into a JPEG “cover
image”. However, the proposed approach creates a signiﬁcant expansion to image ﬁle size
due to the use of a cover image. This will impact the system usability. Zhang et al. [34]
introduce a framework called POP, which enables privacy-seeking mobile device users to
outsource burdensome photo sharing and searching safely to untrusted servers. With a
carefully designed architecture and novel non-interactive privacy-preserving protocols for
image similarity computation, unauthorized parties, including the server, learn nothing
about photos or search queries. For eﬃciency and good user experience, the proposed
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framework allows users to deﬁne personalized private content by a simple check-box
conﬁguration and then enjoy the sharing and searching services as usual. All privacy
protection modules are transparent to users. However, this study focuses more on the
problem of image searching or retrieval instead of photo sharing. In addition, [18, 19]
and [35] all demonstrate the feasibility of using their proposed encryption methods to
protect privacy in JPEG image on popular social networks, e.g. Facebook. The results
show that the encrypted image can still be decrypted even if it has been manipulated on
social network using common image processing like image scaling and JPEG compression.
2.3 Privacy Analysis in Image
Research eﬀorts have also been devoted in identifying the potential privacy thread
of sharing image content, understanding users privacy concern, automatic recognition
of privacy-sensitive image regions, or even trying to break existing privacy protection
solutions. All these studies mainly aim at providing insights, implications or suggestions
to build stronger, more secure and usable privacy protection solutions. We call all these,
collectively, privacy analysis. Early in 2007, Ahern et al. [36] conducted a qualitative
and quantitative analysis of privacy in a real-world photo-sharing mobile and online
application, to understand users privacy patterns and considerations in online and mobile
photo sharing. In their study, context-aware cameraphones were used as capture devices
which allow us to conduct a subjective user study. This is one of the ﬁrst study that tries
to understand people privacy concern and behavior in online photo sharing. Besmer et
al. [37] examine privacy concerns and mechanisms surrounding tagged images in social
networking environment that provides photo tagging feature. The authors explore the
needs and concerns of users and propose a set of design considerations for tagged photo
privacy. Friedland et al. [38] make a case for the emerging privacy issue caused by
wide-spread adaptation of location-enabled photo and video capturing devices, allowing
potential attackers to easily “case out joints” in cyberspace. The aim of this study is
to raise awareness of a rapidly emerging privacy threat cause by geo-tagging in images
and calls for research eﬀort on designing systems to be location-aware while at the same
time oﬀering maximum protection against privacy infringement. Pesce et al. [39] expose
some of the privacy issues with photo albums, especially the use of photo tags to predict
information about Facebook users. The aim of the study is to show that the use of photo
tagging can enhance accuracy of attackers aiming to predict personal user attributes and
to raise awareness of the kinds of information transmitted by photo tags in social networks,
thus avoiding collateral damages. Zerr et al. [40] propose techniques to automatically
detect private images using machine learning, and to enable privacy-oriented image search.
In this study, privacy classiﬁers are trained on a large set of manually annotated Flickr
photos, combining textual metadata of images with a variety of visual features. The
classiﬁcation models can be used for searching for private photos, and for diversifying
query results to provide users with a better coverage of private and public content.
10
2.4. Context-Dependent Information Sharing
Recently years, researchers started to use the latest deep convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) to identify privacy sensitive objects or regions in images. This types of studies
include [41, 42, 43], most of which utilize diﬀerent CNN models for privacy-sensitive region
detection and recognition. In addition, both [44, 45] employ deep learning approaches to
defeat common image obfuscations such as image blurring, masking and P3 [32]. The two
studies reveal that deep learning can be used to accurately recognize some faces, objects
and handwritten digits even in visually obfuscated images. The results reveal privacy
implications of photo sharing even with certain visual protection applied in image, and
provide signiﬁcant insights in designing stronger privacy protection methodologies that
can both enable privacy and preserve the maximum usability.
2.4 Context-Dependent Information Sharing
When sharing photo information, users may take into account several factors to balance
privacy, utility and convenience. The factors include the information about the image
content and diﬀerent contextual information such as location, time, activities and presence
of other people. In this section, we review the studies on contextual and context-dependent
information sharing.
A substantial research eﬀorts have been made to understand users behavior and privacy
attitudes towards online information sharing, and the factors that inﬂuence their decisions.
Smith et al. [46] provide an early investigation on solutions to enable people to share
contextual information (e.g. location) in mobile social networks. The authors developed
a system called Reno that can automate the decision making process of location sharing,
based on a set of pre-deﬁned regions. However, they show that static rules for location
sharing in pre-deﬁned regions are not accurate enough in expressing the users actual
behavior when other contextual information changes, such as the time. Toch et al. [47]
study the inﬂuence of the type of locations visited by users on their willingness to share
the locations with others. Simple statistical models reveal that the semantic category
of the location being shared (such as a shopping center or a hospital) and the social
group of the person asking for the location are signiﬁcant factors in location information
decision making. These results also agree with early studies in [48, 49, 50] in providing
the most inﬂuential contextual features for location-sharing. We use these results in
our system design for context-dependent photo sharing (Chapter 7). Benisch et al. [51]
compare simple access control policies with more sophisticated ones (based on time, day
and location) and ﬁnd out that the accuracy of the sharing policies increases as their
complexity (or ﬂexibility) increases. Besides, they also observe that the accuracy beneﬁts
are the most notable for the information that is highly sensitive. This suggests that the
cost of incorrect information sharing (to unauthorized parties) is an important factor in
designing and optimizing automated information-sharing mechanisms. This concept is
also used in our study in a way of designing a cost-sensitive decision making mechanism
in online photo sharing (Chapter 7). Wiese et al. [52] investigate the impact of various
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factors on users willingness to share information. The results of the study reveal that
social closeness and the frequency of communication perform as better predictors of
sharing than physical proximity and social groups of the people asking for the information.
The authors suggest that automatic methods for inferring social closeness could be suited
for automatic information-sharing decisions more than physical co-location.
In addition to the studies on photo sharing policy inference [20, 21, 23, 25, 24] introduced
in Section 2.2.1, decision making for general information sharing has also been widely
studied and most of them are based machine learning approaches. Sadeh et al. [50]
compare the accuracy of user-deﬁned sharing policies with an automated mechanism
and a machine learning based approach (random forest). Results reveal that automated
approaches have a better accuracy than those user-deﬁned policies, and provide insights of
applying machine learning in information sharing decision making systems. Fang et al. [53]
propose an approach to infer access control policies for personal information on online
social networks, based on supervised-learning. The learning procedure is done by asking
each user a limited number of questions about her/his sharing behavior with speciﬁc
friends. Bigwood et al. [54] evaluate the performances of diﬀerent machine-learning
algorithms for predicting information sharing decisions in terms of correct decisions and
information over-sharing. In their study, cost-sensitive classiﬁers are also used to reduce
over-sharing cases. However, they only focuses on a binary (yes/no) location-sharing
problem. Xie et al. [55] study the inﬂuence of diﬀerent contextual (e.g. semantics of the
location) and personal features on users location-sharing behaviors. A recommendation
system for privacy preferences is proposed in this study and the system determines the
recipients to whom a given piece of information can be shared. Recently, Harkous et
al. [56] present a conceptual framework named C3P for automatic estimation of privacy
risk of data based on the sharing context. The framework lets users crowdsource their
sharing contexts with the server and determine the risk of sharing particular data item(s)
privately, thus helping users make decisions in information disclosure. As a study most
related to ours, Bilogrevic et al. [57] present SPISM, an information-sharing system that
predicts (semi-)automatically sharing decision, based on personal and contextual features.
However, they focus on only general information sharing such as location, nearby people
and availability. Despite the substantial works on contextual information sharing, very
few have considered contextual information for privacy protection in online photo sharing.
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3 Overview of JPEG and Secure
JPEG
The success of digital imaging applications is in part due to the development of eﬀective
image compression standards such as JPEG. JPEG is one of the early standards and
is de facto the most popular compression standard to store or transmit images thanks
to its eﬃciency and low complexity. It has remained the most popular image format
used in a large variety of consumer imaging applications, e.g. digital camera, smartphone
and social media. In this thesis, the proposed methods for protecting image privacy
are designed on the basis of JPEG compression and protected images are required to
be backward compatible with JPEG. Such an idea was initially proposed in the form
of Secure JPEG [58], an open and ﬂexible framework to secure JPEG images. This
chapter provides an overview of JPEG compression, its ﬁle format and the Secure JPEG
framework, which are closely related to the design of our algorithms and architectures in
the thesis.
3.1 Overview of JPEG
JPEG is the most commonly used method of lossy compression for digital images, especially
for those images produced by digital photography. JPEG compression is used in a number
of image ﬁle formats, e.g. JPEG/Exif (the most popular image format used by digital
cameras or other photographic capture devices) and JPEG/JFIF (the most common
format for storing and transmitting photographic images on the World Wide Web1). We
usually do not distinguish these format variations and collectively call them JPEG. The
term “JPEG” is originally an acronym for the Joint Photographic Experts Group, a joint
committee between ISO/IEC JTC12 and ITU-T3, which created the JPEG compression
standard. This section provides a brief overview of JPEG compression, including its
encoding, decoding, transcoding processes and the ﬁle formats and syntax.
1http://httparchive.org/interesting.php#imageformats
2https://www.iso.org/isoiec-jtc-1.html
3http://www.itu.int/
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Figure 3.1 – Workﬂows of JPEG encoding, decoding and transcoding.
3.1.1 JPEG Compression
First of all, Figure 3.1 illustrates the workﬂows of JPEG encoding, decoding and transcod-
ing respectively. Then the three processes are described in detail as follows.
JPEG Encoding
JPEG encoding, or compression process, aims at compressing the raw image data into
a compressed form to reduce irrelevance and redundancy of the image data. An entire
JPEG compression procedure usually consists of the following steps:
Color Space Transformation The ﬁrst step is to convert the raw image data from the
RGB color space to the YCbCr color space, where Y channel represents the luminance
(brightness) component and Cb/Cr the chroma components representing color. YCbCr
can be computed directly from 8-bit RGB according to the following formula:⎡
⎢⎣ YCb
Cr
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣ 0.299 0.587 0.114−0.1687 −0.3313 0.5
0.5 −0.4187 −0.0813
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣RG
B
⎤
⎥⎦+
⎡
⎢⎣ 0128
128
⎤
⎥⎦ . (3.1)
Chroma Subsampling Since human can see more ﬁne details in the brightness of an
image (the Y channel), than in the hue and color saturation (the Cb and Cr components),
the two color channels are usually subsampled at a lower resolution than the Y channel
to reduce the amount of information to be encoded without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the
perceptual quality. Typical subsampling options include 4:4:4 (no subsampling), 4:2:2
(downsampling by a factor of 2 in the horizontal direction), and the most commonly used
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4:2:0 (downsampling by a factor of 2 in both horizontal and vertical directions).
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) After subsampling, each channel of the image
is divided into non-overlapped blocks, each of 8 × 8 pixels. For an 8-bit image, every
pixel value in each channel falls in the range of [0, 255]. The midpoint of the range (i.e.
128 in this case) is subtracted from each pixel to produce a data range of [−128, 127]
centered on zero. Then the 2D Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is applied to each
block, resulting in 8× 8 DCT coeﬃcients. The ﬁrst value of the 64 DCT coeﬃcients is
called the DC coeﬃcient, which represents the mean of all the pixels within a block. The
remaining 63 coeﬃcients are called AC coeﬃcients, representing intensity changes across
the block. The DCT coeﬃcients represent the information about the image block in the
frequency-domain. Given an image x in the spatial domain and its pixel at coordinates
(n1, n2) denoted as xn1,n2 , a 2D DCT is given by the formula:
Xk1,k2 =
1
4
Ck1Ck2
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
xn1,n2 cos
[
π
N1
(n1 +
1
2
)k1
]
cos
[
π
N2
(n2 +
1
2
)k2
]
, (3.2)
where k1 = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N1 − 1 and k2 = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N2 − 1 and N1 and N2 are the
dimensions of a DCT block, i.e. N1 = N2 = 8. In Equation 3.2, Ck1 and Ck2 are two
normalization constants deﬁned as
Cki =
⎧⎨
⎩
1√
2
, if ki = 0
1, otherwise
, i = 1 or 2. (3.3)
Quantization Then, all the ﬂoat-valued DCT coeﬃcients are quantized to integers.
This is the only step that causes image information losses in the entire compression
procedure. Due to the fact that human eyes are more sensitive to small variances in the
low-frequency than high-frequency image regions and that image information is usually
concentrated in the low- to medium-frequency components, larger quantization steps
are applied in the high-frequency DCT coeﬃcients while smaller quantization steps in
lower-frequency coeﬃcients. To this end, a quantization table is employed to represent
diﬀerent quantization steps for diﬀerent coeﬃcients. The standard quantization tables
deﬁned by Independent JPEG Group (IJG)4 for luminance (Y) and chrominance channels
4http://www.ijg.org/
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(Cb and Cr) are given in the following respectively:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61
12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55
14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56
14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62
18 33 37 56 68 109 103 77
24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92
49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101
72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
&
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
17 18 24 47 99 99 99 99
18 21 26 66 99 99 99 99
24 26 56 99 99 99 99 99
47 66 99 99 99 99 99 99
99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (3.4)
A quality factor (Q) in range of 1 to 100 is used to scale the values in the above standard
quantization tables to generate scaled quantization tables, achieving diﬀerent compression
ratios. Q = 100 corresponds to the highest quality while 1 to the lowest. Note the
standard quantization table(s) as Tb, then the scaled quantization table(s) Ts are given
by the following formula:
Ts =
s×Tb + 50
100
, (3.5)
where s is a scale factor deﬁne as
s =
{
5000/Q, if Q < 50
200− 2×Q, otherwise
. (3.6)
Entropy Coding As the last step, quantized DCT coeﬃcients are encoded with a run-
length encoding (RLE) algorithm, which groups similar frequencies together, inserting
length coding zeros, and then using Huﬀman coding on what is left. The 64 DCT
coeﬃcients are scanned in a zigzag order while coding, to group lower-frequency coeﬃcients
in top of data vector with higher-frequency coeﬃcients at the bottom. The diﬀerence
between two consecutive DC coeﬃcients is encoded rather than the actual values. While
the 63 quantized AC coeﬃcients do not apply such a prediction-based scheme. This
is called baseline sequential encoding, which encodes coeﬃcients of a single block at
a time in a zigzag manner. JPEG also supports progressive encoding, which encodes
similar-positioned batch of coeﬃcients of all blocks in one go (called a scan), followed
by the next batch of coeﬃcients of all blocks, and so on. The advantage of progressive
JPEG is that one can see an approximation to the whole image very quickly while an
image is being viewed on-the-ﬂy as it is transmitted. The quality is gradually improved
as one waits longer. However, each scan of a progressive decoding takes about the same
amount of computation to display as a whole baseline JPEG ﬁle would. So the progressive
encoding is not often used. In addition to Huﬀman coding, the JPEG standard also
supports arithmetic coding, which typically makes ﬁles about 5 ∼ 7% smaller but has
rarely been used due to its lower eﬃciency and royalty issues.
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JPEG Decoding
The decoding process of a JPEG image follows the inverse of the above encoding operations.
The quantizated DCT coeﬃcients are ﬁrst decoded with the entropy decoder. The DCT
coeﬃcients are then dequantized by multiplying the original values with the entries in
quantization tables extracted from the JPEG ﬁle header. The decoder then applies on
each DCT block the Inverse Discrete Cosine Transform (IDCT) to produce the subsampled
YCbCr image channels. The IDCT is deﬁned as
xn1,n2 =
1
4
N1−1∑
k1=0
N2−1∑
k2=0
Ck1Ck2Xk1,k2 cos
[
π
N1
(n1 +
1
2
)k1
]
cos
[
π
N2
(n2 +
1
2
)k2
]
. (3.7)
Then the channels are upsampled to original image size, shifted by 128 and converted
back to RGB color space according to the following formula:⎡
⎢⎣RG
B
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣1 0 1.4021 −0.34414 −0.71414
1 1.772 0
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣ YCb− 128
Cr− 128
⎤
⎥⎦ . (3.8)
JPEG Transcoding
Certain image manipulations can be applied on a JPEG image without information loss,
by directly operating the JPEG Minimum Coded Unit (MCU) blocks while keeping the
information in each MCU intact. An MCU block contains several DCT blocks of the
YCbCr channels, usually with 16 pixels in both directions, for a 4:2:0 chroma subsampling.
These operations include image rotation (in 90-degree increments), ﬂipping (in horizontal,
vertical or diagonal axes) and cropping (with MCU block as the minimal unit). The
concept of JPEG lossless transcoding is an important basis for the design of our secure
protection algorithms, which also directly manipulate as unit of MCU or DCT blocks
of certain regions in an existing JPEG image, without altering other DCT coeﬃcients
outside those regions.
3.1.2 JPEG File Format and Syntax
Image ﬁles that employ JPEG compression are collectively called JPEG ﬁles, and are
stored in variants of the JPEG interchange format deﬁned in the JPEG standard (ITU-T
Recommendation T.81 | ISO/IEC10918-1 [59]). A JPEG image ﬁle consists of a sequence
of segments, each beginning with a marker. Each marker starts with a 0xFF byte followed
by a byte indicating the type of the marker. Some markers consist of just those two bytes;
others are followed by two bytes indicating the length of marker-speciﬁc payload data
that follows. Consecutive 0xFF bytes can be also used as ﬁll bytes for padding purposes.
Several common JPEG markers are listed in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 – Common JPEG markers.
Marker Bytes Description
SOI 0xFF0xD8 Start Of Image
DHT 0xFF0xC4 Deﬁnes one or more Huﬀman Table(s)
DQT 0xFF0xDB Deﬁnes one or more Quantization Table(s)
APPn 0xFF0xEn Application-speciﬁc markers, e.g. APP0 for JFIF, APP1 for Exif
SOF0 0xFF0xC0
Start Of Frame (baseline DCT): Indicates that this is a baseline
DCT-based JPEG, and speciﬁes the width, height, number of
components, and component subsampling.
SOF2 0xFF0xC2
Start Of Frame (progressive DCT): Indicates that this is a pro-
gressive DCT-based JPEG, and speciﬁes the width, height, num-
ber of components, and component subsampling
SOS 0xFF0xDA
Start Of Scan: Begins a top-to-bottom scan of the image. In
baseline DCT JPEG images, there is generally a single scan.
Progressive DCT JPEG images usually contain multiple scans.
This marker speciﬁes which slice of data it will contain, and is
immediately followed by entropy-coded data.
EOI 0xFF0xD9 End Of Image
JPEG Application Segments JPEG provides a set of application-speciﬁc markers, i.e.
Application Segments or APPn markers, to specify diﬀerent variants or extensions of the
standard JPEG interchange format. Two typical examples are the JPEG File Interchange
Format (JFIF, speciﬁed by APP0) [60] and Exchangeable image ﬁle format (Exif, speciﬁed
by APP1) [61]. JFIF is a minimal ﬁle format which enables JPEG bitstreams [59] to be
exchanged between a wide variety of platforms and applications. It solves some limitations
of basic interchange format in regard to simple JPEG encoded ﬁle interchange. Most
image capturing devices (e.g. digital camera, mobile phone) actually create image ﬁles in
the Exif format, which has been standardized for interchanging metadata of image and
audio ﬁles recorded by digital cameras. Those metadata includes capture time, camera
model, aperture and shutter setting, number of pixels and even a thumbnail image. Both
formats use the actual standard JPEG syntax and are fully compatible with JPEG. They
employ diﬀerent APPn markers of JPEG: JFIF uses APP0 and Exif uses APP1. Strictly
speaking, the JFIF and Exif standards are not compatible between each other because
each speciﬁes that its marker segment appears ﬁrst. However, in practice, most JPEG ﬁles
contain a JFIF marker (APP0) followed by an Exif header (APP1). This allows legacy
JPEG decoders to correctly handle the older JFIF format, while newer decoders can also
read the following Exif segment, being less strict about requiring it to appear ﬁrst. Our
design of privacy protection algorithms also utilizes this property of JPEG such that we
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could produce a special protected secure JPEG ﬁle that is still backward compatible with
standard JPEG. In addition to JFIF and Exif, the remaining APPn markers are used for
other applications, e.g. APP2 for tagging International Color Consortium (ICC) proﬁle
and APP14 as Adobe tag to store image encoding information for DCT ﬁlters. In the
implementation of our Secure JPEG protection algorithms, we use the APP11 markers to
signal the information about the security metadata of protected images.
3.2 Secure JPEG Framework
Before introducing our algorithms for protecting image privacy, in this section, we recap
the Secure JPEG, an open and ﬂexible framework to secure JPEG images, initially
proposed by Dufaux and Ebrahimi in [58].
Secure JPEG framework aims to enable various security options for JPEG images
oﬀering similar features as those in JPSEC [62, 63], the framework for security solutions
for JPEG2000 images. In other words, Secure JPEG acts as an extension of JPEG and
accomplishes for JPEG what JPSEC is enabling for JPEG 2000. The goal of Secure
JPEG is to allow the eﬃcient integration and use of security tools enabling a variety
of security services in JPEG image. The framework is designed in such a way that it
does not interfere with baseline JPEG decoders unaware of such an extension, namely,
backward-compatible with JPEG. To signal the information about the security tools used
to protect the image, a new marker segment is introduced in Secure JPEG containing
information similar to the JPSEC SEC marker segment. This marker segment is present
in the Frame Header of the JPEG code-stream. The syntax used can be either similar to
that deﬁned by JPSEC, or deﬁned in special structures suitable for speciﬁc applications.
Similar to JPSEC, Secure JPEG enables the use of various tools supporting a number of
security services for JPEG image, including but not limited to:
• Conﬁdentiality: Transformation of image data (and/or the associated metadata)
into an encrypted/ciphered form such that original information is concealed;
• Integrity Veriﬁcation: Detection of manipulations applied to image data (and/or
the associated metadata) to verify its integrity;
• Source Authentication: Veriﬁcation of the identity of a user or party that
generated the image content;
• Conditional Access: Mechanism to grant or restrict access to image data, includ-
ing the entire image, parts of image data, or just a low resolution image without
being able to visualize a higher resolution;
• Registered Content Identiﬁcation: Registration of a JPEG image with a
Registration Authority.
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4 Secure JPEG Scrambling
Three use cases of the Secure JPEG framework addressing integrity veriﬁcation, encryption
and scrambling are brieﬂy described in our previous study [58]. Particularly, the scrambling
method operates by randomly changing the signs of quantized DCT coeﬃcients of a JPEG
image. Similar scrambling scheme is also designed in [64] as a tool for protecting privacy
in video surveillance systems. In this chapter, we elaborate the scrambling algorithm
for securing JPEG image, and evaluate its performance in regard to diﬀerent aspects of
usage in the scenario of social networks and photo sharing. Both objective and subjective
experiments were conducted, in comparison with another well-known JPEG-based privacy
protection scheme, P3 [32].
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 describes in detail the
Secure JPEG Scrambling algorithm. Section 4.2 presents the experiments and evaluation
results. Finally Section 4.3 summarizes this chapter.
4.1 JPEG Scrambling: The Algorithm
The operating principle of JPEG Scrambling is to randomly change the signs of quantized
DCT coeﬃcients based on a secret key. The scrambled image is still of the same structure
as standard JPEG and is therefore backward compatible with JPEG. With a special
decoder or transcoder that supports the proposed scrambling scheme and a correct secret
key, the scrambled image can be descrambled to its original form. Such a scrambling
scheme can be integrated in either a JPEG encoding/decoding procedure or JPEG
transcoding. Figure 4.1 illustrates the two typical types of scrambling protection and
recovery processes.
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(a) Scrambling in JPEG encoding and descrambling in decoding.
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(b) Scrambling and descrambling in JPEG transcoding.
Figure 4.1 – Workﬂow of JPEG Scrambling protection and recovery in (a) JPEG encod-
ing/decoding or (b) JPEG Transcoding.
4.1.1 The Scrambling Protection
The scrambling protection process is carried out throughout either an entire image or
arbitrary image regions with MCU blocks as the minimum units. Therefore, our algorithm
is also called selective scrambling. To deﬁne the image regions to protect, we introduce
the Mask Matrix, noted as M, which speciﬁes the shape, size and locations of regions
of interest (ROIs) to be scrambled. The mask matrix is a binary-valued 2D matrix,
each element of which points to each MCU block of the entire image. In a mask matrix,
elements 1 indicate MCU blocks to be changed and 0 for unchanged blocks. An MCU
block in JPEG is usually of 16×16 pixels for 4:2:0 chroma subsampling and therefore our
mask matrix is of size W/16 × H/16 pixels, where W and H indicate the width and
height of the image and · indicates the ceiling function.
We use a strength factor l to specify the scope of DCT coeﬃcients to scramble, such that
diﬀerent levels of visual obfuscation can be achieved. We deﬁne four levels of scrambling
strengths (l ∈ {L, M, H, UH}) described as follows:
• Low level (L): Scramble only the AC coeﬃcients of all three YCbCr components.
• Medium level (M): Scramble both the DC and AC coeﬃcients of only the Y
component.
• High level (H): Scramble both the DC and AC coeﬃcients of all YCbCr compo-
nents.
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(a) Original (b) Low (c) Medium (d) High (e) Ultra-high
Figure 4.2 – Example image scrambled in diﬀerent strength levels.
• Ultra-High level (UH): Scramble both the DC and AC coeﬃcients of all YCbCr
components followed by applying a XOR cipher on the DC coeﬃcients of all three
components.
Figure 4.2 shows an example image scrambled in diﬀerent strength levels. According to
the mask matrix M and above deﬁnitions of scrambling strength levels, a function F() is
applied on the original JPEG image IO to generate a vector of DCT coeﬃcients (noted
as COEF) that need to be actually scrambled:
COEF = F(IO,M, l). (4.1)
Based on a Secret Key, we generate a binary key stream KA, of the same length as
COEF. Then DCT coeﬃcients in COEF are scrambled according to the key stream by
the following formula:
COEF∗ = COEF (KA× 2− 1), (4.2)
where  denotes elementwise multiplication and COEF∗ denotes the vector of scrambled
DCT coeﬃcients. If l = UH (Ultra-high level speciﬁed), the DC coeﬃcients in COEF∗
are further encrypted with a new key stream KA′ by a bitwise XOR operation:
COEF∗DC = COEF
∗
DC ⊕KA′, (4.3)
where COEF∗DC is a subset of COEF
∗ containing only DC coeﬃcients and ⊕ denotes
the bitwise XOR operator. Afterwards, the modiﬁed DCT coeﬃcients within the ROIs
along with the original coeﬃcients out of the ROIs are entropy coded.
As the last but indispensable step, a set of metadata about the scrambled image is
inserted in a JPEG application marker (APP11 in our current design) in the scrambled
JPEG ﬁle. The metadata includes the strength factor l and the mask matrix data. Since
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Figure 4.3 – The syntax of scrambled JPEG image ﬁle.
the mask matrix contains only 0 and 1, we simply encode it as a binary sequence, with
each bit representing an element of the matrix. In practice, the mask matrix can be
further compressed as it is sparse. Figure 4.3 shows the syntax of a scrambled JPEG ﬁle,
which follows the same structure of standard JPEG but contains an extra APP11 marker
signaling the metadata about the scrambling protection.
4.1.2 The Descrambling Recovery
The descrambling process aims to recover the original image from the scrambled image,
with the same secret key used in the scrambling protection. Given the scrambling
procedure described in Section 4.1.1, the descrambling process basically reverses the
operations performed in scrambling. First, a special JPEG decoder/transcoder is needed
to extract the strength factor and mask matrix data from the APP11 markers of the
scrambled image. While reading the entropy-decoded JPEG data, the vector COEF∗
holding the scrambled DCT coeﬃcients is formed based on the mask matrix specifying
the positions of MCU blocks and the strength factor specifying the scope of scrambled
DCT coeﬃcients. The same binary key stream KA (and KA′ is case of Ultra-high level
scrambling) is generated if a correct secret key is provided. Then, the descrambled DCT
coeﬃcients COEF are generated by the given operation:
COEF = COEF∗  (KA× 2− 1). (4.4)
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If l = UH (Ultra-high level speciﬁed), the DC coeﬃcients in COEF∗ are ﬁrst decrypted
using the bitwise XOR operation before the above descrambling operation:
COEF∗DC = COEF
∗
DC ⊕KA′, (4.5)
Finally, the descrambled DCT coeﬃcients COEF of the protected ROIs along with other
original coeﬃcients are either encoded to form the descrmbled JPEG image or fed into a
JPEG decoder for display.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance evaluation of the JPEG Scrambling is reported, in
comparison with another well-known JPEG-based privacy protection method, P3 [32].
Such a scrambling scheme may cause expansion to image ﬁle size due to the random
modiﬁcations applied to DCT coeﬃcients and the inserted metadata. In practice, such
expansion is expected to be as small as possible to minimize the storage overhead and
transmission burden. Unlike encryption, such an image scrambling may still present
certain amount of original image visual information. Therefore, we ﬁrst evaluate and
compare the storage overhead created by the two protection methods, and then investigate
how well the two methods are able to preserve privacy against diﬀerent attacking scenarios.
4.2.1 Storage Overhead
Evaluation Metric First of all, we give the deﬁnitions of storage overhead (noted as
O) for JPEG Scrambling and P3 as follows respectively:
OScrambling =
S(IS)− S(IO)
S(IO)
and OP3 =
S(IPubP3 ) + S(I
Sec
P3 )− S(IO)
S(IO)
, (4.6)
where S(I) indicates the ﬁle size of an image I and IO, IS , IPubP3 and I
Sec
P3 denote the
original image, the scrambled image, the public and secret part of P3-protected image
respectively. Since P3 protection splits an image in two portions: public part and secret
part, separately stored in client- and server-side, we need to take into account both
portions when computing the storage overhead.
Dataset We evaluate the storage overhead based on three publicly available image
datasets, as representatives of diﬀerent types of images:
• The USC-SIPI image database1 [65], which contains 215 raw images in Tagged Im-
age File Format (TIFF) with various sizes such as 256×256, 512×512, or 1024×1024
1http://sipi.usc.edu/database/
27
Chapter 4. Secure JPEG Scrambling
pixels. There are 53 images in color and the rest in grayscale. From the dataset, we
removed 6 images that have special spatial patterns such as chessboard-like blocks,
to minimize the inﬂuence of ROI selection on storage overhead2. We convert all the
TIFF images to JPEG with a quality factor of 85. The ﬁle size of most resulted
JPEG images ranges between 7 and 398 KB. This dataset is a representative set of
small-size standard images containing various image content.
• The People in Photo Album (PIPA) dataset3 [66], which consists of over 60000
images (JPEG format) of more than 2000 individuals collected from public Flickr
photo albums. Each image in this dataset containts one or more people in image
content. From this dataset, we randomly selected 1500 images of the same size
1204×768 pixels4. The ﬁle sizes of the 1500 images are in range of 105 KB and 945
KB. This is a representative collection of small to medium size internet images with
people as the major content.
• The INRIA Holiday image datset5 [67], which contains 1491 full color images (in
JPEG format) from vacation scenes (e.g. mountain, a river, a small town and other
interesting topographies.). It has a greater diversity than the USC-SIPI and PIPA
datasets in terms of image content, texture and resolutions. Unlike USC-SIPI and
PIPA, images in this dataset were captured from digital cameras directly. The
image ﬁle sizes of this dataset fall in range from 82 KB to 6.35 MB. This is a
representative dataset of medium to large size photographic images.
Experiments and Analysis For each image from the three datasets, we manually
created 10 mask matrices representing diﬀerent ROIs with increasing size (10% to 100%)
relative to the entire image area. We then applied JPEG Scrambling (in four strength
levels) on the 10 ROIs of each image respectively. Meanwhile, we applied P3 using four
diﬀerent threshold values (t = 1, 5, 10 and 20) on each entire image. Note that the
original P3 algorithm does not directly supports partial protection. The storage overhead
for each protected image (JPEG Scrambling and P3) is computed and the results (mean
and 95% conﬁdence interval) for the three datasets are shown in Figure 4.4. From the
results, one observes a near linear relation between the storage overhead and the relative
size of protection ROI, for any level of JPEG Scrambling. The slopes for diﬀerent levels of
scrambling are diﬀerent: the growth rate is higher if higher level of scrambling is applied.
For Low-, Medium- and High-level scrambling, the overhead is extremely low: < 6%
for USC-SIPI, < 8% for PIPA and < 3% for INRIA. The overhead for Ultra-high level
scrambling, though about double the overhead of High-level scrambling, is still acceptable:
2The ﬁnal subset of 209 images used in the experiment is available at http://grebvm2.epﬂ.ch/lin/
thesis/dataset/USC-SIPI-subset-209.zip.
3https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~nzhang/piper.html
4The ﬁnal subset of 1500 images used in this experiment is available at http://grebvm2.epﬂ.ch/lin/
thesis/dataset/PIPA-subset-1500.zip
5http://lear.inrialpes.fr/people/jegou/data.php#holidays
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(c) INRIA Holidays dataset
Figure 4.4 – Storage overhead of JPEG Scrambling on diﬀerent image datasets.
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for all the three datasets, the maximum overhead for entire image scrambling (ROI size =
100%) is not higher than 17%. Compared to JPEG Scrambling, the overhead of P3 (for
threshold between 1 and 20) is much higher. Although increasing the threshold reduces
P3’s overhead, higher threshold values make P3 public images preserve more information
of the original image, therefore revealing more visual privacy. This will be proved in
Section 4.2.2. The mean overhead when images are entirely scrambled in any level of
strength is always lower than or equal to that of P3 in threshold of 20, not to mention
partial image region scrambling. From this experiment, JPEG Scrambling outperforms
P3 in terms of storage overhead.
4.2.2 Privacy Protection Capability
We also evaluated the privacy protection capability of the two algorithms (JPEG Scram-
bling and P3) in two typical scenarios of recognition attacks that may compromise users
privacy: (i) face detection/recognition and (ii) number plate recognition. The two types
of attacks aim at identifying diﬀerent visual information, namely the human face and
text (number and letter). We conducted both objective and subjective experiments, to
investigate the performance of the protection methods against diﬀerent “attackers”, i.e.
machine and real human.
Objective Privacy Evaluation
Face Detection We ﬁrst conducted a face detection experiment using the Caltech
face dataset6, which contains 450 frontal color face images of 27 individuals depicted
in diﬀerent circumstances (illumination, background, facial expressions, etc.). We ﬁrst
applied JPEG Scrambling (four strength levels) and P3 (t = 1, 5, 10 and 20) on each
image, and then applied the Haar face detector [68] from the OpenCV library7 on each
original image and its protected variants. For P3, the face detection is performed on the
public image. The detection rates (proportion of correctly detected faces) for original
and protected images are shown in Table 4.1.
From the results, one observes that automatic face detection still performs well in
Low-level scrambled images, where more than 90% faces were successfully detected. When
Medium- or High-level scrambled was applied, the detection rate is greatly reduced to
2.99% and 0.85% respectively. With Ultra-high level scrambling applied, not a single face
could be detected. Compared to JPEG Scrambling, P3 in all four threshold values always
provides stronger protection such that no any face could be detected.
6http://www.vision.caltech.edu/Image_Datasets/faces/
7http://opencv.org/
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Table 4.1 – Results of objective privacy evaluation of JPEG Scrambling and P3: face
detection rate, license plate recognition rate and SSIM (mean).
Image
type
Face
detection
License plate
recognition SSIM
Original 100% 82.5% 1
SCRB.L 94.23% 0.20% 0.497
SCRB.M 2.99% 0 0.160
SCRB.H 0.85% 0 0.161
SCRB.UH 0 0 0.093
P3.t=20 0 1.39% 0.682
P3.t=10 0 0.40% 0.633
P3.t=5 0 0.40% 0.589
P3.t=1 0 0.20% 0.452
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Figure 4.5 – Face recognition results obtained on the original and diﬀerent protected
images using three diﬀerent recognition methods: Eigenfaces, Fisherfaces and LBPH.
Face Recognition We then evaluated face recognition using the AT&T face image
dataset8, which contains 40 individuals’ frontal face images (10 images for each identity).
We implemented three classical face recognition methods, namely the Eigenfaces [69],
the Fisherfaces [70], and the Local Binary Patterns Histograms (LBPH) [71], using the
OpenCV library9. For each identity, we selected n of his/her images (in original form
without protection) as training set, leaving the rest 10− n images as the evaluation set.
Each image in the evaluation set were protected by the two methods with the same
settings as the previous experiment. Each recognition classiﬁer was trained using the n
training images of each identity, and evaluated on diﬀerent variants (original images or
protected images with diﬀerent methods) of the evaluation set. The overall recognition
rate (proportion of correctly identiﬁed faces) of all the 40 identities corresponding to
diﬀerent values of n for diﬀerent recognition algorithms is shown in Figure 4.5.
8http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/attarchive/facedatabase.html
9http://docs.opencv.org/2.4/modules/contrib/doc/facerec/
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First of all, one observes that the face recognition rate for original unprotected evaluation
images generally increases as the training size increases, regardless of recognition method.
When 7 or more images (per person) were used for training, the recognition rate for
original images reaches the scale higher than 0.9. For methods Eigenfaces and Fisherfaces,
Low-level JPEG Scrambling does not eﬀectively reduce the recognition rate. If higher-level
scrambling has been applied (M, H or UH), the recognition rate is signiﬁcantly reduced
to nearly 0. For P3, any of the four parameters almost deactivates face recognition by
methods Eigenfaces and Fisherfaces. Compared to Eigenfaces and Fisherfaces, LBPH is
more robust to most of the visual obfuscations. For Low- to High-level scrambling and
P3 (t=20), the recognition rate is lower than half of the rate obtained on original images,
though still considerably higher that of a random guess. When stronger obfuscation is
applied (Ultra-high level scrambling or P3 with t ≤ 10), the recognition rate becomes as
low as random guess.
License Plate Recognition To evaluate the performance of license plate recognition
on diﬀerent types of protected images, we employed a license plate image dataset from http:
//www.zemris.fer.hr/projects/LicensePlates/english/results.shtml. The dataset contains
503 images of the rear views of various vehicles (cars, trucks, busses), taken from an
OLYMPUS C-2040 ZOOM digital camera under various lighting conditions. The two
protection methods with the same parameters as in the previous experiments were
applied on each image. We then used the open source license plate recognition library
OpenALPR10 to identify the license plate in original and protected images. The recognition
rate (the proportion of correctly identiﬁed plates) for diﬀerent protection setups is shown
in Table 4.1.
As is shown, the recognition rate for original license plate images is about 82.5%. With
Low-level JPEG Scrambling applied, only one license plate (about 0.2%) was recognized.
By applying higher level JPEG Scrambling, not a single license plate could be correctly
identiﬁed. The performance of P3 is comparable with JPEG Scrambling, but slightly
worse. The recognition rates are 1.39%, 0.40%, 0.40% and 0.20% for threshold 20, 10,
5 and 1 respectively. Again, this experiment indicates that JPEG Scrambling provides
comparable level of protection as P3 in making number plate unintelligible.
Subjective Privacy Evaluation
Similarly, two sets of subjective experiments were conducted based on online crowdsourcing
to evaluate how real humans perform in diﬀerent recognition tasks, i.e. face recognition
and license plate recognition from protected images.
10http://www.openalpr.com/
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Face Recognition For the subjective experiment on face recognition, we employed the
color Face Recognition Technology (FERET) dataset11 [72], from which we selected 9
male identities (4 white, 3 black and 2 Asian). In the experiment, we recruited online
subjects through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)12, and asked subjects to identify the
person in protected images from the 9 identities. We selected 6 face images for each
identity: 2 regular frontal, 2 left view and 2 right view images. For each identity, we made
three of his images (one frontal, one left view and one right view) public and unprotected
as the training set, with the rest three as evaluation set. Each image in the evaluation set
was protected by JPEG Scrambling and P3 with diﬀerent parameters as before. Finally,
216 diﬀerent protected images (3× 9× 8) were generated. In each Human Intelligence
Task (HIT) on AMT, the training images of all the 9 identities are ﬁrstly presented
and made always available during the experiment session for subjects to review. Then
an evaluation image protected by a certain method is presented with a question asking
the subject to identify the person in image. If the subject has no any clue about the
identity of the protected person, he/she could choose the option “I really don’t know”.
In addition to the evaluation set, we also included the original images from the training
set in evaluation, serving as “honeypot” to help us remove sloppy subjects. We asked 20
subjects to vote on each image. A screenshot of an HIT on AMT is shown in Figure A.1
in Appendix A.
Finally, 146 valid subjects13 completed the experiment each voting on 33.3 images in
average. The proportion of correct, incorrect and “I don’t know” answers corresponding
to each protection is shown in Figure 4.6(a). Here, one observes that the face recognition
rate (proportion of correct answers) for Low-level JPEG Scrambling is still high, close to
100%. This is similar as the automatic face recognition results obtain from Eigenfaces and
Fisherfaces. When Medium- or High-level JPEG Scrambling was applied, the recognition
rate decreased to about 60% and 40% respectively. Only when Ultra-high level scrambling
applied, almost no face could be correctly identiﬁed and most people selected the answer
“I don’t know”. As for P3, threshold values of 20 and 10 provide similar degree of privacy
protection as Medium- and High-level JPEG Scrambling. Similar to JPEG Scrambling,
only with the strongest protection (t = 1) applied, no face can be correctly recognized.
License Plate Recognition A subjective experiment on number plate recognition was
conducted in a similar way. From the license plate image dataset used in the objective
experiment, we selected a subset consisting 28 example license plate images, shown in
the web page14. Every license plate image was protected by the two methods each with
the corresponding four parameters. In each HIT on AMT, a license plate image (either
11https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/image-group/color-feret-database
12https://www.mturk.com/
13Subjects who provided wrong answers to “honeypot” images were removed and vacated HITs were
republished on AMT until all have been successfully ﬁnished.
14http://www.zemris.fer.hr/projects/LicensePlates/english/images.html
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Figure 4.6 – Results of subjective experiment on (a) face recognition and (b) license plate
recognition: proportion of “I don’t know”, incorrect and correct answers for original and
protected images.
original or protected form) is presented to the subject, who is asked to identify the license
plate and record it in a text ﬁeld. If the subject cannot get any clue from protected image,
he/she can simply put “0” indicating “I don’t know”. A screenshot of an HIT for license
plate recognition on AMT is provided in Figure A.2 in in Appendix A. Original license
plate images were used in evaluation as “honeypot” for detecting outliers. Again, we
asked 20 subjects voting on each image, which resulted in 112 subjects each annotating
45 images on average. Sloppy subjects who provided wrong answers to original images
were removed.
The recognition results are shown in Figure 4.6(b). As is revealed, the recognition
rate in Low-level scrambled license plate images is already very low, below 20%. With
higher-level scrambling applied, the recognition rate is further reduced, extremely close
to zero. As for P3, with threshold values of 20, 10 and 5, there are still a large number of
license plates correctly recognized (∼ 50%, ∼ 33% and ∼ 22% respectively). Only with
the strongest protection applied (t = 1), no license plate can be recognized. The results
of this experiment also agree with that of automatic license plate recognition experiment:
For both real human and machines, JPEG Scrambling is superior to P3 in protection of
text information in image, unless the strongest P3 is applied (t=1).
Analysis and Discussions
The experiment reveals that the two methods perform diﬀerently in protecting diﬀerent
types of visual information. For instance, when protecting privacy against face recognition,
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(a) Scrambling Low (b) Scrambling Medium
(c) Scrambling High (d) Scrambling Ultra-High
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Figure 4.7 – Example license plate protected by JPEG Scrambling and P3 with diﬀerent
parameters.
the performances of JPEG Scrambling in M, H and UH levels are comparable with that of
P3 in t = 20, 10 and 1 respectively. While, for license plate recognition, the performances
of JPEG Scrambling in the three levels are signiﬁcantly better than the corresponding
levels of P3. This is due to the diﬀerent natures of the two methods: JPEG Scrambling is
based on permutation of signs of DCT coeﬃcients, which interfere with image information
in all frequencies. While, P3 uses a threshold to transfer partial information from each
DCT coeﬃcient to a secret image, preserving minimal amount of information about
the original image in the public image. If the threshold in P3 is not small enough,
signiﬁcant high-frequency information might be disclosed from the public image, as many
high-frequency AC coeﬃcients have small values. These features include sharp contours
or edges, such as numbers or letters in license plate. An example license plate image
obfuscated by the two methods with diﬀerent parameters is shown in Figure 4.7. In
scrambled images, the license plate can be hardly observed even for Low-level scrambling.
However, one can easily read the license plate in P3-protected images for t ∈ [5, 10, 20]. To
quantify how much information about the original image is revealed from an obfuscated
image, we use another metric, namely the structural similarity index (SSIM) [73], to
measure the similarity between the original and the protected image. We computed and
the SSIM for each protected image from the Caltech face dataset compared to its original
image. The mean values of SSIM corresponding to diﬀerent protections are listed in
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Table 4.1. As is shown, images protected by P3 (the public part) still reveal somewhat
similarity compared to the original images. For the threshold of 20, an average SSIM of
0.682 is obtained. Even with the lowest threshold of 1, an average SSIM of 0.452 is also
resulted. Compared to P3, the SSIM scores of scrambled images are much lower: 0.497
for Low-level scrambled images, about 0.16 for Medium- or High-level scrambled images,
and merely 0.093 for Ultra-high scrambled images. Although SSIM of protected image
is not directly related to its capability of privacy preservation, it reveals a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the visual appearance between the two diﬀerent approaches.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter elaborates JPEG Scrambling, a lightweight encryption for securing JPEG
image, initially introduced in [64] as a tool for protecting privacy in video surveillance.
JPEG Scrambling randomly changes the signs of quantized DCT coeﬃcients of a JPEG
image, based on a secret key. It is a selective approach in the sense that arbitrary ROIs can
be deﬁned and diﬀerent levels of strength can be achieved. Both objective and subjective
experiments were conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed method with
regard to its storage overhead and privacy preservation capability, in comparison with
another JPEG-based privacy protection scheme, P3 [32]. Experimental results indicate
that JPEG Scrambling provides similar performance as P3 in preventing face recognition
from both machines and real human. In addition, the scrambling approach shows its
advantages over P3 in protecting text information in image, due to diﬀerent nature of
visual information permutation. The privacy protection capabilities of the two methods
both vary depending on the selected strength parameter, which in turn inﬂuences the
level of storage overhead. For both JPEG Scrambling and P3, storage overhead increases
as the protection strength increases. But the overhead of JPEG Scrambling is always
lower than P3 even if the strongest scrambling is applied on the entire image. Using
the proposed JPEG Scrambling, we could always achieve a stronger protection but less
storage overhead than P3; in this respect, JPEG Scrambling outperforms P3. A signiﬁcant
drawback of JPEG Scrambling is that scrambled image is not robust to most lossy image
transformations, meaning that the reconstruction becomes impossible if a scrambled image
has been modiﬁed. This is because the applied transformation may completely reorder the
signs of DCT coeﬃcients. Also, similar to any other encryption-based approach, JPEG
scrambling can only generates high distorted visual eﬀect, which may not be expected
when applied in protection of images in social media.
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Most approaches to protect image visual privacy stay in the stage of encrypting or
permuting image data, including the proposed JPEG Scrambling in the last chapter.
From data security point of view, an encryption-based scheme can well preserve privacy
in a secure and reversible manner. However, simply encrypting an entire image results in
either an unreadable image or highly distorted visual eﬀect, which may signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the usability of photo sharing and may not be in users best interest from both usage
and perception perspectives. In many cases, people hope to share their photos online
to public while partially hiding speciﬁc image regions in a simple and pleasant way, e.g.
creating an anonymous face with a cartoon smiley, or blurring and inpainting a sensitive
area. Usually, those interesting manipulations cannot be reversed directly. Inspired by
these facts, we explore the design of visual protection method that can satisfy all the
characteristics raised in the introduction of the thesis (Chapter 1), including not only
basic requirements such as security, reversibility, robustness, backward-compatibility, but
also advanced features such as personalization and pleasantness.
In this chapter, we present secure JPEG Transmorphing, an image privacy protection
algorithm, or framework, that meets all desired features outlined in Chapter 1. Within
Secure JPEG Transmorphing, almost any type of regional obfuscation can be applied,
such as masking, blurring, pixelation, inpainting, warping, etc. More importantly, the
original image can be reconstructed with near lossless quality, even if the protected image
has been manipulated. A set of experiments were conducted to evaluate the performance
of the proposed approach with respect to its storage overhead, reconstruction quality,
privacy protection capability and subjective pleasantness.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 describes in detail the
proposed JPEG Transmorphing. Section 5.2 reports the evaluation experiments and
results analysis. Section 5.3 outlines some discussions and Section 5.4 summarizes this
chapter.
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Figure 5.1 – Overview of JPEG Transmorphing: the protection and reconstruction
procedures.
5.1 JPEG Transmorphing: The Algorithm
The working principle of Secure JPEG Transmorphing is to utilize the JPEG application
segments markers (APPn) in ﬁle header to secretly preserve partial original image
information, while encoding the JPEG image in a visually protected form. The visual
information of the original image can be protected by any type of regional manipulation,
such as masking, blurring, pixelation, inpainting, warping, and so on. The protected
image, or called the Transmorphed image, of the same syntax as standard JPEG, is
therefore backwards compatible with JPEG. With a dedicated JPEG transcoder or
decoder that supports JPEG Transmorphing, the original image can be recovered by
replacing the obfuscated regions in the protected image with the corresponding original
regions extracted from APPn markers. The workﬂow of Secure JPEG Tramsmorphing,
comprising two procedures: protection and reconstruction, is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The two procedures are then described in detail as follows.
5.1.1 Transmorphing Protection
The protection procedure of secure JPEG Transmorphing consists of three steps: (i) mask
matrix generation, (ii) sub-image construction and (iii) Transmorphing data insertion,
each presented in the following algorithm blocks. To let reader better understand the
following, an illustration of Transmorphing protection is given in Figure 5.2.
Mask Matrix Generation
First of all, assume a user attempts to apply an obfuscation on certain regions of interest
(ROIs) of an image, such as masking the two faces with cartoon stickers, shown in
Figure 5.2. Once ﬁnishing the masking operation, a binary-valued 2D matrix is generated
to indicate the shape, size and position of the protected ROIs. As JPEG is coded with
respect to MCU block, which is composed of several DCT blocks, we let each element
38
5.1. JPEG Transmorphing: The Algorithm
????????? ? ??????????? ? ???
???? ??????
???????????
0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?
0?0?0?0?0?0?1?1?0?0?
0?0?1?1?0?1?1?1?1?0?
0?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?0?
0?1?1?1?1?0?1?1?0?0?
0?0?1?1?0?0?0?0?0?0?
0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?0?
???? ??????
????
?????
????? ???
????
?????
Secret
Key
????????????
???? ? ???
????????????? ????
?
Figure 5.2 – Illustration of a protection procedure of JPEG Transmorphing.
of the matrix point to one MCU block of the image, with elements one to protected
blocks and zero to unprotected blocks. As also introduced in Section 4.1.1, this matrix is
named Mask Matrix, noted as M, which holds the essential geometric information about
the protected image regions, indispensable for the future reconstruction. Depending on
applications, the mask matrix can be generated either from the geometric information
of users actions (e.g. coordinates of ﬁnger touch on a mobile phone), or by comparing
the original and obfuscated images. The step of generating mask matrix is presented in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 GenerateMaskMatrix(IO,P)
/∗ The function to obfuscate partial image ROIs and generate the mask matrix. The
inputs consist of the original image IO and an obfuscation operation deﬁned by P . ∗/
1: IP ← VisualObfuscation(IO,P)
2: if P is known and well deﬁned then
3: M← ComputeMaskMatrix(IO,P) # Compute the mask matrix based on P
4: else
5: IYO ← RGBtoYUV(IO)[Y ] # Y (luminance) channel of IO
6: IYP ← RGBtoYUV(IP )[Y ] # Y (luminance) channel of IP
7: IΔ = |IYO − IYP |
8: IBΔ = (IΔ > t)
9: M← DownSample(IBΔ , 16) # Downsample IBΔ by factor of 16. If any pixel in an
MCU block is 1, that block becomes an element 1 in M. The mask matrix is round
up to size of (H/16, W/16) ( W and H are width and height of image IO).
10: return M
Sub-Image Construction
Based on the mask matrix, a sub-image is constructed by transcoding the original JPEG
image to a new one while preserving only the DCT coeﬃcients corresponding to ROIs
deﬁned by the mask matrix M. DCT coeﬃcients outside the ROIs are set to zero. The
sub-image is still a JPEG image with the same dimensions but smaller ﬁle size as the
original image. It contains the information of sensitive part of the original image that the
users wants to preserve. This procedure is presented in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 ConstructSubImage(IO,M)
/∗ The function to construct the sub-image ISub from the original image IO based on
mask matrix M ∗/
1: while Trancoding IO to a new JPEG image ISub do # Loop all MCU blocks
2: (iM, jM) ← IndexOfCurrentMCU() # Index of the current MCU block
3: if M(iM, jM) == 0 then
4: ISub.MCUArray(iM, jM) = 0 # Set to zero if the MCU is not in the ROIs
5: else
6: ISub.MCUArray(iM, jM) = IO.MCUArray(iM, jM) # Copy DCT coeﬃcients
7: return ISub
Transmorphing Data Insertion
As the last step, the sub-image is secured by a symmetric encryption scheme with a
secret key, e.g. the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [74] or JPEG Scrambling. The
security and privacy of the ﬁnal protected image is ensured by the chosen encryption
scheme. Then the bitstream of the encrypted sub-image, the mask matrix, along with
a set of metadata, collectively named Transmorphing data, is inserted in one or more
application segments of the obfuscated JPEG image; in this respect, the obfuscated
image serves as a “cover image”. Similar as in JPEG Scrambling, binary elements of the
mask matrix is encoded into a bitstream. In practice, the mask matrix can be further
compressed as it is sparse. The metadata contains the auxiliary information about the
inserted sub-image and mask matrix, such as the data length, the encryption scheme,
etc. Since JPEG allows a maximum of 65533 bytes1 allocated for each marker segment,
it is highly probable that the entire sub-image data needs to be separately stored in
several APPn segments. In our current implement, APP11 marker is employed for JPEG
Transmorphing. The step of inserting Transmorphing data is presented in Algorithm 3
and the syntax of the ﬁnal Transmorphed image ﬁle is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Overhead Control
Inserting additional information in the protected image causes expansion to ﬁle size,
which will create overhead to storage and transmission. To control such overhead, we
designed two mechanisms to reduce the ﬁle size of Transmorphed image without sacriﬁcing
the quality of reconstructed image. Both mechanisms manipulate the DCT coeﬃcients
corresponding to only the obfuscated ROIs in the Transmorphed image (e.g. the image
stickers in the “cover image” in Figure 5.3) within a JPEG transcoding process. The
manipulations of DCT coeﬃcients can be done (but not limited to) in the following ways:
1Each JPEG APP marker signals its marker length using two bytes (16 bits), resulting in a maximum
of (216 − 1)− 2 = 65533 bytes to record extra information.
40
5.1. JPEG Transmorphing: The Algorithm
Algorithm 3 InsertTransmorphingData(IP ,M, ISub, C,K)
/∗ The procedure to insert the Transmorphing data in obfuscated JPEG image IP . Input
parameters include the obfuscated JPEG image IP , mask matrix M, sub-image ISub, the
chosen encryption scheme C and a secret key K. ∗/
### Insert metadata and mask matrix: ###
1: CSub ← Encrypt(ISub, C,K)
2: BSM ← ByteStreamOf(M)
3: MD ← [SizeOf(BSM), SizeOf(CSub), C] # Metadata MD
4: NMD+M ← SizeOf(MD) + SizeOf(BSM) # Size of the ﬁrst APP11 segment
5: IP .header.writeAPPnMarker(“0xFFEB”) # Create an APP11 marker
6: IP .header.writeMarkerLength(NMD+M) # Write the length of the marker
7: IP .header.writeBytes(MD) # Write the bytestream of the metadata
8: IP .header.writeBytes(BSM) # Write the bytestream of the mask matrix
### Insert sub-image data: ###
1: NSub ← SizeOf(CSub)
2: if NSub <= 65533 then # Write the sub-image data in one segment
3: IP .header.writeAPPnMarker(“0xFFEB”)
4: IP .header.writeMarkerLength(NSub)
5: IP .header.writeBytes(CSub)
6: else # Write the sub-image data in several segments
7: NMarker = NSub/65533 # Number of segments needed for the sub-image data
8: for i ∈ [1, . . . , NApp] do
9: IP .header.writeAPPnMarker(“0xFFEB”)
10: if i = NMarker then
11: IP .header.writeMarkerLength(65533)
12: IP .header.writeBytes(CSub.byteArray[(i− 1) ∗ 65533 : i ∗ 65533])
13: else
14: IP .header.writeMarkerLength(NSub mod 65533)
15: IP .header.writeBytes(CSub.byteArray[(i− 1) ∗ 65533 : end])
16: return IP # Final Transmorphed image IP
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Figure 5.3 – The syntax of Transmorphed JPEG image ﬁle.
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Figure 5.4 – Block diagram of DCT re-quantization for overhead control in JPEG
Transmorphing.
DCT Re-quantization This approach re-quantizes the DCT coeﬃcients of the obfus-
cated ROIs. To be more speciﬁc, while the transcoding process of JPEG Transmorphing,
the DCT coeﬃcients corresponding to obfuscated regions are ﬁrst de-quantized based on
the original quantization table, and then re-quantized using a new quality factor (noted as
QF). The quantization steps for re-quantization are computed in the same way as is done
in normal JPEG compression, using the QF to scale the standard quantization tables.
The re-quantized DCT coeﬃcients of the ROIs along with the original DCT coeﬃcients
out of the ROIs are entropy-coded such that the ﬁnal transmorphed image is generated.
However, in the resulted image, only the original quantization tables are kept. If QF
is smaller than the original Q factor of the JPEG ﬁle, re-quantization greatly reduces
the image quality and ﬁle size, due to the larger quantization step applied. Even if the
applied QF is larger than the original Q factor used in JPEG compression, re-quantizing
an existing JPEG image may also decrease ﬁle size due to the re-quantization errors,
which have been well explained in [75]. We just make sue of such a “side eﬀect” of
JPEG re-quantization to decrease the quality of the obfuscated regions in the “cover
image”, further reducing the ﬁle size of the Transmorphed image. Such a manipulation is
illustrated in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.5 – Illustration of DCT coeﬃcients Cut-oﬀ with a CF of 5.
DCT Cut-oﬀ This method simply “cuts oﬀ” certain number of high-frequency DCT
coeﬃcients by setting them to zero. A Cut-oﬀ Factor (CF) is applied to specify the
number (N) of low-frequency coeﬃcients to preserve in a zig-zag scanning of a DCT block
(illustrated in Figure 5.5):
N =
(1 + CF)× CF
2
. (5.1)
An example image Transmorphed with diﬀerent setups is shown in Figure 5.6. The ﬁle
size of the Transmorphed image with either DCT Re-quantization or Cut-oﬀ is signiﬁcantly
reduced compared to that without overhead control. Although the two approaches may
decrease the quality of the protected image, such visual degradation is only observed
in the obfuscated regions, e.g. the image stickers, blurred or inpainted image regions,
which is less important from a privacy protection point of view. Moreover, since both
approaches are applied only on the protected regions in the “cover image” during a JPEG
transcoding process, the DCT coeﬃcients of rest regions are kept intact. Therefore, both
approaches have no any inﬂuence on the quality of the reconstructed image.
5.1.2 Transmorphing Reconstruction
The reconstruction procedure aims at recovering the original image from a Transmorphed
image, by reversing the above Transmorphing protection operations. Since the inserted
mask matrix and sub-image preserves the complete information about the original image
corresponding to the protection ROIs, the protected image is robust to most types of
image transformations. However, we need to assume that the image transformations do
not remove the inserted data in JPEG header, and that the transformation is a known
operation that can be re-performed. Depending on whether or not an transformation has
been applied on image, the reconstruction process can be done in either the pixel DCT
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Figure 5.6 – Illustration of an image protected by JPEG Transmorphing without and
with overhead controls.
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Figure 5.7 – Illustration of a reconstruction procedure of Secure JPEG Transmorphing.
coeﬃcient or pixel domain. The Algorithm 4 presents the reconstruction procedure of
JPEG Transmorphing. In addition, we also use a diagram (Figure 5.7) to illustrate the
reconstruction procedure of a Transmorphed JPEG image.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance of the proposed JPEG Trans-
morphing, with regard to the following aspects: (i) storage overhead, (ii) reconstruction
quality, (iii) privacy protection capability and (iv) pleasantness.
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Algorithm 4 RecoverTransmorphing(IP , T (·),K)
/∗ The procedure to recover the original image IRec from a Transmorphed image IP , which
might be the outcome of an image transformation T applied on the original Transmorphed
image IOP (unavailable). K is the secret key to decrypt the sub-image. ∗/
1: (M, CSub, C) ← ExtractTransmorphingData(IP )
2: MO ← UpSample(M, 16) # Upsample mask matrix to the size of original image
3: ISub ← Decrypt(CSub, C,K)
4: if T (·) was applied, meaning IP = T (IOP ) then
5: switch Type of the operation T (·) do
6: case Lossy Geometric Transformation: # Scaling, cropping, warping, etc.
7: I ′P ← T −1(IP ) # Reserve the transformation to get the protected image
of the same geometry as the original image
8: I ′P .pixelArray[MO] = ISub.pixelArray[MO] # Pixels replacement
9: IRec ← T (I ′P ) # Apply T (·) again to get the recovered image IRec of the
same geometry as IP
10: case Lossy Compression: # E.g., JPEG compression
11: IP .pixelArray[MO] = ISub.pixelArray[MO]
12: IRec = IP
13: case Lossless Rotation/Flipping via JPEG Transcoding:
14: M′ ← T (M)
15: I ′Sub ← JPEGTrans(ISub, T (·))
16: IP .MCUArray[M
′] = I ′Sub.MCUArray[M
′] # DCT coeﬃcients replacement
17: IRec = IP
18: else # If the protected image is intact without any transformation
19: IP .MCUArray[M] = ISub.MCUArray[M]
20: IRec = IP
21: return IRec
5.2.1 Storage Overhead
To evaluate the storage overhead, we used the same three datasets and methodology as is
used in Section 4.2.1. Namely, we manually created 10 mask matrices for each image,
representing diﬀerent ROIs of increasing size (10% to 100%). We then applied JPEG
Transmorphing (without and with overhead control using the two mechanisms) on each of
the 10 ROIs in each image. Since JPEG decoding and re-encoding may aﬀect image ﬁle
size, we directly insert the sub-image into the original JPEG image, instead of actually
creating the obfuscated image manipulated in spatial domain to diminish such an impact.
This is to diminish the impact of JPEG decoding and re-encoding on ﬁle size, and it is
equivalent as if we assume the applied image obfuscation does not change the ﬁle size.
Similarly, the storage overhead for a Transmorphed image is deﬁned as:
OTransmorphing = S(IP )− S(IO)
S(IO)
, (5.2)
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where IP and IO refer to the Transmorphed image and original image respectively. We
put P3 in comparison and applied P3 on each image with thresholds of 1, 5, 10 and 20
respectively. Finally, for each Transmorphed image, the storage overhead was computed
and the results over all images (mean and 95% conﬁdence interval) of each dataset for
the two overhead control mechanisms are presented in Figure 5.8 and 5.9 respectively.
Similar to JPEG Scrambling, for diﬀerent setups of JPEG Transmorphing, a near linear
relation between the storage overhead and area of protected ROI is observed. However, the
overhead of JPEG Transmorphing is signiﬁcantly higher than that of JPEG Scrambling,
when compared with Figure 4.4 in Section 4.2.1. This is mainly due to the sub-image data
inserted in the Transmorphed image. With the proposed overhead control mechanisms,
the overhead of JPEG Transmorphing can be greatly reduced. For instance, with DCT
Re-quatization (QF=80) or DCT Cut-oﬀ (CF=4), the overhead is reduced by more than
40% compared to the case without overhead control. The overhead of P3 (applied on
the entire image) is lower than that of JPEG Transmorphing when applied on entire
image. Yet, the major purpose of using JPEG Transmorphing is to protect regional image
information, instead of obfuscating the entire image. With overhead control applied,
the overhead of JPEG Transmorphing can also be eﬀectively reduced. For instance, if
we apply JPEG Transmorphing on 40% of the entire image region, using either DCT
Re-quantization (QF=80) or DCT Cut-oﬀ (CF=4), the overhead is only between 20%
and 30% (depending on dataset) and very close to that of P3 in threshold of 5.
In addition, we also investigate the inﬂuence of quality factor in JPEG compression
on storage overhead of JPEG Transmorphing. In this experiment, we used the USC
SIPI dataset and compressed each raw image in JPEG using diﬀerent quality factors in
range of 30 and 100. For each quality factor, we performed JPEG Transmorphing in each
image corresponding to ROIs of diﬀerent sizes. We did not apply any overhead control
in this experiment. In Figure 5.10, the storage overhead for each JPEG quality factor
and diﬀerent sizes of ROI (10% to 50%) is shown. From the results, one observes that
the overhead in general decreases as the JPEG quality increases. This indicates that the
overhead introduced by JPEG Transmorphing depends on not only the size of protection
ROI but also the quality factor of the original JPEG image. This is also the reason that
the overhead diﬀs between the three datasets, as images in diﬀerent datasets might be
compressed in diﬀerent quality factors.
5.2.2 Reconstruction Quality
The second experiment aims to evaluate the quality of reconstructed images from Trans-
morphed images. For this experiment, we employed the subset of PIPA dataset [66]
containing 1500 images2, deﬁned in Section 4.2.1. In each image of the dataset, ground
truth head annotations (rectangle) of identities are provided. In addition to the ground
2http://grebvm2.epﬂ.ch/lin/thesis/dataset/PIPA-subset-1500.zip
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(c) INRIA Holidays dataset
Figure 5.8 – Storage overhead of JPEG Transmorphing with overhead controlled by DCT
Re-quantization.
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Figure 5.9 – Storage overhead of JPEG Transmorphing with overhead controlled by DCT
Cut-oﬀ.
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Figure 5.10 – Storage overhead of JPEG Transmorphing for images compressed with
diﬀerent JPEG quality factors.
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Figure 5.11 – Illustration of three diﬀerent image ROIs considered as protection targets.
truth Head region, we considered two more regions as protection target: (i) the Full-
body region, 3×head width and 6×head height, with head at the top center of the
full body and (ii) the Upper-body region, upper-half of the full body rectangle. The
deﬁnitions of the three ROIs are illustrated in Fig. 5.11. Then, for each image, we applied
JPEG Transmorphing on an identity’s three ROIs respectively, and applied P3 on the
entire image3 with a threshold of 5. For JPEG Transmorphing, we applied visual masking
with a smiley sticker. Since the spatial-domain visual masking involves JPEG decoding
and re-encoding, which aﬀects the quality of reconstructed images, we encoded the masked
JPEG images with the maximal JPEG quality factor of 100 to minimize such impact.
Firstly, executed the reconstructions from each protected image directly without
transformation applied. Then, we applied four image transformations on each protected
image by JPEG Transmorphing and P3 and reconstructed the images from the transformed
images afterwards. The four transformations deﬁned as follows:
3Original P3 algorithm only allows full image protection.
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Table 5.1 – Mean PSNR (dB) and SSIM scores of images reconstructed from JPEG
Transmorphing and P3, without and with image transformations applied.
Method Withouttransformation
Reconstruction with transformation
Scaling Cropping Compression Rotation
Secure JPEG
Transmorphing
PSNR: 45.08 39.37 42.94 37.59 45.08
SSIM: 0.9874 0.9746 0.9790 0.0227 0.9874
P3 PSNR: Inf. 37.46 43.27 35.53 Inf.SSIM: 1 0.9683 0.993 0.9253 1
Baseline JPEG compression (Q=75) PSNR: 36.32SSIM: 0.9444
• Scaling: Subsample the image by a factor of 2 on both directions.
• Cropping: Crop the center region of the image with size of 512×384.
• Compression: Recompress the image in JPEG with a quality factor of 70.
• Rotation: Rotate the image by 90◦ in clockwise direction with a JPEG transcoder.
Finally we used two metrics to examine the quality of reconstructed image, compared to
the original image: (i) Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) and (ii) structural similarity
index (SSIM) [73]. For scaling and cropping, the PSNR and SSIM were computed based
on comparing the reconstructed image with the original image manipulated by the same
scaling or cropping operation.
The mean PSNR and SSIM scores for diﬀerent reconstruction conditions are shown in
Table 5.1. For comparison, we also include the PSNR and SSIM of original images recom-
pressed in JPEG with a quality factor of 75 as baseline. From the results, one observes
that the average PSNR and SSIM of reconstructed images from JPEG Transmorphing are
45.08 dB and 0.9874, which would be considered practically lossless in the signal processing
community. With diﬀerent transformations applied on the Transmorphed images, the
reconstructed images still preserve a high quality, with the PSNR and SSIM scores higher
than that of the original images recompressed in JPEG with Q factor of 75. As a rotation
operation by JPEG transcoding is lossless, the quality of corresponding reconstructed
images is identical to that of the images reconstructed without transformation. For P3,
the image reconstructed without transformation is lossless, which is because P3 algorithm
directly performs on an existing JPEG image without JPEG decoding and re-encoding
involved. With scaling and compression applied, the reconstruction quality of P3 is
slightly worse than JPEG Transmorphing, but still could be still considered as lossless.
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5.2.3 Privacy Protection Capability
Secure JPEG Transmorphing is proposed as an approach to preserve regional visual
privacy in image. For many practical cases, such an approach is able to protect privacy
perfectly, while still preserving the reversibility and high usability in the protected image.
For instance, when a license plate or face region is completely hidden by an image sticker,
there is no way to recognize them without any context information provided. Therefore, it
is trivial to conduct simple evaluation such as the face recognition experiments conducted
in Section 4.2. In a previous work by Oh et al. [44], the ability of several visual obfuscations
for protecting image privacy is evaluated against automatic person recognition based
on deep learning. Experimental results of the study reveal the fact that conventional
regional privacy obfuscations like visual masking cannot ensure a perfect protection against
automatic person recognition if similar context information is available in other public
unprotected images of an identity. However, the degree to which diﬀerent types of visual
obfuscations can preserve users privacy against “attacking” from real human, especially in
the context of online social media, has not yet been well studied. Therefore, we conducted
a novel subjective experiment, where “attackers” were put in a simplistic social networking
scenario, to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent regional image obfuscations against
person recognition from real human “attackers”.
User Study based on Crowdsourcing
The subjective experiment was carried out by employing online subjects via Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT)4, to recognize person in image obfuscated by diﬀerent protection
methods. To do so, we selected 6 identities (adult male) from the PIPA dataset [66] as
the protection and recognition targets, each of which has four images, named evaluation
set. We then applied seven types of obfuscations on each of the three ROIs (deﬁned in
Section 5.2.2) of the target identity in each evaluation image. The seven obfuscations are
described in Table 5.2. In addition to the 6 identities, we selected another 3 identities to
confuse subjects. Therefore, the subjects were required to recognize the protected identity
in image from a total of 9 candidates. The lower the recognition rate, the stronger the
method is able to preserve privacy. We assigned each identity an artiﬁcial name such that
subjects can remember them easier.
Evaluation Scenarios Based on the image data, we designed three experiment setups,
to simulate diﬀerent scenarios of person recognition “attacks” in the context of online
photo sharing:
• Within-Context Person Recognition In this scenario, we assume that an “at-
tacker” has rich prior knowledge about the protected person in an image. The prior
4https://www.mturk.com/
51
Chapter 5. Secure JPEG Transmorphing
Table 5.2 – Visual privacy protection methods put in comparison in privacy evaluation.
Name Description
SCRB.H High-level JPEG Scrambling
SCRB.M Medium-level JPEG Scrambling
P3.t=5 Regional P3 [32] protection with a threshold of 5
P3.t=20 Regional P3 [32] protection with a threshold of 20
Blur Image blurring with radius of 8
Pixelate Image pixelation with block size of 8
Mask Visual masking using a smiley sticker (on head region) or a
gray rectangle (on upper-/full-body region)
knowledge may be some public photos of the protected person in his/her online
proﬁle or from the attacker’s memory about the person if the attacker knows the
person well or meets the person often. To model this scenario, we designed an
experiment where subjects were provided with four reference images of each identity.
The reference images are in original form without any visual obfuscation applied.
We call them reference set. In this scenario, the identities in reference images have
the similar or same context (dressing, event, people nearby or environment) as in
their corresponding images of the evaluation set.
• Across-Context Person Recognition In the second scenario, we assume an
“attacker” has also some prior knowledge about the protected person but the prior
knowledge is less straightforward compared to the Within-Context scenario. For
instance, the prior knowledge may come from other public photos of the protected
person with diﬀerent context compared to the protected images, e.g. a completely
diﬀerent photo album. For this scenario, we designed the second setup using a
new set of reference images, which are very diﬀerent from the evaluation set in the
context of the target identity (e.g. dressing, event, people nearby or environment).
• Without-Context Person Recognition We also considered a scenario where the
“attacker” has no direct prior knowledge about the protected person. However, the
“attacker” may slightly know the person or has met the person once and therefore
has a vague impression about the facial appearance of the protected person. To
model this scenario, we designed the third setup where no any reference image is
provided and subjects need to identify the protected person merely based on a
proﬁle picture showing the head of each identity.
The evaluation images and the two sets of reference images (Within-Context and Across-
Context) of an example identity “Carl” are shown in Figure 5.12. The complete set of 24
evaluation images of six identities are shown in Figure A.3 in Appendix A. The reference
images of all the 9 candidates for the two recognition scenarios (Within-Context and Across-
Context) are shown in http://grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/privacy/ref/withinctx/images.
html and http://grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/privacy/ref/acxctx/images.html respectively.
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Figure 5.12 – Reference and evaluation image sets of an example identity.
We conducted subjective experiments based on AMT with the above three setups
respectively. Each experiment was divided into three sessions, each showing a set of
evaluation images with only one type of ROI protected. Thus we prevented any subject
seeing the same image protected in diﬀerent ROIs. Every HIT on AMT presents 6
protected evaluation images and an extra image unprotected serving as a “honeypot”
to help us remove sloppy subjects. Since we have 168 diﬀerent images (4 images × 6
identities × 7 obfuscations) for each protection ROI to evaluate, each session contains
28 diﬀerent HITs (6 images/HIT). For Within-Context and Across-Context setups, the
“honeypot” images are randomly selected from the reference images. While for Without-
Context setup, “honeypot” images are only selected from the three extra identities apart
from the six identities under evaluation. In such a way, the “honeypot” images do not
reveal any information about original images the evaluation set. For Within-Context
and Across-Context setups, the reference images of all 9 candidates are presented in
the beginning of each HIT and were made always available during the experiment for
subjects to review. Each HIT contains two questions, one for subjects to identify the
protected person by selecting from the 9 candidates, the other acquiring the conﬁdence
about the subject’s answer. In the ﬁrst question, if subject has no any clue about the
protected person, he/she could choose “I really don’t know”, in which case the second
question about recognition conﬁdence does not appear. In the second question, we use
5-scale conﬁdence scores, from 1 to 5, to indicate Unsure, Not so sure, Neutral, Sure
and Very sure respectively. Figure 5.13 shows the screenshot of an evaluation image
with the corresponding two questions presented in an HIT on AMT. The HITs of all the
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Figure 5.13 – Screenshot of an HIT presenting an image under subjective privacy evaluation
on AMT.
experiment sessions were generated on AMT with the following constraints satisﬁed:
• The 6 evaluation images in each HIT belong to 6 diﬀerent identities respectively;
• The order in which the 6 identities and applied obfuscations appear is random;
• Each image or HIT is rated by at least 7 diﬀerent subjects;
• Each subject can take unlimited number of HITs within a session, but cannot
participate in more than one session.
We ﬁltered out outliers who answered the “honeypot” question incorrectly and those who
always provided constant answers throughout all the questions and HITs. Finally, we
collected answers from 241 subjects, each rating 39.2 images (including reference images)
on average.
Results and Analysis
Figure 5.14 shows the average proportion of correct, incorrect, and “I don’t know” answers
over all images in the evaluation set, respect to diﬀerent recognition scenarios and
protection ROIs. First of all, one observes that the recognition accuracy (proportion of
correct answers) of Within-Context scenario remains high in most cases: For images with
only Head or Upper-body protected, the recognition accuracies against most obfuscations
are above 60%, signiﬁcantly higher than that of random guess, which is about 11.11% (1/9);
While for Full-body protected images, the recognition rates are signiﬁcantly reduced, but
still well above the level of random guess. The performances of all the seven obfuscations
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Figure 5.14 – Proportion of “I don’t know”, incorrect and correct answers across all images,
with respect to diﬀerent protection methods and regions. “H”, “U” and “F” annotated on
each bar indicates Head, Upper-body and Full-body respectively.
are comparable, with Blur and Pixelate showing slightly worse protection to privacy
than the others. We have to admit that in the case where direct context information
about the protected person is available, most regional visual obfuscation cannot ensure
a good level of privacy protection. In the scenario of Across-Context recognition, the
overall recognition accuracies are greatly reduced. In turn, the proportions of incorrect
and “I don’t know” answers are signiﬁcantly higher. The recognition accuracies for most
images protected by methods such as JPEG Scrambling, P3 and visual masking are lower
than 20%, close to the level of random guess accuracy. This time, one observes that
recognition accuracies against Blur and Pixelate protections are obviously higher than
the other methods, which is because the two methods still disclose certain amount of
low-resolution visual information about the original image region. In images protected
by Blur and Pixelate, size of protection ROI does not show a signiﬁcant impact on the
accuracy of recognition. As for the Without-Context scenario, recognition accuracies
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Figure 5.15 – Certainty scores of correct and incorrect recognition answers with respect
to diﬀerent scenarios and protection methods.
are further reduced: the proportions of correct answers for protection methods including
JPEG Scrambling, P3 and visual masking are all below 10%. However, the accuracies
for Blur and Pixelate are still higher than 20%. Among all the seven obfuscations,
Mask and P3.t=5 provide the strongest protections, which is reasonable as masking
operation completely hides the visual information behind the mask and a strong level of
P3 protection is visually extremely to a gray mask.
We then investigate how diﬀerent visual obfuscations aﬀect the subjects recognition
conﬁdence in diﬀerent conditions. We consider subjects conﬁdence in two dimensions:
the conﬁdence of correct recognition answers and the conﬁdence of incorrect answers. For
both correct and incorrect answers, we plot in Figure 5.15 the conﬁdence scores (mean
and 95% conﬁdence interval) corresponding to each recognition scenario and protection
method. For Within-Context scenario, the conﬁdence scores of correct answers are mostly
above 4.0, signiﬁcantly higher than the other two scenarios. The overall conﬁdence of
correct recognition in Across-Context scenario is around 3.0, a neutral level between sure
and not so sure. In the Without-Context scenario, the conﬁdence scores of correct answers
are slightly lower than that of Across-Context, falling down to the level of not so sure. In
addition, the conﬁdence scores vary between applied obfuscations: For correct answers
in Within-Context scenario, the overall conﬁdence of Mask protection is the lowest;
High-level JPEG Scrambling (SCRB.H) and P3 with a small threshold of 5 (P3.t=5) also
generate slightly lower conﬁdence scores than the remaining methods. As for incorrect
recognition answers, the conﬁdence scores are lower than 3.0 in most cases. This is
natural as subjects tend to generate wrong decisions if they are not conﬁdent enough.
However, the conﬁdence scores of incorrect answers corresponding to diﬀerent obfuscation
methods and recognition scenarios show relatively random patterns, where the conﬁdence
in Within-Context scenario is just slightly higher. From the results, some obfuscations
(e.g. SCRB.H, P3 and Mask) result in relatively higher conﬁdence for incorrect recognition
answers, implying that those methods could perform better in “confusing” subjects.
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Figure 5.16 – Certainty scores of correct recognition answers with respect to diﬀerent
scenarios, protection ROIs and protection methods.
At the end, for each scenario, we also plot the conﬁdence scores of correct answers
corresponding to each protection ROI and protection method, shown in Figure 5.16. In
the scenario of Within-Context recognition, the conﬁdence scores are the highest in Head
region protected images, for all the seven obfuscations. While, the conﬁdence scores for
Upper-body and Full-body protected images are still higher than 3.5, and comparable.
For Across-Context and Without-Context scenarios, the overall recognition conﬁdence is
much lower, consistent with the results observed in 5.15. However, one cannot clearly
distinguish the diﬀerence in conﬁdence between diﬀerent protection ROIs for the two
scenarios, which is also consistent with our ﬁndings in Figure 5.14, where the recognition
accuracies for the three ROIs are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Due to very few correctly
recognized samples in the two scenarios, the conﬁdence interval of conﬁdence scores is
large.
The experimental results indicate that the contextual information such as unprotected
parts of human body, clothes and people nearby the protected person indeed can provide
some visual cues for real humans to recognize protected person in an image. This is why
the recognition accuracy for the Within-Context scenario is much higher than the other
two scenarios, in which the “I don’t know” and incorrect answers predominate. This means
certain regional obfuscations can well conceal the identity of a protected person if not
much meaningful context information is available. By comparing the recognition results
obtained on three diﬀerent protection ROIs, Full-body obfuscations always provide the
strongest protection to privacy, as it reveals the minimum amount of information about
the human body. The recognition accuracies against Head and Upper-body obfuscations
are comparable and both higher than that of Full-body protection. This implies that even
if disclosing some parts of the person’s body, “attackers” may utilize such information to
recognize the obfuscated person.
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Figure 5.17 – 13 images used in pleasantness evaluation of privacy protection methods.
5.2.4 Pleasantness
As the last experiment, we attempt to understand the pleasantness with respect to users’
perception and usage preference of diﬀerent visual privacy protection methods. Hence, in
this experiment, we deﬁne the term “pleasantness” in twofold:
• The Perception Pleasantness, which refers to users emotional perception when
observing others photos protected by a particular method.
• The Usage Pleasantness, which refers to users preference to use a particular
method to protect their own privacy in online photo sharing.
We also employed the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)5 to conduct subjective experiments
based on crowdsourcing. We selected 13 images from the PIPA dataset [66] (shown in
Figure 5.17), and applied 10 visual protections on a person’s head region in each image.
Therefore, it resulted in 130 diﬀerent visually obfuscated images6. The applied visual
protection methods are listed in Table 5.3. An example image obfuscated by the 10
visual protections is illustrated in Figure 5.18. To measure perception pleasantness, we
apply the Valence model in psychology using 9-Point SAM Scales [76], where 1 stands
for very unpleasant, 9 for very pleasant and the middle point 5 for neural. As for usage
pleasantness, we use the three-level preference scales, i.e. “Dislike”, “Neutral” and “Like”.
We removed the results from one subject who is considered as outlier as he/she provided
very constant answers. The screenshot of an HIT on AMT for this experiment is given
in Figure A.4 in Appendix A. On AMT, we asked 25 diﬀerent subjects to vote on the
pleasantness of each of the 130 protected images. Finally, 105 unique subjects participated
in our experiment, each voting on 30.95 images on average.
5https://www.mturk.com/
6All the 13 images and their protected versions used in the experiment are available at http://grebvm2.
epﬂ.ch/lin/privacy/dataset_privacy_pleasantness.zip.
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Table 5.3 – Visual privacy protection methods being compared in pleasantness evaluation.
Name Description
SCRB High-level JPEG Scrambling
P3 Regional P3 [32] protection with a threshold of 20
Pixelate Image pixelation with block size of 20
Blur Image blurring with radius of 20
Black Visual masking in black color
Smiley Visual masking with a “Smiley” Emoji7
TearsJoy Visual masking with a “Face with Tears of Joy” Emoji, the 2015
word of the year by Oxford English Dictionary8
SnapGhost Visual masking with a Snapchat Ghost logo9
Vendetta Visual masking with a cartoon Guy Fawkes mask originally from
the ﬁlm V for Vendetta10
C-Stamp Visual masking with a gray stamp showing “CONFIDENTIAL”
(a) SCRB (b) P3 (c) Pixelate (d) Blur (e) Black
(f) Smiley (g) TearsJoy (h) SnapGhost (i) Vendetta (j) C-Stamp
Figure 5.18 – 10 diﬀerent visual privacy protection methods.
Results and Analysis
Perception Pleasantness The overall results on perception pleasantness of the ten
protection methods are given in Figure 5.19, which shows the average perception pleas-
antness score and its 95% conﬁdence interval corresponding to each protection method.
From the result, one observes that diﬀerent methods reveal signiﬁcantly diﬀerent degrees
of perception pleasantness. Among the ten methods, Pixelate, Blur, Smiley and TearsJoy
Emoji provide obviously higher pleasantness scores than the others: The mean pleasant-
ness scores of Pixelate, Blur, Smiley and TearsJoy are all above 5.0, indicating positive
emotions; While others reveal only negative pleasantness with average pleasantness scores
7Emoji sticker downloaded from https://emojiisland.com/pages/free-download-emoji-icons-png
8http://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2015/11/word-of-the-year-2015-emoji/
9https://www.snap.com/en-US/brand-guidelines/
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V_for_Vendetta_(ﬁlm)
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Figure 5.19 – Overall perception pleasant-
ness scores of diﬀerent protection methods.
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Figure 5.20 – Distribution of MOS across
all 13 images for each protection method.
below 5.0. Among the ten methods, Secure JPEG Scrambling (SCRB) and P3 provide
the lowest pleasantness, lower than 3.8. We believe this is because image pixelation and
blurring generate the most natural visual eﬀects compared to the others while the two
Emoji stickers are the most enjoyable and amusing ones among all the methods. On
the contrary, the two distortion-based approaches, JPEG Scrambling and P3, result in
the most ugly visual eﬀects. Interestingly, image stickers such as the SnapGhost and
Vendetta, though funny and interesting, still reveal relatively low pleasantness. The
other two methods, Black masking and C-Stamp, generate similar levels of pleasantness
as SnapGhost and Vendetta. Then, for each of the 130 images, we computed its mean
pleasantness score (MOS) across the ratings of diﬀerent subjects. For each protection
method, we plot the mean pleasantness scores of all the 13 images in a box and whisker
diagram in Figure 5.20. In this ﬁgure, each box plot represents the spread of mean
pleasantness scores over diﬀerent image content. The results basically coincide with the
observations in Figure 5.19, revealing a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in pleasantness between
the 10 protection methods. In addition, the box plots also reveal somewhat inﬂuence of
image content on pleasantness, although such an impact is not signiﬁcant: For most of
the protection methods, the maximum diﬀerence in pleasantness scores between images
is in range of 1 and 1.5; Also, for a certain method, the pleasantness scores of diﬀerent
images do not usually change drastically across the boundary (5.0) between pleasant and
unpleasant emotions.
Usage Pleasantness We then analyze the results on usage pleasantness measured by
the three preference votes. For each protection method, we ﬁrst compute the overall
proportions of votes for “Dislike”, “Neutral” and “Like” respectively. The results are shown
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Figure 5.21 – Histograms of “Dislike”, “Neutral” and “Like” for diﬀerent protection methods.
in Figure 5.21. Again, the two Emoji stickers Smiley and TearsJoy obtain the most votes
for “Like”, above 60% and 55% respectively. For the two methods, about 20% subjects
voted for “Dislike” and 20% for “Neutral”. Similar as the observations in perception
pleasantness, Pixelate and Blur also received a large number of votes for “Like” (35% and
51%), and in the same time a large number of votes for “Neutral” (both around 30%).
Particularly, the Blur protection received the minimum proportion of votes for “Dislike”,
which might due to its high visual naturalness. This time, the Vendetta mask also got
a considerable proportion of votes for “Like” with the smallest proportion of “Neutral”
among all the 10 methods. Compared to SnapGhost and C-Stamp, Vendetta got the
same number of votes for “Dislike”. This reveals that the Vendetta mask is prone to being
either liked or disliked by people. In addition, the other methods all received much less
votes for “Like”. Among all the 10 methods, the two distortion-based obfuscations, JPEG
Scrambling and P3 are the least preferred by people for usage.
Perception pleasantness vs. Usage pleasantness Comparing the results between
perception pleasantness and usage pleasantness, one observes a signiﬁcant correlation.
To investigate how the two types of pleasantness correlate with each other, we make
the scatter plots in Figure 5.22, showing the the perception pleasantness MOS versus
the proportions of “Dislike”, “Neutral” and “Like” votes of each image respectively. In
addition, two correlation metrics are computed to quantify the degree of correlation: the
Pearson correlation coeﬃcient11 [77] and the Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient12. As
Figure 5.22 shows, the perception pleasantness (MOS) is highly correlated with the two
votes for “Dislike” and “Like”, but not obvious for “Neutral”. The two correlation scores
between perception pleasantness and proportion of “Like” are both higher than 0.9. The
absolute values of two correlation scores between perception pleasantness and “Dislike”
11https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy-0.14.0/reference/generated/scipy.stats.pearsonr.html
12https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy-0.15.1/reference/generated/scipy.stats.spearmanr.html
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Figure 5.22 – Correlation between perception pleasantness (MOS) and proportion of votes
for three diﬀerent preference options.
are both greater than 0.95, but representing a strong negative correlation. However, the
proportion of votes for “Neutral” is not obviously correlated to perception pleasantness,
where both correlation scores are close to zero.
5.3 Discussions
Security In the proposed JPEG Transmorphing algorithm, sensitive privacy information
is considered to be associated in the sub-image, which is encrypted before being inserted
in the protected JPEG image. Therefore, the security of the proposed algorithm mostly
relies on the encryption algorithm applied on the sub-image. In practice, the state of the
art algorithm can be used to encrypt the sub-image, e.g. Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [78]. The security analysis is out of the scope of this thesis.
Privacy The primary purpose of using JPEG Transmorphing is to protect regional
visual privacy in image, in a reversible and personalized manner. Frankly, obfuscation of
partial image regions may not perfectly preserve privacy revealed from other unprotected
regions, as is shown in Section 5.2.3 and [44]. Yet, we still consider it as a powerful tool
to protect privacy in cases where meaningful context information is unavailable. As our
experiments in Section 5.2.3 imply, if “attackers” do not possess considerable amount
of relevant context information about the protected person, hiding just a head region
can signiﬁcantly decrease the accuracy and conﬁdence of person recognition. We also
admit that our experiments have certain limitations to perfectly simulate the realistic
scenarios. For example, in the experiments, subjects only needed to identify the person
from 9 candidate identities, which already provides a 10% probability to get the correct
answer by just a random guess. Besides, we had to explicitly tag each identity in reference
images so that subjects could conduct the survey. It is however not easy in reality for
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Table 5.4 – Qualitative comparison of diﬀerent reversible visual privacy protection methods.
Sc., Cr., Co. and Ro. denote four types of image transformations, namely scaling, cropping,
JPEG compression and rotation respectively.
Method ModiﬁedDomain
Level of
Overhead Visual Eﬀect
Regional
Protection
Compatibility with
Image Transformation
Sc. Cr. Co. Ro.
Poller [31] Pixel Median(<160%) Distorted
√ √ × √ ×
P3 [32] DCT Low(<40%) Distorted
√ √ √ √ √
Cryptagram [33] Bitstream Varied(40 - 680%) Personalized × × × × ×
PUPPIES [19] DCT Varied(50 - 800%) Distorted
√ √ √ √ √
Wright [15] Pixel Varied(100 - 800%) Distorted × × ×
√ √
Sun [18] DCT Low(<6%) Distorted ×
√ × √ √
JPEG
Scrambling DCT
Low
(<20%) Distorted
√ × × × √
JPEG
Transmorphing DCT
Median
(<120%) Personalized
√ √ √ √ √
an “attacker” to know which set of public images belong to the protected person, among
all the public images he/she can access. Therefore, in reality, recognition of a protected
person from merely an image without direct context information available might be more
diﬃcult.
Usability In fact, the JPEG Transmorphing employs the similar idea as P3, where two
portions of the same image are generated: a public portion that can be available to any
party and a secret portion considered as secret and privacy-sensitive. The most signiﬁcant
diﬀerence is that, JPEG Transmorphing preserves the secret portion, namely the sub-
image, in the protected ﬁle itself (the public portion) in form of APPn markers. While
P3 splits the two portions in two separate ﬁles and employs another server to manage the
secret image. Compared to JPEG Transmorphing, the drawbacks of P3 are twofold: (i)
It creates two separate ﬁles, which potentially complicates the ﬁle management system.
(i) P3 generates only the grayish visual eﬀects in its public images, which basically has
no diﬀerence from any other distortion-based approach in the pleasantness point of view.
This brings us to the discussion on the usability of our proposed method. With JPEG
Transmorphing, one can protect arbitrary image regions using most types of spatial-
domain manipulations, including not only conventional ﬁlters like blurring, pixelation
and warping, but also various interesting image manipulations such as inpainting, sticker
addition, and image style transfer [79]. It provides a signiﬁcant ﬂexibility and usability
such that users can choose their preferred ways to protect any sensitive image regions
while preserving the reversibility of the protected image. This is the most distinctive
63
Chapter 5. Secure JPEG Transmorphing
characteristic of our method compared to the others. Although such a high usability is at
the cost of ﬁle size expansion in the Transmorphed image, the ﬁle size can be adjusted by
the proposed approaches to overhead control or ﬁne-grained deﬁnition of protection ROIs.
To summarize our discussions, a qualitative comparison of selected reversible methods
for visual privacy protection is given in Table 5.4. From this comparison, one can observe
the advantage of the proposed JPEG Transmorphing over other methods: Using JPEG
Transmorphing, reversibility of protected images can be achieved at the cost of a moderate
level of storage overhead. At the same time, image protected with JPEG Transmorphing
is robust to most image manipulations. While, most all methods cannot fulﬁll all the
above features.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents secure JPEG Transmorphing, a ﬂexible framework for protecting
image visual privacy in a secure, reversible and personalized manner. The working
principle of JPEG Transmorphing is using JPEG application segments markers (APPn)
to secretly preserve partial original image information, while encoding the “cover” JPEG
image in a visually protected form. The original image visual information can be
protected by almost any image obfuscation, such as visual masking, blurring, pixelation,
inpainting and warping. The protected image (Transmorphed image) has the same
syntax as standard JPEG, and is therefore backward compatible with JPEG. With a
dedicated JPEG transcoder or decoder that supports JPEG Transmorphing, the original
image can be recovered by replacing the obfuscated regions in the protected image with
the corresponding original regions extracted from APPn markers. Performances of the
proposed method have been evaluated and studied with a set of experiments. Experimental
results show that the images protected with JPEG Transmorphing are robust to most
lossy and lossless image transformations like scaling, rotation, cropping and compression.
Although a Transmorphing protection causes overhead to image ﬁle size, such overhead
can be modulated by the proposed overhead control mechanisms, without aﬀecting the
reconstruction quality. In addition, with two subjective experiments conducted via online
crowdsourcing, the proposed method shows great potentials to provide a good degree of
privacy preservation, and much higher usability from a subjective pleasantness point of
view than JPEG Scrambling and P3. We admit that regional image obfuscation may not
oﬀer the perfect protection to privacy as unprotected regions in image may still reveal
private information. Yet, it is useful enough in many practical scenarios of online photo
sharing. For instance, when one attempts to protect his/her children or a license plate in
image from public but still hopes to share the original image with intimate connections,
the proposed secure JPEG Transmorphing is well competent for the job.
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6 ProShare: Privacy-Preserving
Photo Sharing based on a PKI
OSN sites usually oﬀer conditional access as a mechanism to help users protect their own
privacy. Conditional access works based on the fact that users need to trust the service
provider to enforce the access control based on user-deﬁned policy. Irrespective of a service
provider’s sincerity in matters of privacy, all image sharing platforms exhibit the same
basic ﬂaw: Once an image has left the device it was created on, its owner loses control
over who will have access to his image, when and where. Researchers have proposed
diﬀerent approaches to preserve privacy by secure protection of image content. Here,
the protection and reconstruction are based on a secret key and most of the proposed
approaches can be seen as a “symmetric encryption”, where one of the central issues is
how to exchange keys between subjects. However, in most proposed approaches, this
issue is not addressed and most studies simply assume that users exchange symmetric
keys in an oﬄine secure channel.
In this chapter, we present ProShare, an architecture for a privacy preserving service
applicable to image protected by Secure JPEG. The architecture is built based on a public
key infrastructure (PKI) integrated with a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE). In ProShare, a photo is securely protected by a Secure JPEG protection
algorithm with a secret key. The secured photo is then safely kept on an untrusted
service (server, cloud, etc.). Meanwhile, the secret key is encrypted by CP-ABE with a
user-deﬁned access policy. With the help of the PKI, users can share ABE private keys
between each other and only those who possess the right ABE private keys associated
with matched attributes are able to recover the original image.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 outlines the fundamental
cryptographic protocols ﬂowing into this work. Section 6.2 describes in detail the system
design with particular emphasis on the use of diﬀerent cryptographic protocols and how
these are integrated to provide a consistent and secure process ﬂow. Section 6.3 presents
our implementation of a demonstrator based on the proposed architecture. Finally,
Section 6.4 concludes this chapter.
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6.1 Cryptography Basics
This section provides the fundamentals of cryptography protocols that are used in the
proposed privacy-preserving photo sharing architecture. It starts with the conventional
public key cryptography and infrastructure followed by a special type of public key
encryption in which the secret key of a user and the ciphertext are dependent upon
attributes, namely attribute-based encryption.
6.1.1 Public Key Cryptography and Infrastructure
Secure protection of an image powered by Secure JPEG can be considered a form of
symmetric encryption, where the same secret key is used to protect (encrypt) and recover
(decrypt) the image. Therefore, securely exchanging secret keys with diﬀerent entities,
more precisely, the people who are authorized to see the original image, is vital and
challenging. Public key cryptography (PKC) provides a reliable and eﬃcient way to
exchange secrets securely. PKC is an asymmetric cryptography, where a pair of keys is
used to encrypt (using public key) and decrypt (using private key) a message respectively.
Any user who wants to share a secret message obtains the public key of the intended
recipient, encrypts the message using this key and sends it to the recipient. On the other
side, the recipient uses his private key to decrypt the encrypted message. Therefore, the
public key can be available to public and does not reveal any secret information. While
the private key should be kept securely by its owner so that no one else can decrypt a
message that is encrypted by his/her public key. Various public key algorithms have been
proposed, among which RSA [80] is the most widely used.
Authentication of a public key is the central problem of using public-key cryptography,
i.e. how to prove a public key belongs to the right person or entity claimed, or has
not been tampered with or replaced by a malicious third party. The usual solution
to this issue is the public key infrastructure (PKI), an arrangement that binds public
keys with respective identities of entities (people or organizations). The binding process
is established through registration and issuance of digital certiﬁcates by a certiﬁcate
authority (CA). A digital certiﬁcate certiﬁes the ownership of a public key by the named
subject of the certiﬁcate, which allows others to rely upon signatures or on assertions
made about the private key that corresponds to the certiﬁed public key. The CA digitally
signs and publishes the public key bound to a given user, using the CA’s own private key.
Therefore, the CA acts as a trusted third party (TTP): trusted both by the owner of the
certiﬁcate and by the entities relying upon the certiﬁcate.
6.1.2 Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a relatively new cryptography approach that revises
the concept of conventional public key cryptography. As the name implies, ABE brings
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Figure 6.1 – Illustration of two schemes of attribute-based encryption.
the notions of Attributes and Policy during the encryption and decryption procedures.
The principle of ABE is to enable a ciphertext to be decrypted by multiple secret keys
possessed by diﬀerent entities, as long as the secret keys and the ciphertext have a
good match in terms of attributes and an access policy ABE deﬁnes an identity not
atomically but as a set of attributes about the identity, e.g. the age, role and relationship.
An attribute in ABE can be either a nominal (e.g. ‘Close Friend’ or ‘Name:Alice’),
a numerical (e.g. ‘age >= 18’ or ‘ID = 6’) or a negation (e.g. ‘NOT Name:Bob’)
expression. A policy is an access structure over the universe of attributes, constructed
using conjunctions, disjunctions or (k, n)-threshold gates. A typical example of access
policy is (‘Close Friend’ OR ‘Family’ OR (‘age > 16’ AND ‘age <= 25’ AND
(NOT ‘Bob’))). Depending on the association of attributes and access structure, two
types of ABE schemes have been developed: the Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(KP-ABE) [81] and the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [82].
We use two diagrams in Figure 6.1 to illustrate the working principle of KP-ABE and
CP-ABE respectively.
In KP-ABE, the access policy is encoded in each entity’s private key, and the ciphertext
is associated with a set of attributes. A private key is able to decrypt a ciphertext only is
the set of attributes in the ciphertext satisfy the policy integrated in the key. In KP-ABE,
the access policy is enforced on the private keys of users and therefore the encryptor
is considered to exert no control over who can access the data he/she encrypts [82],
except by his choice of descriptive attributes for the data. The encryptor has to trust the
key-issuer to issue appropriate keys to grant or deny access to the appropriate users. In
this regard, the “intelligence” of KP-ABE is assumed to be with the key-issuer, rather
than the encryptor.
In CP-ABE, the access policy is integrated in the ciphertext when encrypting a
message, and a user’s private key is associated with a set of attributes. If the attributes
in a private key satisfy the policy associated in a ciphertext, the private key is able
to decrypt the ciphertext. Therefore, CP-ABE allows to realize an implicit access
control, where authorization is included in encrypted data and only those who are given
attributes-matched private keys can access the original data. Contrary to KP-ABE, the
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“intelligence” of CP-ABE is exerted on the data-encryptor, rather than the key-issuer.
Another advantage of CP-ABE over KP-ABE is that users can obtain their private keys
after data has been encrypted. The data can be encrypted by only specifying the access
policy that allows to decrypt it, without knowing the actual set of users who may have
access. Any future user that will be issued a key with respect to attributes satisfying
the policy will be able to decrypt the data. A CP-ABE protocol usually consists of the
following fundamental algorithms or operations [82]:
1. Setup: The initial setup procedure takes as input implicit security parameters (e.g.
random seed initialized by a user ID or name) and generates a pair of keys for a
user: an ABE public key (APK) and an ABE master secret key (AMSK).
2. Key Generation (AMSK, A): This algorithm takes as input the ABE master
secret key AMSK and an attribute set A to generate an ABE private key ASK.
3. Encryption (APK, m, S): The encryption algorithm encrypts a message m to its
ciphertext Cm. Input parameters include the ABE public key APK, the message m
and an access structure deﬁned by S.
4. Decryption (APK, Cm, ASK): The decryption algorithm takes as input the
ciphertext Cm, the ABE public key APK of the encryptor, and an ABE private key
ASK of the decryptor. Only if the set of attributes A′ associated in ASK satisfy the
access structure S implicitly deﬁned in the ciphertext Cm, i.e. S(A′) = True, will
the original message m be successfully decrypted.
Due to the above stated reasons, we employed CP-ABE in the proposed ProShare photo
sharing architecture. The security proofs including more detailed mathematics of CP-ABE
algorithms is given in [82, 83] and therefore is not covered in the thesis.
6.2 ProShare: The Architecture Design
In this section we describe in detail the architecture design of ProShare. All notations
with corresponding descriptions used in this chapter are listed in Table 6.1. To better
understand the following, we ﬁrst distinguish two types of roles in such a photo sharing
system: (i) the sender, who wants to post and share a photo with friends; (ii) the requester,
who attempts to review a photo shared by the sender.
6.2.1 Operating Principle
First of all, we deﬁne the following functional requirements for the proposed photo sharing
architecture: A sender can select and then protect an arbitrary set of regions in a given
photo, using any preferred visual obfuscation; Once protected, the resulting image ﬁle can
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Table 6.1 – Notations used in describing ProShare architecture.
Notation Description
ui A user identiﬁed by i
ui.SS.KS ui’s storage service (SS) on key server (KS)
ui.SS.CS ui’s storage service (SS) on content cerver (CS)
(m, Cm) A pair of plaintext m and its ciphertext Cm
(IO, IP ) A pair of original image IO and its protected form IP
(TPK, TSK) A pair of PKC public key TPK and private key TSK
(APK, AMSK) A pair of ABE public key APK and master secret key AMSK
ASKi→j ABE private key ASK for user j issued by user i
JPEGSec(IO, P) The function to protect an image IO using a Secure JPEG protection
algorithm deﬁned by a parameter set P, which speciﬁes the algorithm
type (Scrambling or Transmorphing), secret key and algorithm speciﬁc
parameters, e.g. mask matrix, strength (Scrambling) or/and encryption
scheme (Transmorphing)
JPEGRec(IP , K) The function to recover the original image from a secure image IP with a
secret key K
PKCSetup() The function to generate a pair of PKC public key TPK and PKC private
key TSK
PKCEnc(m, TPK) The function to encrypt a message m in PKC with a public key TPK
PKCDec(c, TSK) The function to decrypt a ciphertext c in PKC with a private key TSK
ABESetup() The function to generate pair of ABE public key APK and ABE master
secret key AMSK
ABEKeyGen(A, AMSK) The function to generate an ABE private key APK with an attribute set
A and an ABE master secret key AMSK as input
ABEEnc(m, S, APK) The function to encrypt a message m in CP-ABE with an access structure
S and an ABE public key APK as input
ABEDec(c, ASK, APK) The function to decrypt a ciphertext c in CP-ABE with an ABE private
key ASK and an ABE public key APK as input
be freely shared and viewed with any JPEG compliant decoder; The shared image ﬁle is
internally consistent and therefore contains all the data necessary to view both protected
and unprotected image regions; Finally, the photo sender can dynamically associate an
access policy with the protected photo and assign a set of attributes with prospective
requester. Only if the photo sender has granted a requester a set of matching attribute(s)
compared to the access policy deﬁned for the photo, will this photo be accessible to that
particular requester. Complying with the above attributes, such a service allows for the
protection of privacy in photos prior to them leaving the user’s device. Once shared,
the photo sender retains control over who can view which parts of a privacy protected
photo. And ﬁnally, the protected photo can be freely shared and viewed, albeit only in
its protected form unless a requester has been authorized by the photo sender.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the overall architecture of ProShare, which consists of two types of
components: client-side components and server-side components. Client-side components
mainly refer to users local devices such as phone and laptop (including applications and
software) on which the secure protection/recovery of images and the generation/encryp-
tion/decryption of secret keys take place. Users secret information, including the PKC
private keys and ABE master secret keys, are kept on the client side. All client-side com-
ponents are assumed to be trustworthy. ProShare users store their image data (protected)
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Figure 6.2 – Overview of ProShare architecture for privacy-preserving photo sharing.
including encrypted keys on a storage service (SS). Two types of servers are employed in
each user’s storage service: (i) content server (CS), which is a speciﬁc server, storage space
or cloud server (e.g., Dropbox) storing all users protected images; (ii) key server (KS),
which keeps all the encrypted keys (image secret keys and ABE private keys). In addition,
each ProShare user is identiﬁed by a user ID and a single PKC public key. We assume the
existence of a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA) on the key server responsible for issuing public
key certiﬁcate upon users requests. The content server and key server do not need to be
trusted, but are assumed to operate correctly according to the proposed protocol, namely
“honest-but-curious”. In addition, we assume all users do not permanently cache images
they have viewed, image secret keys and ABE private keys on their client-side devices.
The aim is to release the storage burden of the client side as much as possible, and more
importantly for the purpose of revocation, which will be discussed in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.2 Operations
The complete ﬂow of ProShare operations including how diﬀerent cryptographic protocols
collaborate is described in the following.
Initialization
First of all, a user registers an account by setting a username and password. Then the
system (client-side) assigns the user an ID and generates two pairs of keys for the user:
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Function 1 UserInit(Username, Password)
1: i ← GenerateUserID(Username, Password)
2: Ki ← PBKDF2(Password)
3: (TPKi,TSKi) ← PKCSetup()
4: (APKi,AMSKi) ← ABESetup()
5: ui.SS.KS.put(TPKi)
6: ui.SS.KS.put(APKi)
Function 2 AddFriend(ui,Ai→j)
1: ASKi→j ← ABEKeyGen(Ai→j ,AMSKi)
2: CASKi→j ← PKCEnc(ASKi→j ,TPKj)
3: ui.SS.KS.put(CASKi→j )
PKC key pair (TPK, TSK) and ABE key pair (APK, AMSK). In addition, a master key K
for the user is generated by a password-based key derivation function (e.g. PBKDF2 [84]).
The TPK is uploaded and managed by the centralized CA and the APK in the key server
of the user. While, the user keeps his/her TSK, AMSK, K and a copy of the APK securely
on the client side. The entire procedure is presented in Function 1.
Friending
The user then invokes the Function 2 to add another user as friend featured by a set of
attributes. The user generates an attribute secret key using the ABEKenGen() function,
encrypts this key using the public key of the target user, and then stores the encrypted
key on the key server of his/her storage service.
Example Usage: Alice attempts to add Bob as friend and therefore generates Bob
an ABE private key ASKAlice→Bob with the set of attributes: (‘Bob’, ‘Close Friend’,
‘Co-worker’). Alice encrypts this key using Bob’s PKC public key TPKBob and stores
the encrypted key CASKAlice→Bob on her storage service under the key server. Another user
Carol, as a classmate of Alice, hopes to be a friend of Alice and therefore sends a request
to Alice. Alice accepts the request and issues Carol an ABE private key in the same way
as is for Bob, with a diﬀerent set of attributes: (‘Carol’, ‘Co-worker’, ‘Education’).
Photo Protection and Sharing
In this step, described by Function 3, the user protects a photo with a Secure JPEG
protection algorithm (Scrambling or Transmorphing). The secret key for image protection
is derived from the master secret key of the user, and is then encrypted with CP-ABE
under an access structure S, deﬁned by the user in either manual or automatic way. The
encrypted image secret key is uploaded to the user’s storage service under the key server.
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Function 3 SharePhoto(ui, I,P, S)
1: salt ← RandomGen()
2: key ← PBKDF2(Ki, salt)
3: IP ← JPEGSec(I, key,P)
4: Ckey ← ABEEnc(key, S,APKi)
5: ui.SS.CS.put([IP , salt])
6: ui.SS.KS.put(Ckey)
Function 4 AccessPhoto(uj , IP , ui)
1: CASKi→j ← ui.SS.KS.get()
2: if CASKi→j exists then
3: ASKi→j ← PKCDec(CASKi→j ,TSKj)
4: APKi ← ui.SS.KS.get(APK of ui)
5: Ckey ← ui.SS.KS.get(encrypted secret key for IP )
6: (result, key) ← ABEDec(Ckey,ASKi→j ,APKi)
7: if result is True then # CP-ABE decryption is succeeded and key is valid
8: I ′O ← JPEGRec(IP , key)
9: return I ′O
10: else # CP-ABE decryption failed and key is invalid
11: Exit with warning: “Sorry, you have no right to access the original photo.”
12: else # CASKi→j does not exist
13: Exit with warning: “Sorry, you are not a friend of the user.”
Example Usage: Alice takes a photo with Carol and attempts to share this photo to
Carol, to family and intimate friends. However, for some reason, she does not wish to
share the entire photo Bob and others. So Alice protects an image region in the photo,
uploads the photo to the photo sharing service (the content server) and sets the following
access structure: ( ‘Family’ OR ‘Close Friend’ OR ‘Carol’ AND (NOT ‘Bob’) ).
The secret key is then encrypted in CP-ABE with respect to the access structure.
Photo Accessing and Viewing
On the other side, a requester uj tries to recover and view the original version of a photo
shared by ui. The user ﬁrstly requests from the key server his ABE private key issued by
ui. If this key does not exist, it means uj is not even a friend of ui and therefore has no
right to access the original picture. If the key exists, uj decrypts the key using his PKC
private key, and then uses the decrypted ABE private key to decrypt the image secret key
in CP-ABE. If CP-ABE decryption succeeds, meaning that uj has been granted the right
to access the original photo, uj recovers the image using the decrypted image secret key.
When the complete photo viewing activity is ﬁnished and uj has no long been watching
the picture for a certain duration t, the decrypted image key and recovered image is
deleted permanently from uj ’s device. The above operations are deﬁned in Function 4.
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Example Usage: Carol attempts to view the photo shared by Alice in the previous
example. Since Carol has an attribute ‘Carol’ in her ABE private key issued by Alice,
which satisﬁes the access policy deﬁned for the photo: (‘Family’ OR ‘Close Friend’
OR ‘Carol’ AND (NOT ‘Bob’) ), Carol is able to view the original photo. Bob also
attempts to view the same picture but failed, although he is deﬁned as a ‘Close Friend’
of Alice. This is because Bob is excluded by the access structure. Except for Bob, any
other user in the group ‘Family’ or ‘Close Friend’ are able to see the original version
of this photo.
Revocations
Users connections in the environment of social networks are dynamic and may change
over time. Users may also hope to change the access policy of the photos they shared in
the past. Therefore, an eﬃcient solution to revoke a user’s access right or to change a
photo’s access policy is indispensable. In the current design of the proposed ProShare
architecture, we hold the assumption that users would not permanently cache the image
they have viewed, the image secret keys and ABE private keys they have decrypted on
their client device. This means each time when attempting to view a photo of another
user, the requester must execute the Function 4, namely, making a new request to the
photo sharing service, retrieves and decrypts again corresponding keys from server. With
this assumption, we provide two simple and ﬂexible solutions for the two revocation
problems respectively based on key re-encryption.
Revocation of access right of a user: To revoke or update the access rights of an
existing friend, one can simply generate and encrypt a new ABE private key for that
friend using a newly deﬁned attribute set. Another extreme case would be to simply
“unfriend” a user by removing the ABE private key of that user from key server. These
operations are described in Function 5 and 6.
Revocation of access policy of a photo: This is the scenario where a user hopes
to change the access range of her/his photos. In this case, the user can simply re-encrypt
the image secret key, using a newly deﬁned access policy. For example, to restrict the
access of a photo that was available to (‘Family’ OR ‘Close Friend’ OR ‘Carol’), one
can re-encrypt the image key using the new access policy ( ‘Family’ OR ‘Carol’ ), to
make it only accessible to family members and Carol. Another particular case is to delete
a photo, where one can simply remove the photo and corresponding secret keys from
server. This process is presented in Function 7 and 8.
Alternatively, the above approaches based on key re-encryption for revocation provide
users with ﬂexible solutions to grant more access rights to friends or increase access range
of photos. Since the generation of ABE private keys and CP-ABE encryption operations
are proven fast enough with a limited number of attributes, e.g., below 20 [82], such
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Function 5 UpdateFriend(ui,A∗i→j)
/∗ A∗i→j is a new set of attributes. ∗/
1: ui.SS.KS.remove(CASKi→j )
2: AddFriend(ui,A∗i→j)
Function 6 RemoveFriend(ui)
1: ui.SS.KS.remove(CASKi→j )
revocation approaches are eﬃcient and ﬂexible in most practical cases. More advanced
approaches to revocations [27, 85] can also be used, both relying on a minimally trusted
proxy to handle revoked users and attributes.
Negation in Access Structure
Negation expression like (NOT ‘Bob’) is not directly supported in the common imple-
mentation of CP-ABE [82]. However, some negation expressions can be solved by being
converted to numerical expressions, making use of the unique ID of user. Let us assume
the ID is a number, for example, Bob holds the ID of 8. The negation expression (
NOT ‘Bob’ ) in above example could be converted to ( ‘UserID < 8’ OR ‘UserID >
8’ ). Similarly, conjunction of negation expressions can be interpreted as combination of
several numerical comparison expressions, e.g. ( (NOT ‘Bob’) AND (NOT ‘David’) ) is
equivalent to ( (‘UserID < 8’) OR (‘UserID > 8’ AND ‘UserID < 16’) OR (‘UserID
> 16’) ), where 16 is the ID of David.
6.3 Prototype and Implementation
A prototype application named ProShare has been developed to demonstrate the minimum
functionalities of the proposed photo sharing architecture. We use RSA (key length 1024-
bit) in PHP1 as the public key encryption algorithm and the cpabe toolkit2 to implement
the functionalities of CP-ABE. For Secure JPEG image protection, we demonstrate JPEG
Transmorphing with scrambling as the encryption scheme for securing sub-image.
The prototype application consists of two parts: (i) a client mobile interface, running on
both iOS and Android platforms, and (ii) a web server hosting images and managing secret
keys. For the ease of implementation, the protection of images, secret key management
and various encryption and decryption operations all perform on the server. Instead,
the mobile application simply acts as a user interface. In such a way, the implemented
prototype application is designed to simulate the behavior of the proposed photo sharing
1http://php.net/manual/en/function.openssl-public-encrypt.php
2http://hms.isi.jhu.edu/acsc/cpabe/
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Function 7 UpdatePhoto(ui, IP , S∗)
/∗ S∗ is a new access structure. ∗/
1: salt ← ui.SS.CS.get(the salt of IP )
2: key∗ ← PBKDF2(Ki, salt) # key∗: a new image secret key
3: C∗key ← ABEEnc(key, S∗,APKi) # C∗key: re-encrypted image secret key
4: ui.SS.KS.replace(Ckey,C∗key)
Function 8 RemovePhoto(ui, IP )
1: ui.SS.KS.remove(Ckey)
2: ui.SS.CS.remove([IP , salt])
architecture. In our implementation, the web service consists of three components, each
for performing/storing a set of ProShare operations/data:
• Trusted Component (TC): hosts users certain secret information such as PKC
private keys and ABE master keys. The Secure JPEG protection and recovery also
happen on this component. We use this part of the web service to simulate some of
encryption/decryption operations supposed to happen on client device, which is
assumed to be trusted.
• Key Service Component (KSC): acts as the key server deﬁned in Section 6.2,
for storing encrypted keys and issuing PKC public keys.
• Content Service Component (CSC): acts as the content server deﬁned in
Section 6.2, for storing users protected images.
6.3.1 Functionalities
The prototype application simulates the following minimum functionalities of the proposed
photo sharing architecture.
User Registration Each user registers an account using an e-mail address. Upon
registration, two pairs of keys (TPK/TSK, APK/AMSK) are generated. The two public
keys (TPK and APK) are then stored and managed by KSC and the other two secret
keys are stored to on TC in each user’s storage space3. This step happens on the TC.
Photo Protection and Sharing User takes a picture from the mobile device and
applies a Transmorphing protection by placing one or more image stickers (selected by
3Each user has an individual folder on TC.
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Figure 6.3 – Screenshots of ProShare iOS application.
user) onto sensitive image regions. The mask matrix is computed on the mobile device
and then sent to TC along with the original image, protected image, image secret key and
deﬁned access policy. Then the actual protection based on Secure JPEG Transmorphing
takes place on TC. Once ﬁnishing protection, the secure photo is uploaded and stored on
the CSC while the original image and mask matrix are deleted. Meanwhile, the image
secret key is encrypted in CP-ABE under the user-deﬁned access policy. In the current
implementation, the image secret key is manually set by user.
Friendship Management The application allows user to add friend by specifying the
email address of another user and a set of attributes. In the current implementation, we
only consider a certain number of relation-based attributes, such as ‘Family’, ‘Close
Friend’, ‘Colleague’, ‘Education’ and ‘Current city’. The friend’s ASK is then
generated and encrypted according to the algorithm described in Section 6.2. Both the
generation and PKC encryption of ASKs happen TC.
Photo Viewing In the prototype application, all photos are by default public to
everyone in protected form. Only those who were assigned the authorized attributes are
able to view the original photos. The key decryption and image reconstruction processes
take place on TC. The recovered image is sent to and displayed on the mobile phone.
After ﬁnishing reviewing the photo, the recovered image along with decrypted image keys
are deleted from TC.
Interaction with Facebook In addition, the application also allows user to share
images protected in Secure JPEG on Facebook in the form of App Links4. By clicking the
4http://applinks.org/
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shared link, other Facebook users are directed to either the ProShare App (if ProShare
installed on the mobile device) or a web interface (otherwise). If the user has an account on
ProShare, the photo can be shown to the user depending on his/her “relation” (attributes)
with the photo sender. On the web interface, a secret key has to be manually provided in
order to recover the image.
Two interfaces (iOS and Android) of the prototype application have been developed and
made publicly available on the Apple Store5 and Google Play6 respectively. Screenshots
of the iOS App demonstrating ProShare are shown in Figure 6.3.
6.3.2 Evaluation
Based on the prototype implementation, we conducted a simple evaluation experiment to
examine the time required for key ProShare operations: (i) adding friend (Function 2),
(ii) share photo (Function 3) and (iii) access photo (Function 4). The evaluation was
performed using an iPhone 5C as interface and all images were taken from the iPhone
camera and resized to a smaller size (max. width or height of 1080 pixels) before being
uploaded to the server. The server employed has an 8-core Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU
with 2.80GHz and 16GB memory. To evaluate the time for adding friend, we used the
application to add 8 target users as friend using diﬀerent number of attributes, from
1 to 8, respectively. To evaluate the time for sharing photos, we selected 30 photos
from iPhone gallery (taken either from frontal or back camera), apply protection using
a random cartoon sticker on a face region, and share each photo with CP-ABE using
diﬀerent policies containing varying numbers of attributes with conjunction “OR”. The
number of attributes is changed from 1 to 8. To evaluate the time for accessing photo,
we used each of the 8 target users’ account to access each of the 30 photos protected
the 8-attributes policy. Here we assume the photo accessing time may depends on the
number of matched attributes between the user’s ABE private key and the access policy.
Figure 6.4 displays measurements (mean and 95% conﬁdence interval) of time for adding
friend, sharing photo and accessing photo respectively. From the result, one observes
that the time for photo sharing and friend addition operations linearly increases as the
number of attributes increases, and this result well agrees with the performance results of
the cpabe toolkit in [82]. Even with 8 attributes used, it only takes no more than 0.18
seconds in average to share a photo, which are short enough so that one can hardly feel.
Adding friends takes even less time than sharing photos. For accessing photos, the time
slightly increases as the number of “matched” attributes increases. Such an increasing
trend is not obvious and the time spent is always in range of 0.06 and 0.08 seconds. Notice
that all these operations also include the photo uploading, PKC encryption/decryption,
and JPEG Transmorphing protection/recovery; in this respect, our prototype application
5https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/proshare/id1047578277
6https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.epﬂ.proshare
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Figure 6.4 – Performance evaluation of ProShare prototype application.
demonstrates an eﬃcient and fast functioning of the ProShare photo sharing architecture.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present ProShare, an architecture for privacy-preserving photo sharing
based on a public key infrastructure. In ProShare, a sender can select and protect an
arbitrary set of regions in a given photo, using any preferred visual obfuscation, powered
by the Secure JPEG privacy protection algorithms. Once protected, the resulting image
ﬁle can be freely shared and viewed with any JPEG compliant decoder. The shared
image ﬁle is internally consistent and therefore contains all the data necessary to view
both protected and unprotected image regions. Finally, the photo sender can dynamically
associate an access policy with the protected photo and assign a set of attributes with
prospective requester. Only if the photo sender has granted the requester a set of
matching attribute(s) compared to the access policy deﬁned for the photo, will this photo
be accessible to that particular requester. Complying with the above attributes, such
a service allows for the protection of privacy in photos prior to them leaving the user’s
device. Once shared, the photo sender retains control over who can view which parts of
a privacy protected photo. And ﬁnally, the protected photo can be freely shared and
viewed, albeit only in its protected form unless a requester has been authorized by the
photo sender. In the end, we implemented a prototype application built on a dedicated
server communicating with two mobile interfaces, i.e. iOS and Android, to demonstrate
the correct and eﬃcient functioning of the proposed architecture.
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7 ProShare S: Context-Dependent
Privacy-Aware Photo Sharing
Most social networking or photo sharing services provide access control for users to manage
who can access their photos. However, in most services, users need to manually set their
policies in a static manner, without the possibility to share their photos to diﬀerent groups
of people depending on contexts, e.g. the location, time or even nearby people of the
prospective viewer. Most access control mechanisms enforce only binary sharing options,
namely “Yes” or “No”, which may not provide the best experience when a user just wants
to disable partial information in photo sharing. With the recent advancements in image
analytics, pattern recognition, and deep learning techniques, large scale information is
mined from multimedia content shared by users. These information is used for diﬀerent
purposes by service providers, such as content and advertisement recommendations. Those
techniques, though seemingly compromising privacy, can in turn be used to enhance our
privacy, in such a way of helping people estimate the privacy value of their content or
control the access of their content automatically and dynamically.
In this chapter, we present a conceptual architecture for photo sharing, named
ProShare S, where the service provider is granted the trust to help users make photo
sharing decisions automatically based on their past decisions. The proposed architecture
takes into account not only the content of a user-posted image, but also the context
information about the image capture and a prospective requester. Using machine learning,
the system then makes decision whether or not to share a particular photo of a user to a
requester, and if yes, at which granularity.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 describes in detail the
proposed architecture for context-dependent and privacy-preserving photo sharing. Then
Section 7.2 and Section 7.3 present the user study and corresponding evaluations performed
on the collected dataset. Finally, Section 7.4 outlines some discussions and Section 7.5
concludes this chapter.
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Figure 7.1 – Workﬂow of ProShare S architecture.
7.1 ProShare S: The Architecture Design
ProShare S is a “brand new” architecture design for privacy-preserving photo sharing
that employs diﬀerent philosophy compared to the ProShare in Chapter 6. In ProShare
S architecture, the photo sharing service is minimally trusted to apply necessary image
analysis and pattern recognition techniques on user posted photos. However, the infor-
mation extracted from users photos is used to understand the privacy value of those
photos, and then to decide whether or not a particular photo can be disclosed to another
user. The proposed architecture utilizes not only the semantic features of photos but
also the contextual features of the photo capture and the requester, to build a photo
sharing decision making core based on machine learning. The architecture is illustrated
by an example in Figure 7.1. In the following, we describe the operating principle and
the architecture design in detail.
7.1.1 Operating Principle
Security Assumption
First of all, we assume the photo sharing service providers are trustworthy. This means
users allow the service to conduct necessary analysis on their photos, and the system
is granted the right to enforce access control of users photos. Therefore, the proposed
architecture is mainly to guard users privacy against the spying from unauthorized,
curious or malicious people. Actually, it is possible to relax the security assumption of
the ProShare S architecture, in given conditions. This will be discussed in Section 7.4.
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A Practical Scenario
First we assume Alice is the sender and Bob is a requester. The deﬁnitions of the sender
and requester can be found in Section 6.2. We then use the following story to describe
the operating procedures of the proposed architecture: Alice uploads a set of pictures
on the photo sharing service, and the service system analyzes each picture and extracts
a set content and contextual features about those images. Meanwhile, the system asks
Alice a set of questions on her willingness to share each picture to speciﬁed individuals
in various scenarios. These individuals can be selected from those who visited Alice’s
proﬁle recently or frequently. Each scenario describes a certain context of a possible
requester, who attempts to visualize a picture shared by the sender. The context includes
the identity (either real name or social group), location, nearby people and the time when
the requester tries to visualize the image. The system then trains a classiﬁer based on
Alice’s answers for diﬀerent photos in diﬀerent scenarios. On the other side, Bob visits the
proﬁle page of Alice. With the help of the classiﬁer, the system analyzes Bob’s context
and Alice’s photo information, to decide whether or not to show certain photos to Bob,
and if yes, at which granularity.
7.1.2 Feature Deﬁnition
To train such a classiﬁer, we considered two groups of features: Image Semantic
Features (I) and Requester Contextual Features (R). Instead of low-level image
features such as color, texture, composition and SIFT, we considered higher-level semantic
features which we believe have a more immediate inﬂuence on sharing decision. These
features include the image category, number/identities of people in image, activities or
objects in image and the location and time of image capture. The contextual features of
the requester include the requester’s identity, location, nearby people and time.
A detailed description of all the features used in our experiments, grouped in diﬀerent
aspects of context, is shown in Table 7.1. Note that the time of requester is not included
in this list, because it would be too cumbersome for subjects to read and analyze the
complete information containing all contexts. Also, in our study, we could not put subjects
in realistic photo sharing scenarios, due to the lack of a real social networking system.
Therefore, we used only social groups to deﬁne the identities of requester, and added the
gender of requester as another feature. According to diﬀerent natures of features, they
can be deﬁned in diﬀerent data types, such as numerical or categorical. Particularly, we
applied a simpliﬁed Bag-of-words model to describe the people identities and activities in
image, because more than one identities or activities can be in the same image.
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Table 7.1 – Notation and deﬁnition of features in ProShare S.
ID Feature Description
W
h
at
IC
Image:
Category
Major category of the picture, selected from the eight
categories identiﬁed in Instagram pictures [86]: Friends,
Activity, Selﬁe, Food, Pets, Gadget, Fashion and Cap-
tioned photo.
IA
Image:
Activities
Activities involved in the picture, selected from 26 key-
words partially deﬁned by [87]: working, meeting, read-
ing, presentation, resting, chatting, socializing, family,
friends, vacation, TV, cooking, eating, drinking, clean-
ing, shopping, exercising, traveling, walking, landscape,
city, concert, sporting, gaming, gadget and pets.
W
h
o
IP
Image:
# of People The number of people in the picture.
Image:
Identities
The existence of diﬀerent identities in the picture. Eight
types of identities were deﬁned: Sender him/herself,
Family, Close friend, Schoolmate or Colleague, Girl or
Boyfriend, Acquaintance, Celebrity and Stranger.
RI
Requester:
Identity
The relationship between the requester and the sender,
categorized in six types: Family, Close friend, School-
mate or Colleague, Girl or Boyfriend, Acquaintance and
Stranger.
RG
Requester:
Gender Gender of the requester: Female or Male.
RN
Requester:
Nearby
Whether or not the requester has other people nearby
at requesting time.
W
h
er
e
IL
Image:
Location
The semantic location where the image was captured,
selected from 12 major location categories adopted from
Foursquare Location Categories.
Image:
Loc. Coordinates Latitude and longitude of the image capture location.
Image:
Loc. Frequency
The frequency of the sender being present in such place,
selected from Rarely, Sometimes, Often and Almost ev-
eryday.
RL
Requester:
Location
Semantic location of the requester, categorized in Un-
known, Friend’s home, His/her own home, Work place
and Public place.
W
h
en
IT
Image:
Time
The time of photo capture in a ﬂoat value, e.g. 14.5
denotes 2:30 PM.
Image:
Day
The day (in a week) of photo capture, selected from
Monday to Sunday.
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7.1.3 Photo Sharing Decisions
In the proposed photo sharing architecture, we deﬁne three sharing decisions, corre-
sponding to diﬀerent levels of photo information disclosure. The three decisions and
corresponding descriptions presented in the user study are as follows:
Decision 1 - Do NOT Share: No, I don’t want to share the picture.
Decision 2 - Partially Share: Yes, but with some image region protected or/and
metadata (GPS, time, etc.) removed.
Decision 3 - Entirely Share: Yes, I want to share the picture completely.
The reasons of using the speciﬁc three sharing decisions instead of conventional binary
decisions (“Yes” or “No”) are twofold: First, in many scenarios of online photo sharing,
people may want to simply remove partial privacy-sensitive visual information in an
image, such as ID card, license plate or their children faces. Second, most images shared
from smart mobile devices contain metadata such as geotags, camera model and time,
which could also compromise privacy. Therefore, an option should be provided for users
to partially protect and share their image content. Within the framework of ProShare S,
Secure JPEG protection described in Part I of the thesis can be just used to preserve
partial image privacy corresponding to the second decision. To do so, the system can
create a secure version of a photo, with protect region deﬁned by user. Depending on
the predicted decision, the system then releases the corresponding version (protected or
recovered original form) of the image to the requester.
7.2 User Study and Data Collection
We conducted a study that put participants in personalized photo sharing scenarios,
and collected an image dataset containing user-annotated image semantic features and
personal contextual sharing decisions.
7.2.1 The Data Collector
To conduct user study and collect data, we developed an Android application1, named
ProShare S. Several screenshots of the application are shown in Figure A.6 in Appendix A.
The application allows a user to create an account, take pictures, conduct a set of surveys
for each, protect privacy-sensitive image regions, and ﬁnally upload them to a dedicated
server. The workﬂow of a user study using ProShare S is illustrated in Figure 7.2.
Particularly, the survey part is structured in two sets of questionnaires:
1The application is publicly available at http://grebvm2.epﬂ.ch/proshare-s/proShare-rd2.1.apk.
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Figure 7.2 – Workﬂow of user study using ProShare S.
Q1 - Image Semantic Information The ﬁrst questionnaire (Q1) requires the user to
add necessary image semantic tags. This questionnaire appears once a picture has been
taken from either gallery or camera. The questions in Q1 cover all the semantic features
deﬁned in Section 7.1.2. A build-in face detector oﬀered by Android API2 is applied to
count the number of people in image, which can be manually modiﬁed if not correct.
Location coordinates and capture time are automatically extracted from image metadata.
Q2 - Contextual Photo Sharing Decisions Once Q1 is ﬁnished, the user is directed
to the second questionnaire (Q2), where he/she is presented with 12 sharing contexts/ques-
tions. For each context, user needs to decide how he/she would like to share the picture
with the speciﬁc requester, by selecting one of the three decisions deﬁned in Section 7.1.
The description of an example context is “Would you share this picture with a close
friend, when he is at a public place with other people?” The 12 contexts (or questions)
are selected in a special way such that each of the six requester identities appears twice
in a random order, with the other contextual features (gender, location, nearby people)
sampled at random. In the study, basic user proﬁle is also collected through the app. We
therefore present the sharing contexts adaptively based on user’s proﬁle. For instance, for
a female user we present the requester as “your boyfriend” instead of “girl or boyfriend”.
7.2.2 User Study and Dataset Basic Statistics
We recruited 23 volunteers to participate in our user study, and assigned each of them a
task of uploading at least 50 daily pictures of their own and completing corresponding
surveys using ProShare S. Each subject was required to complete the task within a week
and was asked to try to cover a wide range of image content3. Finally, 20 out of the
23 subjects successfully ﬁnished the required task. We therefore kept only the data of
the 20 eﬀective subjects for the later evaluation experiment. A total of 1’018 images
including 12’216 sharing decisions were contributed by the 20 subjects, each providing 50.9
images on average4. Figure 7.3 shows the histogram of images in each content category
2https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/FaceDetector.Face.html
3The instruction and agreement sheet for the user study is available at http://grebvm2.epﬂ.ch/
proshare-s/instruction_sheet_rd2.1.pdf
4The dataset containing all image semantic features and users sharing decisions is publicly available
at http://grebvm2.epﬂ.ch/lin/thesis/dataset/data_ProShareS.zip
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Figure 7.3 – Distribution of (a) images in each category, (b) subjects sharing decisions
and (c) images in each location type.
and location type, and the contextual sharing decisions made on all the images. The
distribution of images over diﬀerent image categories (Figure 7.3(a)) bascially agrees with
the observations found in [86]. From Figure 7.3(b), users sharing decisions are more biased
to Decision 3 (“Entirely Share”) instead of Decision 1 and 2. In addition, one observes a
signiﬁcant number of decisions made on Decision 2, slightly higher than Decision 1, which
indicates the necessity of providing the third photo sharing option (“Partially Share”) for
users instead of only binary sharing (“Yes” or “No”).
7.3 Evaluation and Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed model for decision making, we conducted
three sets of experiments based on the data collected from our user study. We take
the working hypothesis that users photo sharing behaviors and privacy attitudes are
highly subjective and such behaviors or attitudes may change over time from an image to
another. The variance of user behaviors may also cause the proposed model to perform
diﬀerently between subjects.
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7.3.1 Methodology
The ﬁrst experiment focused on the performance of the proposed model with respect
to each user, namely, within-subject analysis. In the second experiment, we explored a
universal one-size-ﬁts-all classiﬁer trained on all users data for predicting a new user’s
decisions. In the third experiment, we investigated the inﬂuences of diﬀerent image and
requester features on the decision making performance of the proposed model.
The WEKA machine learning library5 [88] was used in experiments and three rep-
resentative classiﬁcation methods were considered: logistic regression, support vector
machine (SVM) and random forest. We started with a preliminary test by running a
10-fold cross validation on each user’s data using the three methods and random forest
always outperformed the other two. We therefore kept using random forest for the rest of
the experiment.
To evaluate the decision making performance of the proposed architecture, we use the
following metrics:
• Correct Decision rate: The proportion of correctly predicted decisions.
• Over-Sharing rate: The proportion of cases where image information is shared
more than what user expect to share, which compromises privacy.
• Under-Sharing rate: The proportion of cases where image information is shared
less than what user expects to share, which may compromise usability.
• Kappa statistic: Cohen’s kappa score [89] that measures the chance-corrected
agreement between predicted and ground truth decisions.
7.3.2 Within-Subject Analysis
In the ﬁrst experiment, we considered the scenario where users need ﬁrstly make a
number of sharing decisions manually so that the service can train a classiﬁer to make
the remaining decisions automatically for users. This is to examine the trade-oﬀ between
user-burden and prediction accuracy of the proposed model. In this experiment, we used
diﬀerent proportions (from 10% to 90%) of each subject’s data to train a classiﬁer, and
evaluated the classiﬁer on the rest of the data (evaluation set). The evaluation results
measured by diﬀerent metrics across the 20 subjects are shown as box plots in Figure 7.4.
In this ﬁgure, one observes that the median correct decision rate has already reached 0.75
at a training set of only 10%, which corresponds to only 5 images in average. This means
we could already build an acceptable model for half of the users using a very small number
of images and their decisions. Above the training set of 50%, most users obtained the
5http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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Figure 7.4 – Performance of decision making at diﬀerent sizes of training sets.
correct decision rate higher than 0.8. The median Kappa score at the training set of 10%
is below 0.5 and rapidly reaches 0.6 at the training set of 20%. Above the training size of
60%, an almost perfect prediction is observed for half of the users with a median Kappa
statistic greater than 0.8. On the other hand, both the over-sharing and under-sharing
rates of most users are very low, even at the training set of 10%. However, we observe the
over-sharing rate is always higher than the under-sharing rate. A possible explanation is
that most users tend to share images and the numbers of diﬀerent decisions in the dataset
are imbalanced. From the results, one also observes a signiﬁcant variance between users.
At the training size of 10%, the maximum diﬀerence in correct decision rate between users
is up to 0.44. At the training size of 80%, where the optimal performance is obtained
for most of the users, such diﬀerence still remains around 0.2. Such results agree with
our hypothesis made in the beginning of this section that users subjective behaviors may
inﬂuence the performance of the proposed model.
Cost-Sensitive Learning
To address the issue of over-sharing, we introduced the cost-sensitive learning [90] in our
decision making core. The aim is to evaluate the extent to which incorrect decisions can
be biased towards the under-sharing cases instead of over-sharing, when users concern
their privacy more than usability. We speciﬁed diﬀerent error-penalties C (> 1) for
over-sharing cases and the same penalty of 1 for all under-sharing cases. Therefore, the
training process tries to minimize the following cost equation:
Total Cost =
∑
1≤i<j≤3
(Ci→j ×Ni→j + 1×Nj→i), (7.1)
where Ni→j denotes the number of cases where Decision i is misclassiﬁed classiﬁed
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Table 7.2 – The cost matrix applied in cost-sensitive learning.
↓ classiﬁed as → Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3
Decision 1 0 C1→2 = c C1→3 = 2c
Decision 2 1 0 C2→3 = c
Decision 3 1 1 0
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Figure 7.5 – Performance of cost-sensitive decision making with two diﬀerent values of c.
as Decision j. Specially, we assigned a double error-penalty 2c for the over-sharing
cases C1→3 compared to the other two over-sharing cases. This is because a mistake by
classifying “Do NOT Share” to “Entirely Share” may severely compromise privacy. The
cost matrix for the cost-sensitive learning is shown in Table 7.2.
We experimented with a set of values for c (from 1.5 to 5), on each user’s data using the
same random forest classiﬁcation. The results at c = 2 and c = 4 are shown in Figure 7.5.
With an error-penalty c = 2, the over-sharing rate is greatly reduced to a level lower than
the under-sharing rate. When increasing c to 4, the over-sharing rate is further reduced,
in sacriﬁce of a signiﬁcant increase on the under-sharing rate. This indicates a signiﬁcant
trade-oﬀ between the capability of privacy protection and system usability. In any cases
of cost-sensitive learning, the overall correct decision rate and Kappa statistic do not
change much, as the introduced error-penalty mainly acts as a parameter to tune the
weights of diﬀerent incorrect decisions.
7.3.3 One-Size-Fits-All Model
In the second experiment, we evaluated a one-size-ﬁts-all model, to examine the potential
of building a global classiﬁer trained on the data of all users for predicting decisions on a
new user’s images. Such a model could be useful when a new user has no enough images
or decisions to build a personalized classiﬁer, in which case the global classiﬁer can help
the user make or “recommend” decisions. In this experiment, for sake of fairness, for
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Figure 7.6 – Performance of a One-Size-Fits-All classiﬁer on decision making.
each subject i, we trained a classiﬁer using random forest on the data of all the other
subjects. The classiﬁer was then evaluated on the data of subject i. This corresponds
to a training-to-evaluation ratio of 19:1 in average. Cost-sensitive learning was also
included in this experiment for comparison. The results over all the 20 subjects are shown
in Figure 7.6. The median correct decision, over-/under-sharing rates and the Kappa
statistic without cost-sensitive learning are 0.636, 0.218, 0.155 and 0.348 respectively.
With cost-sensitive learning, the over-sharing rates are reduced below under-sharing,
without greatly degrading the correct decisions and Kappa score. The overall performance
of such a one-size-ﬁts-all model is not as good as the personalized classiﬁer built on each
user’s own data. This again implies that users may have very diﬀerent behaviors and
privacy attitudes towards photo sharing. Nevertheless, such a classiﬁer could already
provide a much more accurate prediction performance than a random guess, the correct
decision rate and Kappa statistic of which would be about only 0.33 and 0.
7.3.4 Inﬂuences of Features on Decision Making
At the end, we investigated the inﬂuences of diﬀerent types of features on users photo
sharing decisions and on the performance of our prediction model. First, the histograms of
three sharing decisions distinguished by diﬀerent types of features are shown in Figure 7.7.
The variation in decision distributions over diﬀerent feature values indicates the inﬂuence
degree of a particular feature type. One observes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in decision
distributions across diﬀerent identities of requester, which implies that the requester
identity inﬂuences users decision making the most. On the other hand, although the
decision distribution does not change much between other contextual features of the
requester, there is still a small decrease of the “Entirely Share” decisions at the cases
where the requester is at an “Unknown” place or with “Other people” nearby. Diﬀerent
types of image semantic features also have moderate degrees of inﬂuence on the sharing
decisions. For instance, users tend to share pictures without people or with a lot of people
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Figure 7.7 – Histogram of photo sharing decisions distinguished by diﬀerent features.
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Figure 7.8 – Correct decision rates obtained on diﬀerent combinations of features.
(≥ 6), more than the pictures with 1 ∼ 5 people. Also, users favor sharing the pictures
containing strangers or celebrities, over personal pictures with closer contacts like family
and close friends.
We then evaluated performance of decision making on diﬀerent combinations of image
and requester features, by conducting a 10-fold cross validation on each user’s data. The
correct decision rates of cross validation of all the 20 subjects are shown in Fig. 7.8. Please
refer to the feature notations in Table 7.1. We gradually remove certain features, and
the leftmost and rightmost box plots in Figure 7.8 show two extreme cases where all the
features (IAll +RAll) or only the requester features (RAll) were used. As is shown, when
reducing features, the correct decision rate of the majority of subjects decreases, which
implies that all those features in general have a positive impact on decision making for
most users. When reducing image-related features, a signiﬁcant variance across diﬀerent
subjects is observed, which indicates that those image features are important for modeling
many users sharing decisions. However, for two of those subjects, the prediction model
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Figure 7.9 – Correct decision rates obtained on combinations of all Image Semantic
Features (IAll) and diﬀerent Requester Contextual Features (R) for ﬁve example users.
still performs well (correct decision rate higher than 0.9) even using only the requester
features (RAll). A possible reason is that the two users made their sharing decisions
mostly dependent on the context of requesters, regardless of the image content.
One also observes that by removing certain requester contextual features, such as
requester gender (RG), location (RL), or nearby people (RN ), the overall accuracy
does not signiﬁcantly change. With merely the requester identity (RI) + all image
features (IAll), the overall decision making accuracy still remains high. This implies that
the requester contextual information than the requester identity has very week or even
negative inﬂuence on decision making. However, this is not always the case for every
subject. Fig. 7.9 illustrates the results of ﬁve example subjects obtained on diﬀerent
combinations of requester contextual features (+ all image features IAll). Here, one
observes that the inclusion of requester contextual features other than the requester
identity inﬂuences decision making quite diﬀerently between users. For instance, the
correct decision rate of User C obtained on all requester features (∼ 0.8) is much higher
than that on only requester identity RI . For User A or D, combining diﬀerent requester
features (RI,L,N or RI,N respectively) generates better accuracy than just using requester
identity RI . However, for User B and E, using only the requester identity RI provides the
best performance, in which case the other contextual features of requester are considered
as noise in machine learning. Such a variance between users again proved our hypothesis
that users have diﬀerent personalized behaviors in photo sharing.
7.4 Discussions
7.4.1 System Security
As is mentioned in Section 7.1.1, we assume the photo sharing service provider in
ProShare S architecture is trusted. The reasons are twofold: First, it is still not possible
to perform certain pattern recognition tasks on mobile devices eﬃciently, e.g. deep-based
image semantic recognition; Second, the system makes sharing decisions in a dynamic way
by analyzing both image content and requester context, which means the decision making
core must lie on the service provider. However, as the development of pattern recognition
on mobile devices, the security requirement of the proposed architecture can be relaxed.
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In another speciﬁc case of the proposed architecture, where only requester’s identity
is taken into account (no other context) in decision making, the security assumption
can be discarded. In this case, the photo sharing decisions are made in a static way
equivalent to predicting an access policy based on the image. According to another
ProShare architecture presented in Chapter 6, such an access policy can be integrated in
a CP-ABE [82] and secure photo sharing can be easily achieved through an untrusted
server.
7.4.2 Automatic Feature Extraction
In this study, we consider mainly image semantic features, which aims to model the photo
sharing decision making process of a real human: Intuitively, when one decides whether
or not to share a particular photo with someone online, he/she may take into account
the privacy-sensitive information in the photo, e.g. the people in the photo, activities
that take place, location where the photo was captured and location information the
photo may reveal. In this study, we did not tackle the automatic extraction of most
image semantics; Instead, we asked subjects to manually annotate semantic information.
However, thanks to recent advancements in techniques like pattern recognition, content
understanding and deep learning, automatic extraction of most deﬁned semantic features
has become possible and is getting more accurate. In the following, we provide a brief
review on recent research and solutions of several recognition and content understanding
techniques that relate to our study.
Face Recognition Face recognition has been signiﬁcantly developed due the recent
deep learning techniques especially the convolutional neural network (CNN). Nowadays,
the performance of automatic face recognition is close to human-level. Facebook presents
DeepFace [91] that achieves an accuracy of 97.35% on the Labeled Faces in the Wild
(LFW) dataset [92], reducing the error of the current state of the art by more than 27%,
closely approaching human-level performance. DeepFace employs a nine-layer neural deep
network involving more than 120 million parameters. Parkhi et al. [93] proposes another
CNN-based model without any embellishments which achieves an accuracy of 98.95%
slightly higher than DeepFace (both on the LFW dataset). Google presents FaceNet [94],
a face recognition system that directly learns a mapping from face images to a compact
Euclidean space where distances directly correspond to a measure of face similarity. A
new record accuracy of 99.63% has been achieved by FaceNet on the LFW dataset.
Person Recognition Most studies of face recognition are mainly carried out on face
images. Researchers have also been working on person recognition based on not only face
but also context information in image, e.g. other body parts, hair style, clothes, glasses,
pose, environment and people nearby. Zhang et al. [66] proposes the Pose Invariant
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PErson Recognition (PIPER) method, which accumulates the cues of poselet-level person
recognizers trained by deep convolutional networks to discount for the pose variations,
combined with a face recognizer and a global recognizer. [66] also creates the People
In Photo Albums (PIPA) dataset, a large-scale dataset collected from Flickr photos,
which consists of 37’107 photos containing 63’188 instances of 2’356 identities. Based on
the test set of the PIPA dataset, an accuracy of 83.05% is achieved over 581 identities,
Moreover, when a frontal face is available, PIPER improves the accuracy over DeepFace
from 89.3% to 93.4%, which is close to 40% decrease in relative error. Oh et al. [95]
proposes a convnet based person recognition system, which obtains so far the best results
for person recognition on the PIPA dataset. This study also provides a detailed analysis
of performance of diﬀerent visual cues (e.g. face, head, upper body, full body, and scene)
for person recognition.
Semantic Understanding Images contain a great amount of knowledge including the
presence of various objects, the presentation of activities and scenes. Relating visual
information to its semantic meanings remains an open and challenging area of research.
Researchers have been working on diﬀerent aspects towards the semantic understanding
of image content. These studies include detection/recognition of various objects in
image [96], recognition of activities from daily image [87, 97, 98], image location and scene
recognition [99, 100, 101]. Particularly, the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge (ILSVRC) [96] was established in 2010 and has been running for six years. It
has become the standard benchmark for large-scale object recognition, which consists
of two components: (i) a publicly available dataset, and (ii) an annual competition and
corresponding workshop. The closest to ILSVRC is the PASCAL VOC challenge [102],
which provides a standardized test bed for object detection, image classiﬁcation, object
segmentation, person layout, and action classiﬁcation. However, ILSVRC scales up
PASCAL VOC’s goal of standardized training and evaluation of recognition algorithms
by more than an order of magnitude in number of object classes and images: PASCAL
VOC 2012 has 20 object classes and 21’738 images compared to ILSVRC2012 with 1000
object classes and 1’431’167 annotated images.
Automatic Image Tagging APIs Automatic image tagging (also known as automatic
image annotation or linguistic indexing) is the process by which a computer system
automatically assigns metadata in the form of captioning or keywords to a digital image.
Based on the recent developments in various image content understanding and object
recognition techniques, several commercial services have been established to provide the
tools or APIs for automatically assigning tags to image based on analyzing the image
content. Those services includes but are not limited to: Clarifai6, Imagga7, Google Cloud
6https://www.clarifai.com/
7https://imagga.com/
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Vision8, Microsoft Cognitive Services9, IBM Watson APIs10, Amazon Rekognition11,
Algorithmia12, Aylien13, and Wolfram14. Those services provide diﬀerent features and
have their own pros and cons. Most of the services are for commercial uses but provide
limited quota for free usage.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents a conceptual architecture for context-dependent and privacy-aware
photo sharing based on machine learning. The proposed architecture utilizes the images
semantic and requesters contextual information to predict photo sharing decisions for
users, based on their previously shared photos and past decisions. To validate the proposed
model, we ﬁrst conducted a user study on 23 subjects and collected a dataset containing
1’018 manually annotated images with 12’216 personalized sharing decisions in diﬀerent
contexts. Evaluation experiments have been performed using diﬀerent classiﬁcation
techniques and results reveal a promising performance of the proposed architecture.
Furthermore, the inﬂuence of diﬀerent content- and context-related features on decision
making has been investigated, which validate the importance of pre-deﬁned features and
imply a signiﬁcant variance between users sharing behaviors and privacy attitudes.
Limitations of the study still remain: First, users were only put in a hypothetical photo
sharing environment and given hypothesis of diﬀerent sharing scenarios; Second, most
image semantic features were manually annotated by subjects. Due to these facts, the
semantic features we collected cannot be ﬁne-grained. For instance, we limited the image
activities in 26 keywords, which can be greatly enriched in reality. Also, we deﬁned only
a set of relationships (groups) when describing the identities in image and a prospective
requester, which can be speciﬁc to individuals in practice. All these are mainly due
to the lack of the access and control to a popular social network, and that automatic
extraction of some semantic features (e.g. activities in image [87]) is not mature enough.
However, the main aim of this study is to investigate the feasibility of using certain
image semantic information and requester context in automatic photo sharing decision
making. The promising results obtained provide signiﬁcant sights in building accurate
and reliable “privacy-aware” photo sharing decision making system based on content and
context analysis.
8https://cloud.google.com/vision/
9https://www.microsoft.com/cognitive-services/en-us/
10https://www.ibm.com/watson/
11https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/
12https://algorithmia.com/
13http://aylien.com/image-tagging/
14https://www.imageidentify.com/
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8 Towards an Animated JPEG
Animated images have recently become very popular in social networks. Alex Chung,
the founder and CEO of Giphy1, one of the biggest online databases for GIF ﬁles, states
that: “Eventually all Web images will be animated in Harry Potter style”2. He also says,
“... the internet is sterile. It is emotionless, it lacks feeling, and its approach to content
can make it feel dull.” Adopting this view point, a large fraction of still images shared
over the Internet will eventually be replaced by animated images. Indeed, animation
empowers users to share and express emotions in a more powerful and individualistic way.
In contrast to video, animation is characterized by Moreau as: “a mini video, with no
sound, that can be watched from start to ﬁnish in as little as one or two seconds in a
simple, auto-looping fashion.”3 Furthermore animations “oﬀer a more convenient, faster
and totally silent way to express something.” An animation is viewed in the broader
context of where it appears and is therefore “the perfect combination between image and
video that really captures our attention.”
Animated still image ﬁle formats such as animated Graphics Interchange Format
(known as GIF) and motion JPEG provide the means to add a visually compelling motion
component to still images. Compared to video ﬁles, working with still image ﬁle formats
simpliﬁes both server and client side operations and signiﬁcantly reduces the computational
complexity during both creation and playback. For historical reasons, animated GIF has
established itself as the de facto standard for this type of content. Given the state of the
art in image compression and taking into account the trend towards multimedia formats
that are royalty-free, seamless and managed by international standardization committees,
GIF does not seem to be the best solution to provide the necessary features in an online
world demanding ever more dynamic and captivating content. Moreover, GIF supports a
maximum of 256 colors (8 bit) per image frame and using GIF for photographic content
reveals this limitation in the shape of severe color banding (see Figure 8.14). On the
1http://giphy.com/
2https://www.inverse.com/article/14908
3https://www.lifewire.com/rise-of-animated-gif-3485813
4Image source: http://stackoverﬂow.com/questions/2336522/png-vs-gif-vs-jpeg-vs-svg-when-best-to-use
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(a) JPEG: 24 KB - better quality, smaller ﬁle size (b) GIF: 56 KB - worse quality, larger ﬁle size
Figure 8.1 – GIF vs. JPEG.
other hand, the underlying compression used to generate GIF images is lossless and hence
sub-optimal for use in consumer photographic content for the sake of storage eﬃciency.
With animated image content now often generated on the basis of photographic images,
JPEG appears to be the most suitable contender on which to base a new animated image
ﬁle format.
In this chapter, we present aJPEG, an animated image format based on JPEG com-
pression which could serve as a better alternative to animated GIF. Inspired by the JPEG
Transmorphing algorithm proposed in Chapter 5, aJPEG utilizes JPEG Application
Segments to preserve several frames of an animation sequence, while encoding a default
frame in the main JPEG image data. Therefore, an aJPEG ﬁle is backward compatible
with legacy JPEG decoders such that it allows an as seamless experience as possible to an
as large as possible number of end-users. Based on the proposed aJPEG ﬁle format, we
implemented an aJPEG codec and developed two prototype applications demonstrating
the eﬃcient GIF-to-aJPEG conversion and aJPEG playback.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 presents prior work, intro-
ducing the development of GIF and other similar formats. Section 8.2 describes in detail
the syntax construction and ﬁle format of aJPEG. Section 8.3 is split into two parts: the
ﬁrst describes an aJPEG codec, while the second describes two prototype applications of
using such a format, a desktop program and a mobile application, respectively. Section 8.4
reports the performance evaluation of aJPEG with comparison to conventional animated
GIF. Finally Section 8.5 concludes this chapter.
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8.1 Prior Work
This section brieﬂy outlines three animated image ﬁle formats, namely GIF, Motion
JPEG and Motion JPEG 2000. It is not comprehensive but puts particular emphasis on
their respective suitability for social media and emerging online applications.
8.1.1 Graphics Interchange Format (GIF)
Today, animated GIF is the dominant animated image ﬁle format. It derives its name
from Graphics Interchange Format and was ﬁrst introduced by CompuServe in 1987
under the name 87a. GIF was positioned as an alternative to formats such as PiCture
eXchange (PCX) and MacPaint oﬀering support for color and smaller ﬁle sizes. During
1989 CompuServe released version 89a of its ﬁle format which was to become known as
GIF and added support for animation, transparent background colors, storage of metadata
and text overlays. From the outset, GIF was subject to license and royalty constraints
due to its use of Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW) compression [103, 104], a technology under
patent by Unisys corporation until 2004 [105]. While initially released as an image ﬁle
format for CompuServe customers, GIF became a de-facto standard on the early World
Wide Web when support for the ﬁle format was added to the Netscape 2.0 navigator
in 1995. GIF image encoding supports an input color space of 8 bits per primary color.
The encoder then projects colors in the image to be encoded to a maximum of 256
colors and tabulates these in a palette which is addressed through an 8-bit index. This
restricted number of colors was quite suﬃcient in the 1980s but severely limits the visual
quality of GIF images for photographic images and content generated using modern
computer graphics (see Figure 8.1). With the introduction of animated GIF, CompuServe
added the concept of pixel transparency. In secondary images, pixels can be ﬂagged
to be transparent. The decoder will then substitute these transparent pixels with the
corresponding pixels from the primary image. This highly desirable mechanism improves
compression eﬃciency and in the case of computer generated content, supports more
eﬃcient and richer content creation procedures. GIF image compression is particularly
suitable for sharp edges in graphical material with no noise. As such, it supports eﬃcient
encapsulation of simple graphics, logos and small, animated cartoon sequences. Today
the use of GIF extends to sprites and avatars in online games and mobile apps. With
social network platforms such as Facebook, adding support for GIF, users are widely
adopting the opportunity to post animated images, giving GIF a new lease on life. The
bitstream syntax used in GIF ﬁle format is shown in Figure 8.2 and a description of GIF
format can be found on this website [106]. The full speciﬁcations for the GIF ﬁle format
is available at https://www.w3.org/Graphics/GIF/spec-gif89a.txt.
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Figure 8.2 – Syntax of GIF ﬁle format.
8.1.2 Other Animated Image Formats
Motion JPEG (MJPEG) addresses the sub-optimal compression in GIF by replacing
LZW with the eﬃcient image compression embodied in the JPEG standard [59]. The
basic architecture of an MJPEG ﬁle follows that of a GIF ﬁle: Each image constituting
an MJPEG sequence is individually compressed using JPEG. These images are then
combined into a single ﬁle which additionally includes display, context and metadata. As
such, MJPEG is an intraframe coding scheme and no temporal redundancy in the image
sequence is exploited to achieve higher compression. The MJPEG ﬁle for a given image
sequence is therefore larger than the equivalent sequence obtained from state-of-the-art
video compression scheme such as H.265/HEVC. But this is oﬀset by much reduced
complexity, both during encoding and decoding. Many variants and implementations
for MJPEG have been put forward. Yet, no unifying standard or speciﬁcation was ever
adopted and published by the JPEG standardization committee for an MJPEG ﬁle format.
As a consequence, MJPEG has not achieved widespread acceptance due to incompatibility
and interoperability issues which exist between implementations put forth by diﬀerent
developers and system vendors.
Motion JPEG 2000 follows the same implementation strategy as animated GIF and
MJPEG, building on a simple ﬁle structure and an intraframe coding strategy for each
image in the sequence. Avoiding the fragmentation that blocked the widespread adoption
of MJPEG, the JPEG 2000 standard was adopted and published by JPEG standardization
committee in a Part 3 extension of JPEG 2000 standard specifying support for motion
and animation5. Yet JPEG 2000 and, as a consequence, Motion JPEG 2000 are victims
of the success of the legacy JPEG standard which, today, is still the dominant image
coding standard employed in all consumer and prosumer products. This underlines the
requirement for backward compatibility to JPEG of a motion image format that could
serve to displace GIF in Internet and social media applications.
Furthermore, other ﬁle formats such as Animated Portable Network Graphics (APNG) [107]
or Multiple-image Network Graphics (MNG) [108] have been put forward. But none has
attained GIF’s popularity and widespread use despite two major shortcomings of GIF.
5https://jpeg.org/jpeg2000/
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Figure 8.3 – Syntax of aJPEG ﬁle format
8.2 aJPEG Syntax and Structure
8.2.1 aJPEG Overview
The central principle behind the proposed animated JPEG is to encode a default frame
of an animation sequence as standard JPEG while storing the information about the
other frames in the Application Segments of the JPEG ﬁle header. Therefore, any legacy
JPEG decoder will be able to decode the default frame. To decode the other frames and
display the animation, a dedicated aJPEG decoder or transcoder is required. The syntax
of an aJPEG ﬁle is shown in Figure 8.3. An aJPEG image ﬁle starts with a standard
JPEG header, consisting of various APP markers for diﬀerent purposes. We then took
a unique APP marker for the use of aJPEG. In our current implementation, APP11 is
used. The metadata and image data of the animated image frames, except for the default
frame, is inserted in a sequence of APP11 markers. The inserted data consists of the
necessary information to recover the animated image frames, including the number of
inserted frames, frame rate, and the compressed image data of those frames. Finally, the
image data of the default frame is compressed in JPEG in the main aJPEG ﬁle, which
can be read by any legacy JPEG decoder. In our current implementation, the inserted
animation frames are compressed with the same JPEG quality factor as the default frame.
Details of the format syntax and structure are described in the following.
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8.2.2 aJPEG Header
The metadata of the inserted animation frames starts as an aJPEG header, the structure
of which is shown in Figure 8.3. The aJPEG header uses an APP11 segment to signal
the basic information about the inserted frames. As any JPEG marker, it starts with
an marker ID 0xFFEB and the marker length, a header tag “AJPEG” identifying the
aJPEG format. This tag occupies ﬁve bytes in the segment. Then, the next byte is used
to signal the mode of an aJPEG format, which indicates the method for encoding the
inserted image frames. In our current implementation, for instance, all inserted frames
are compressed in JPEG with the same quality factor as is used for the default frame. In
practice, any other encoding methods can be used to compress the inserted frames. At
the end of the aJPEG header, two more bytes are used to indicate the number of inserted
image frames, noted as M .
8.2.3 aJPEG Inserted Frames
After the aJPEG Header, a sequence of segments are used to store the image data of
animated frames one by one. Each image frame starts with a frame header, followed by a
sequence of segments storing the image data of that frame.
Frame Header The structure of a frame header is illustrated in Figure 8.3. Similar to
any other APP marker, this header starts with the marker ID and marker length. The
rest of this header signals the following metadata of the particular frame:
• Image size s: ﬁle size of the frame in bytes.
• Frame delay: the duration (in hundredths of a second) for which the frame is
displayed during animation.
• Extra metadata: extra information about the frame, e.g. annotation and geo-tag.
Frame Data Blocks After the frame header, the bitstream of each compressed image
frame is inserted in a sequence of segments byte by byte. Since JPEG allows APP segment
no longer than 65,535 bytes, as explained in Chapter 5, the bitstream of each compressed
image frame might need to be separately stored in n APP markers:
n =  s
65533
, (8.1)
where s is the size of the frame in bytes and · is the ceiling function.
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8.2.4 aJPEG Compressed Image Data
The image data of the default frame is compressed in standard JPEG, consisting of color
space transformation, downsampling, discrete cosine transform (DCT), quantization, and
entropy coding. Since the aJPEG ﬁle still contains the standard JPEG headers, a legacy
JPEG decoder can read the compressed default frame as a standard JPEG ﬁle. With
a dedicated aJPEG decoder or transcoder, the other image frames can be read from
the aJPEG APP markers and played back as an animated sequence. In other words,
an aJPEG ﬁle is backward compatible with legacy JPEG standard, with the advanced
functionality of being rendered as animated content.
8.3 Codec and Prototype Applications
Based on the proposed aJPEG ﬁle format, we implemented a dedicated aJPEG codec
for encoding and decoding of aJPEG images, based on an open source JPEG library
version 6b maintained by the Independent JPEG Group (IJG)6. To demonstrate the use
of aJPEG, we developed two prototype applications for GIF-to-aJPEG conversion and
aJPEG playback, based on personal computer and smart phone, respectively.
8.3.1 aJPEG Codec
The aJPEG codec consists of two basic components, i.e. an encoder and a decoder. The
encoder takes as input a sequence of JPEG images and converts them to an aJPEG
ﬁle with speciﬁc format deﬁned in Section 8.2. On the contrary, the decoder extracts
all frames from an aJPEG ﬁle. The aJPEG codec is implemented as a command line
executable named ajpegtran, which has two basic modes build and extract for encoding
and decoding respectively.
8.3.2 Prototype Applications
To illustrate the use of the proposed aJPEG format, we developed two prototype programs
that can (i) convert a GIF to an aJPEG ﬁle and (ii) play back animations given as input
an aJPEG ﬁle. The two programs are both implemented in Java based on desktop (Mac
OS X) and mobile phone (Android) respectively. In both applications, one can load
an input ﬁle, in either GIF or aJPEG format. If an animated GIF image is loaded
(GIF-to-aJPEG conversion mode), the program converts the GIF to a sequence of image
frames in JPEG and further converts all those frames to an aJPEG format ﬁle. Once
ﬁnishing the conversion, it plays back the animations. While GIF-to-aJPEG conversion,
the quality factor can be set by user with 75 by default. The frame delay of generated
aJPEG is the same as the original GIF. Furthermore, in the GIF-to-aJPEG conversion
6http://www.ijg.org/
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(a) Man (b) Celebration (c) Chat
(d) Cycling (e) Snow (f) Car
(g) Night (h) Sweet (i) Flower
Figure 8.4 – Nine GIF images selected from TGIF dataset.
mode, the program displays the ﬁle sizes and ratio of input GIF and output aJPEG ﬁle.
If an aJPEG image is loaded, the program (in playback mode) simply decodes each frame
and plays back the animations. In this case, the program acts as a simple aJPEG viewer
or player. In playback mode, user can set a speed factor to control the playback speed
(frame rate). Screenshots of the two applications are shown in Figure A.7 in Appendix A.
8.4 Performance Evaluation
This section reports performance evaluations of the proposed aJPEG format in comparison
to GIF, with respect to compression ratio and image quality.
8.4.1 Datasets
Two datasets were used in the experiments:
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(a) Crowdrun (b) Duckstakeoﬀ (c) Harbour
(d) Ice (e) Parkjoy (f) Soccer
Figure 8.5 – Six video sequences from the EPFL-PoliMI dataset.
• Tumblr GIF Description Dataset (TGIF)7 [109]: This dataset contains 100K
animated GIFs and 120K sentences describing their visual content. We selected
nine GIF ﬁles from the whole dataset, which cover diﬀerent types of image content.
The nine GIF images are named Man,Celebration, Chat, Cycling, Snow, Car, Night,
Sweet and Flower respectively. Example frames of the nine animations are shown
in Figure 8.4.
• EPFL-PoliMI Video Quality Assessment Database8 [110, 111]: This dataset
contains 156 video streams for video quality assessment. From the dataset, we took
six video sequences which were also used in subjective evaluations in [111]. The
six sequences are all in I420 raw progressive format, with 10 seconds long at 4CIF
spatial resolution (704×576 pixels). They are referred to as Crowdrun, Duckstakeoﬀ,
Harbour, Ice, Parkjoy and Soccer respectively. Example images of the six video
sequences are shown in Figure 8.5.
8.4.2 Compression Ratio
In the ﬁrst experiment, we evaluate the compression ratio of aJPEG images compared to
GIFs, in terms of their ﬁle sizes. First, we converted each of the nine GIFs from TGIF
7http://raingo.github.io/TGIF-Release/
8http://vqa.como.polimi.it/
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Figure 8.6 – Normalized aJPEG ﬁle size compared to GIF.
dataset into a set of aJPEG ﬁles compressed with diﬀerent quality factors Q ∈ [30, 90].
The conversion is done by using the GIF-to-aJPEG converter in Section 8.3. For each
aJPEG ﬁle, we computed its normalized ﬁle size compared to ﬁle size of the original
GIF image, i.e. ﬁle size of aJPEG/ﬁle size of GIF. The normalized ﬁle sizes of the nine
images are shown in Figure 8.6(a). From the results, one observes that the ﬁle sizes
of most aJPEG images (except for Cycling) compressed with Q = 90 are smaller than
the original GIF. With smaller quality factor applied, the ﬁle sizes of aJPEG ﬁles are
further reduced and all become smaller than GIF. In Q = 80, the normalized sizes of six
images are between 0.2 and 0.4 with three images (Cycling, Chat and Celebration) as
exceptions. This means that the compression ratio from GIF to aJPEG also depends on
image content.
A similar experiment was conducted using the six video sequences from EPFL-PoliMI
dataset. This time, for each sequence, we converted the ﬁrst 100 raw image frames to
an animated GIF ﬁle and diﬀerent aJPEG ﬁles compressed with varying quality factors
(Q ∈ [30, 90]), with the same frame rate. The normalized ﬁle sizes of aJPEG ﬁles are
shown in Figure 8.6(b). Similar observation is found: For every video sequence, the ﬁle
size of its aJPEG version is always signiﬁcantly smaller than that of GIF, even at the
JPEG quality of 90. When applying a quality factor of 75, the compression ratio is up
to 0.2. Considering that JPEG compression with a quality factor of 75 usually provides
good-enough visual quality, aJPEG outperforms GIF in terms of compression ratio.
8.4.3 Image Quality
To further evaluate the performance of aJPEG with respect to its image quality, we
conducted another set of experiments to compare aJPEG and GIF, using two objective
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Figure 8.7 – Comparison of PSNR between aJPEG and GIF.
metrics: peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and structural similarity (SSIM) [73]. In
this experiment, we used the six raw video sequences from EPFL-PoliMI dataset, and
generated from raw video the GIF and aJPEG ﬁles in the same way as is in Section 8.4.2.
Then, we computed the PSNR and SSIM of each GIF and aJPEG frame compared to the
original raw video frame. For each content, only the ﬁrst 100 frames are considered. The
PSNR and SSIM for GIF (mean) and diﬀerent aJPEG ﬁles (mean and 95% conﬁdence
interval) are show in Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 respectively.
For every image content, aJPEG frames compressed with the quality factor of 90 always
show better quality than GIF in both metrics. For most video sequences, aJPEG coded
with JPEG Q factor of 80 reveal better or similar quality compared to GIF in terms of
both PSNR and SSIM. According to the results from Section 8.4.2, aJPEG ﬁle compressed
at Q factor of 80 or 90 has already much smaller ﬁle size than GIF; in this regard, we
consider Q factor between 80 and 90 as a promising quality factor to reach a good balance
between ﬁle size and image quality of aJPEG. Combining the results of both experiments
on compression ratio and image quality, aJPEG shows a signiﬁcant advantage compared
to animated GIF: With a proper quality factor selected, aJPEG could serve better quality
but much smaller ﬁle size.
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Figure 8.8 – Comparison of SSIM between aJPEG and GIF.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents aJPEG, a novel animated image format based on JPEG compression.
Adopting the similar idea of JPEG Transmorphing presented in Chapter 5, aJPEG encodes
a default frame selected from an animation sequence in a standard JPEG image while
preserving the data of other frames in JPEG Application Segments of the “cover” image.
Therefore, an aJPEG ﬁle is backward compatible with JPEG. Any legacy JPEG decoder
or viewer is able to decode and display the default frame of an aJPEG ﬁle. Only with
a dedicated aJPEG decoder, the other frames can be extracted and displayed as an
animation. Based on the proposed aJPEG ﬁle format, we implemented an aJPEG codec
and developed two prototype applications demonstrating the GIF-to-aJPEG conversion
and aJPEG animation playback. Moreover, we conducted two experiments to evaluate
the performance of aJPEG in regard to its compression ratio and image quality. The
experiments were performed in comparison with GIF, and results show that aJPEG
image compressed with JPEG quality factor of higher than 80 (preferable 90) outperforms
conventional GIF in terms of both ﬁle size and image quality. Considering the wide
popularity of JPEG, such an encoding method for animated image could serve as a better
alternative to conventional GIF, especially for presenting photographic image content in
the scenario of Internet and social media.
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Image Manipulation
Modern photo sharing applications are usually equipped with interesting, easy-to-use and
even interactive image editing tools. Famous applications include Instagram, Snapchat
and so on. Those applications provide consumers with convenient solutions to make their
pictures more attractive, and more importantly, to arouse stronger emotional resonances.
Diﬀerent types of image content generate diﬀerent emotions. Using diﬀerent photographic
techniques, visual ﬁlters or editing tools, pictures of the same scene can also evoke diﬀerent
emotions. Motivated by these facts, we attempt to change an original picture’s evoked
emotion and transform it to new emotions (stronger, weaker, or completely diﬀerent)
by image manipulation. To achieve this goal, we ﬁrst need to understand the emotional
responses evoked by diﬀerent image manipulations when applied to pictures.
This chapter investigates the inﬂuence of image manipulations on evoked emotions, and
aims to ﬁnd the potential pattern between image content, manipulation and generated
emotions. To do so, we conducted subjective experiments based on online crowdsourcing.
Diﬀerent types of images were collected from Instagram, and manipulated by a number of
typical image editing tools. Subjects were then exposed to each, and questioned regarding
their emotions pictures induced on them. Using the crowdsourced data as groundtruth,
we train and evaluate a simple regressor for predicting evoked emotions, taking as input
an original image and the desired manipulation.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.1 outlines prior work in the
ﬁeld of image emotion analysis, classiﬁcation and recognition. Section 9.2 describes our
user study and collected data. Section 9.3 and Section 9.4 analyzes emotional responses
obtained from user study and reports the experiments on emotion prediction upon image
manipulation. Finally, Section 9.5 concludes this chapter and discusses future work.
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9.1 Prior Work
Image aesthetic quality estimation, emotion recognition and classiﬁcation have been
largely studied in the ﬁeld of computer vision [112, 113, 114, 115, 116]. Most previous
works use image features for aﬀective image classiﬁcation and emotion prediction [113,
114, 117, 118, 116]. Such features include color, texture, composition, edge and semantic
information. A few researchers have worked on transforming image emotions by editing
images. In [119], Wang et al. associate color themes with emotion keywords depending on
art theory and transform the color theme of an input image to the desired one. However, in
their work, only a few cartoon-like images are used. Peng et al. [120] propose a framework
to change an image’s emotion by randomly sampling from a set of possible target images,
but only show a few examples. Jun et al. [121] show that changing brightness and contrast
of an image can aﬀect the pleasure and excitement felt by observers. However, only a
limited variation of an input image can be produced by changing the two features. Peng
et al. [122] change the color tone and texture related features of an image to transfer the
evoked emotion distribution, with experiments conducted on only limited types of image
content.
Evaluating image’s evoked emotions after image manipulation is not a trivial task.
Many well-established image manipulation and editing tools have been widely used in
online photo sharing and social networks, as ways for users to enhance their image
content either to draw better attention or to evoke stronger emotions. Popular image
editing tools include image enhancement [123], grayscale conversion, vintage processing,
cartoonizing [124], and more recently addition of stickers1 [125]. However, most image
manipulation methods have been studied merely from the perspective of image processing
and not so much on their emotional impact.
In the previous studies on aﬀective image classiﬁcation or emotional response prediction,
various types of images have been experimented with. Machajdik et al. [113] used artistic
photos or abstract paintings for aﬀective image classiﬁcation. Peng et al. [122] collected
an image dataset named Emotion6 containing only images without high-level semantic
features, such as human facial expressions or text. In addition, the other older aﬀective
image datasets like International Aﬀective Picture System (IAPS) [126] and Geneva
Aﬀective Picture Database (GAPED) [127] both have only limited content types. In our
research, we are more interested in the emotions of everyday photographs, especially those
images that are widely shared by online users. Unfortunately, most existing aﬀective
image datasets contain either extremely emotional images with special content or images
without much natural high-level semantic information. All those types of images do not
ﬁt our requirements. Therefore we decided to collect our own dataset using Instagram,
one of the most popular online photo sharing services.
To measure emotions, diﬀerent types of models have been designed by psychologists.
1https://www.facebook.com/help/1597631423793468
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(a) Original (b) Cartoon (c) Emoji (d) Enhance
(e) Halo (f) Gray (g) Grunge (h) Old paper
Figure 9.1 – An example image processed by seven diﬀerent manipulations.
One of the most popular is the valence-arousal (VA) model (proposed by Russell [128]),
characterizing emotions in two dimensions, where valence measures attractiveness in
a scale from positive to negative, while arousal indicates the degree of excitement or
stimulation. In terms of categorization of emotions, Ekman’s six basic emotions (anger,
disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise) [129] are widely known. In this study, we used
both models similar to the studies in [127, 122].
9.2 Image Dataset and User Study
9.2.1 Image Collection and Preprocessing
We collected images from Instagram, one of the most popular photo sharing platforms.
According to a previous study by Hu et al. [86], images shared within Instagram can be
classiﬁed into the following eight basic categories in terms of their content: Friends, Food,
Gadget, Captioned photo, Pet, Activity, Selﬁe and Fashion. Therefore, we utilized this
categorization and we collected the image dataset by searching for the eight category
keywords or their synonyms via Instagram #tag. This was mainly motivated in order
to have a wider variety of image content. Unlike the work by Peng et al. [122], we are
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concerned with all kinds of images people daily capture and share including those ones
with high-level semantic features. These features may have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on evoked
emotions, but such inﬂuence along with applied manipulations has not yet been well
understood. At the end, 13 color images were selected for each image category resulting
in 104 images in total. All selected images have the same size of 640× 640 pixels. For
each image, we applied seven manipulations to create diﬀerent visual eﬀects. We refer to
the seven manipulations as follows in the rest of the chapter:
• Cartoon: Applies a cartoonized eﬀect to an image.
• Emoji: Adds an “Tear of Joy” Emoji sticker on top-right corner of an image.
• Enhance: Applies brightness/contrast/colorization enhancement on an image via
LAB colorspace.
• Halo: Applies a circular halo eﬀect to an image.
• Gray: Converts an image to gray scale.
• Grunge: Applies a classic vintage eﬀect with a grunge background to an image.
• Old paper: Applies another heritage vintage eﬀect with an old paper as background.
The reason of selecting the particular seven manipulations is that they modify image
visual information from very diﬀerent aspects, including color, texture, composition and
higher-level image semantics. The emoji sticker “Tear of Joy” was selected as it has been
in the top 10 most popular emojis on Emojipedia2 for all of 2015, and the emotion it
expresses is not very straightforward. The seven manipulations were implemented using
the ImageMagick software3. An example image processed by the 7 diﬀerent manipulations
is illustrated in Figure 9.1. Summing up, a grand total of 832 (104 × 8) images were
generated, including the original versions of each image. The image dataset is publicly
accessible at http://mmspg.epﬂ.ch/emotion-image-datasets.
9.2.2 User Study based on Crowdsourcing
We used Microworkers4 platform to collect emotional responses from subjects. A ques-
tionnaire was designed where four emotion-related questions are asked for each image.
The ﬁrst two questions are about the valence and arousal ratings respectively, where a
9-point scale was used, same as [122, 126]. For valence, 1, 5, and 9 mean very negative,
neutral, and very positive emotions respectively, in terms of attractiveness. For arousal,
1 and 9 mean emotions with very low and very high stimulating eﬀects respectively. In
2http://emojipedia.org/face-with-tears-of-joy/
3http://www.imagemagick.org/script/composite.php
4https://microworkers.com/
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the questionnaire, instead of directly asking subjects to provide VA scores, questions are
rephrased to be similar as in [122]. The third question is about the emotion distribution
of the image, based on Ekman’s six basic emotions [129]. Similar to [122], 7 emotion
keywords (Ekman’s six basic emotions and “Neutral”) are used and subjects are asked to
select the keywords that best describe their emotions after seeing a particular picture. In
the fourth question, we ask subjects to select the content-related factors that have the
most inﬂuence on their emotional decisions. The 7 pre-deﬁned factors are:
• Face: Human facial expression, post, gesture, etc.
• Color: Image color, contrast, saturation, etc.
• Scene: Image background, scene, or any landmark.
• Object: Objects in image, such as gadget, clothes and also animals.
• Text: Texts in image.
• Emoji: The Emoji sticker in the image.
• Halo: Halo eﬀect applied to the image.
We gather these information in order to further understand how the image content and
manipulation jointly inﬂuence evoked emotions. Furthermore, in every questionnaire,
a number of CAPTCHA questions (e.g., “56 + 78 =?” and “If the arm is green, what
color is it?”) were included to detect and remove subjects who provided sloppy answers.
Each questionnaire contains eight images, selected in a semi-random way such that the
following constraints are satisﬁed: (i) The eight images in each questionnaire came from
eight diﬀerent categories respectively; (ii) The order of image manipulations appearing
in each questionnaire was randomized. Therefore it ensured that subjects saw diﬀerent
image content in each questionnaire with manipulations in diﬀerent orders. We aimed
at collecting twenty answers for each questionnaire, meaning that every image was to
be rated by 20 diﬀerent answers. Therefore, a total of 2080 (20× 832/8) questionnaires
(implemented using internal template by Microworkers) were distributed online. Thanks
to Microworkers’ rating system, we kept tracking the results and ruling out answers
from dishonest subjects while task campaigns were running, based on their answers to
CAPTCHA questions and the time spent on each questionnaire (for those who spent
less than 120 seconds to answer a questionnaire, their answers were removed). The
vacated positions were then taken by new subjects until their answers satisﬁed the above
requirement. Finally, answers from 590 unique subjects were collected, each rating 28.2
images in average. Screenshot of an image under evaluation in a questionnaire is shown
in Figure A.8 of Appendix A.
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Figure 9.2 – Boxplot of overall VA scores for each image manipulation method.
9.3 Analyzing Emotions induced by Image Manipulation
In this section, we analyze the emotional responses obtained from the crowdsourcing user
study, with respect to each question.
9.3.1 Valence-Arousal Score
Firstly, for each image, the mean valence and arousal scores are computed, by averaging
all the rated VA scores. Then, for each image manipulation (including the original),
distributions of all images mean VA scores are gathered and plotted with box plot in
Figure 9.2. Among all the manipulations, vintage processing with “Grunge” and “Old
paper” generate the lowest VA scores in general. Besides, for certain methods such
as “Gray”, VA scores show a higher variance than that of other methods. The other
manipulations inﬂuence the evoked VA scores in diﬀerent degrees. However, this is just a
ﬁrst glance at the overall VA distributions of all images. We take as working hypothesis
that manipulating an image in a certain way leads evoked emotions to change along a
certain direction, but the change of emotions due to image manipulation highly depends
on image content.
To verify this assumption, we investigate the inﬂuence of the two factors (image content
and manipulation) on evoked emotion, with respect to VA scores. We compute the mean
VA scores of each image category for diﬀerent manipulation methods, by averaging the
scores of 13 pictures belonging to each category for each method. Then we present the
diﬀerence VA scores (ΔVA = original score − score after manipulation), with respect to
diﬀerent image categories, as heat maps shown in Figure 9.3. The higher the absolute
value of the ΔVA score, the more inﬂuence the manipulation has on evoked emotion.
From the results, one observes that certain image manipulations have greater impact on
evoked emotions of certain types of images. For example, manipulations “Grunge” and
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Figure 9.3 – ΔVA scores for diﬀerent image content and manipulations.
“Old paper” greatly lower the VA scores of most image content, especially for “Food” and
“Pet” images. In addition, other manipulations like “Emoji” and “Halo” both increase the
VA scores of “Gadget” and “Captioned” images. We then plot the ΔVA scores of every
image (diﬀerence score between original and manipulated version by “Old paper”), versus
the their original VA scores, as a scatter plot shown in Figure 9.4. Here, we observe
that images with higher original valence or arousal scores are more likely to generate
higher diﬀerence VA scores, indicating that images with higher VA scores are prone to be
impacted by the manipulation.
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Figure 9.4 – Scatter plot of all ΔVA scores due to “Old paper” manipulation.
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Figure 9.5 – Average emotion distribution of diﬀerent manipulation methods.
9.3.2 Emotion Keywords Distribution
We then assess the evoked emotions in terms of probability distribution of emotional
keywords. To obtain the emotion distribution of each image, we counted the occurrence
of each emotion keyword voted by subjects on each image, and generate a normalized
distribution over the 7 keywords, by dividing the number of keyword with the total
number of voted keywords. The average emotion distribution corresponding to each
manipulation method is shown in Figure 9.5. Again, one observes overall changes on the
emotion distributions across diﬀerent manipulations. The most signiﬁcant observation
is that the proportion of emotion “Joy” for images processed by the two vintage ﬁlters
(“Grunge” and “Old paper”) is much reduced compared to the original images. At the
same time, subjects have been evoked more “Sadness” and “Neutral” emotions by the
two methods. In particular, “Emoji” causes drastic changes on emotion distributions,
where the proportion of positive emotion “Joy” and negative emotion “Anger” are both
increased.
To quantify the changes of emotion distributions due to diﬀerent manipulations, we
used two metrics Euclidean Distance (ED) and Chebyshev Distance (CD) to compute
the diﬀerence in emotion distributions between original and manipulated images. The
average distances for diﬀerent image categories and manipulations are plotted as heat
maps in Figure 9.6. This time, one observes again that diﬀerent types of image content are
inﬂuenced by image manipulation methods in diﬀerent degrees. Similar to the previous
results on VA scores, methods “Gray” and “Old paper” generate higher distances in
emotion distributions for many types of images, especially “Food” and “Pet”. Among all
the image content, “Fashion”, “Food”, “Gadget” and “Pet” are prone to be impacted by
manipulations than other types of content.
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Figure 9.6 – Diﬀerence in emotion distributions between original and manipulated images.
9.3.3 Inﬂuence of Image Content
Furthermore, we investigate the inﬂuence of image content on evoked emotions. This is
to understand how diﬀerent types of image visual cues and image manipulation jointly
inﬂuence evoked emotions. To do so, we compute the overall number of each content-
related factors selected by subjects. The number of each factor for each manipulation
(including original image) is plotted in Figure 9.7. In all manipulations, factors like “Face”,
“Color” and “Object” highly inﬂuence subjects’ evoked emotions, followed by the “Scene”
and “Text”. However, certain image manipulations that modify high-level image semantic
information can draw subjects attentions and facilitate their decision making as well.
Such example are those images manipulated by “Emoji” and “Halo”, where the inﬂuence
of Emoji sticker and halo eﬀect are signiﬁcantly improved. In addition, one observes
that the inﬂuence of “Color” varies signiﬁcantly between diﬀerent manipulations. For
instance, the “Color” information has clearly more impact on any manipulation except for
“Emoji” and the original image. This is because those manipulations change image color
information drastically compared to the original image and the “Emoji” masked image.
9.4 Predicting Emotions induced by Image Manipulation
As stated in the beginning of the chapter, the ﬁnal aim of this study is to manipulate an
original picture and transform its evoked emotions to new emotions (stronger, weaker,
or completely diﬀerent). To this end, it requires a sort of mechanisms that are able
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Figure 9.8 – Framework of an emotion prediction system.
accurately predict the emotion of an image manipulated by certain editing, even before
the manipulation has been applied on the original image. The advantages are twofold:
First, it can predict the emotions of an image after being manipulated by a desired
editing method without actually applying the manipulation. This is especially good for
computational costly operations, such as the recently popular image editing app Prisma5
that applies artistic style image morphing [130]. Second, the proposed predictor extracts
image features only once from the original image, which does not require the system to
extract features each time from a newly manipulated image. Both advantages could help
use make an advanced image emotion transformation system that can recommend the
image manipulation method based on image content and the desired emotion.
Therefore, in this section, we conduct experiment on a predictor that can estimate the
emotions of the manipulated version of an image given only the original image and the
desired manipulation method as input. The purpose of this experiment is to investigate the
feasibility of accurately predicting image emotions according to the prediction mechanism
as is stated and ﬁnd the potential pattern between image content, manipulation and
evoked emotions.
5http://prisma-ai.com/
6https://ch.mathworks.com/help/images/gray-level-co-occurrence-matrix-glcm.html
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Table 9.1 – Features used for predicting evoked emotions upon image manipulation.
Type Dimension Description
Color
1 A global factor measuring the colorfulness of an image [131]
1 A global contrast factor of an image [132]
48 Color histogram of image YCbCr colorspace(16-bin histogram for each channel)
Texture 22 Features from Gray-Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM)
6
including the mean, variance, energy, entropy, etc.
Semantic 1 Number of people in an image
Manipulation 1 Manipulation method to be applied on an image
Figure 9.8 presents the overall framework of such a predictor, where the prediction
targets include: the (i) valence score, (ii) arousal score and iii) emotion keywords dis-
tribution. To train and evaluate the proposed predictor, we utilized the image dataset
used in crowdsourcing experiment and collected emotions responses. In our dataset, there
are 104 images, each manipulated by 7 diﬀerent methods, resulted in 728 manipulated
image samples. To train such a predictor, we extracted a set of features (color, texture
and semantic information) from each original image, and then took another feature
indicating the selected manipulation method. It ﬁnally resulted in a 74-dimension feature
vector for each image. The detailed feature deﬁnitions are given in Table 9.1. To train
and evalute the proposed prediction model, we used the Scikit-learn machine nearning
library7 [133] and experimented with four diﬀerent methods: (i) Linear Regression, (ii)
Support Vector Regression (SVR) with Radial basis function (RBF) kernel, (iii) Random
Forest Regression (RFR) and (iv) a baseline method where the predicted value is simply
the mean of the training set corresponding to each manipulation method. The baseline
method is considered as a naïve approach where the image content is not taken into
account while predicting evoked emotion. To avoid over-ﬁtting, we conducted training
and testing in 10-fold cross validation, with 90% images used for training and the rest
for testing in each fold. As the emotion distribution is a vector instead of a scalar, its
regression is considered as a multilabel regression problem. SVR in Scikit-learn does
not directly support multilabel regression so we trained one classiﬁer for each emotion
category and normalized the seven predicted values in the evaluation phase so that
they sum up to 1. Linear Regression and Random Forest Regression in Scikit-learn
support multilabel regression by default and were therefore used directly. Two metrics
are used to evaluate the regression performance: (i) mean squared error (MSE) and (ii)
coeﬃcient of determination (denoted R2). Particularly, for emotion distribution, the MSE
value was obtained by averaging the squared diﬀerences between predicted distribution
and groundtruth distribution over all the seven dimensions. For each prediction target
(valence, arousal and emotion distribution), we tuned the parameters of the classiﬁer to
obtain as optimal result as possible. The ﬁnal average results of cross validation tests are
shown in Table 9.2.
7http://scikit-learn.org/
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Table 9.2 – Results of emotion prediction based on 10-fold cross validation.
Method Valence Arousal Emotion DistributionMSE R2 MSE R2 MSE R2
Baseline 1.26 −0.004 0.80 −0.011 0.0138 −0.011
Linear Regression 0.78 0.369 0.57 0.311 0.0092 0.325
SVR 0.51 0.589 0.37 0.529 0.0060 0.559
RFR 0.45 0.639 0.34 0.571 0.0056 0.585
From the results, one observes that Support Vector Regreesion and Random Forest
Regression outperform the other two, while Random Forest Regression is slightly better
than SVR. Random Forest Regression results in the highest R2 scores among all the
methods, which are higher than 0.5 in predicting all the three targets: 0.639 for valence,
0.571 for arousal and 0.585 for emotion distribution. Such R2 scores indicate our predictor
performs much better than random guess (R2 ≤ 0) or the baseline method. When
compared to the results of VA score prediction in [116], where the minimal MSE of
1.27 for valence and 0.82 for arousal were obtained, our prediction model for VA scores
seems promising, although diﬀerent datasets were used. With Random Forest Regression,
we also checked the importance of features in decision making, which reveal that the
manipulation method, number of people and energy component of GLCM are the three
most important ones. This again indicates that image manipulation indeed inﬂuences
image emotion in a high degree, and that high-level semantic features like the existence
of people also have great impact on evoked emotion, in addition to other low-level image
features such as color and texture.
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the inﬂuence of image manipulation on evoked emotions for
diﬀerent types of images. An image dataset was created by collecting diﬀerent types of
images from Instagram, and subjective experiments were conducted via crowdsourcing
to examine subjects emotional responses on diﬀerent images processed by diﬀerent
manipulations. Results of the user study show that certain image manipulations induce
evoked emotions diﬀerent from those experienced on original images. However, such
manipulations do not always perform the same on diﬀerent types of images. In other words,
emotions induced by image manipulation depend not only on the applied manipulation
but also on the image content. A further experiment was conducted in attempt to predict
the emotions of a manipulated image given only its original version and the desired
manipulation method. Using random forest regression based on a small set of image
features, such a model reveals a promising accuracy. The results obtained from this study
provide us with insights to design of advanced image emotion transformation systems
that can recommend the type of manipulation to apply, based on the content of a picture
and the desired emotion to express. This will serve as a future direction of our study.
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10 Towards Dietary Management based
on Image Analysis
Well-being is becoming a topic of great interest and an essential factor linked to im-
provements in the quality of life. Modern information technologies have brought a new
dimension to this topic. It is now possible, thanks to various wearable devices (health
bands, smart watches, smart clothes, etc.), to gather a wide range of information from
subjects such as number of steps walked, heart rate, skin temperature, skin conductivity,
transpiration, respiration, etc. and analyze this information in terms of the amount of
calories spent, level of stress, duration and quality of sleep, etc. An accurate estimation
of daily nutritional intake provides a useful solution for keeping healthy and to prevent
diseases. However, it is not easy to assess the nutritional value of food and beverage
consumed by subjects in an automatic and accurate way.
With the advancements of smart mobile phones equipped with high-resolution cameras,
people capture and share a huge amount of photos every day, among which, food is one
of the most popular subjects. In addition, recent years have seen a growing development
of egocentric cameras or mobile capturing devices, such as GoPro1, Narrative Clip2 and
various smart watches with built-in camera, for lifelogging daily activities. All these
provide us with the change to develop dietary assessment system based on multimedia
techniques, e.g. food image analysis, though very challenging. An automatic image-based
dietary assessment system usually follows the basic steps: food image detection, food item
localization, recognition, segmentation, quantity or weight assessment, and ﬁnally caloric
and nutritional value estimation [134]. In the last couple of years, advancements in image
processing, machine learning and in particular deep learning techniques proved to be a
boon for diﬀerent image classiﬁcation and recognition tasks, including for the problem
of food image recognition. Researchers have been working on diﬀerent aspects of a food
recognition system, but we still lack a reliable system that can accurately estimate the
nutritional value given an image containing some food. The reason lies in the diﬃculty
to correctly recognize every ﬁne-grained food item, as many diﬀerent food items may
1https://gopro.com/
2http://getnarrative.com/
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look extremely similar and are not even distinguishable to human eyes, for instance, beef
vs. horse meat and rice vs. risotto. Moreover, in reality, a plate is usually full of highly
mixed food, which makes the problem even more diﬃcult to tackle. Therefore, we state
that, it would be suﬃcient to recognize the general type of a food item in image and
further to provide people with approximate information about their daily intake.
In this chapter, we address the problem of food image detection and recognition, using a
deep learning approach, the convolutional neural network (CNN). We target on the initial
steps of a complete dietary assessment procedure, namely, detecting images that contain
food from users daily images and then classifying them into several major food categories.
Therefore we report two sets of experiments: (i) food/non-food image classiﬁcation, and
(ii) food categorization, both based on ﬁne-tuning a deep CNN, the GoogLeNet model,
using a well-known framework deep learning, Caﬀe3 [135]. To this end, we created two
datasets from the existing food image datasets, social media and mobile devices for the
two tasks respectively.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.1 outlines the related
work by other researchers including a short introduction of CNN, GoogLeNet model and
ﬁne-tuning technique. Section 10.2 describes the creation of food image datasets used
for our experiments and Section 10.3 shows the experimental results on food/non-food
classiﬁcation and food category recognition. Section 10.4 introduces a prototype Android
app for classifying food images and discusses privacy implications of such kind of system.
Finally Section 10.5 concludes this chapter.
10.1 Prior Work
10.1.1 Food/Non-food Image Classiﬁcation
The task of food/non-food image classiﬁcation is to automatically detect the images that
contain food items. It is an indispensable step for an automatic food analysis system
where all daily images are treated as input. Classical approaches to image classiﬁcation
extract features such as interest point descriptors from scale-invariant feature transform
(SIFT) [136, 137], pool the features into a vector representation e.g. bag of words [138] or
Fisher Vectors [139] and then use a classiﬁcation algorithm such as Support Vector Machine
(SVM) to train a classiﬁer. Various approaches have been proposed to solve the problem of
food/non-food image classiﬁcation. Kitamura et al. [140] applied SVM on image features
consisting of color histograms, DCT coeﬃcients and detected image patterns in food image
detection and obtained an accuracy of 88%. [141] reports an automatic detector that ﬁnds
circular dining plates in chronically recorded images or videos. As an important application,
the method can be used to detect food intake events automatically by identifying dining
plates in chronically recorded video acquired by a wearable device. Farinella et al. [142]
3http://caﬀe.berkeleyvision.org/
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employed three diﬀerent image descriptors for food/non-food classiﬁcation based on SVM:
Bag of SIFT [136, 137], Pairwise Rotation Invariant Co-Occurrence Local Binary Pattern
(PRICoLBP) [143] and Bag of Textons [144]. The best result obtained on the UNICT-
FD889 dataset [145] is 94.44% Recently, the convolutional neural network (CNN) [146]
oﬀers a state-of-the-art technique for many general image classiﬁcation problems and is
therefore used in the problem of food image classiﬁcation. Kagaya et al. [147] applied
CNN in food/non-food classiﬁcation and achieved signiﬁcant results with a high accuracy
of 93.8%. Then, in their study [148], the accuracy of food detection is improved to
99.1%. Compared to previous studies using conventional machine learning approaches,
deep-based approaches like CNN provide signiﬁcantly better performance.
10.1.2 Food Image Recognition
For dietary assessment, system should be able to also ﬁnd out what food items are in an
image, their locations, as well as their amount. Therefore, another essential step other
than food/non-food classiﬁcation is to recognize the food item in an image. Most solutions
in food recognition assume only one food item present in an image. Thus, food recognition
can be solved as a multiclass classiﬁcation problem. Researchers have been working on
food recognition using conventional approaches based on classical image feature descriptors
and machine learning for many years. Joutou et al. [149] created a private Japanese
food dataset with 50 classes. They proposed a Multiple Kernel Learning (MKL) method
using combined features including SIFT-based bag-of-features, color histogram and Gabor
Texture features. An accuracy of 61.3% on their dataset was achieved. A follow-up
study by Hoashi et al. [150] achieved an accuracy of 62.5% using the same method on
an extended dataset of 85 food classes. Chen et al. [151] created the Pittsburgh food
database which contained 101 classes of American fast food images taken in a controlled
environment. Yang et al. [152] deﬁned eight basic food materials and learned spatial
relationships between these ingredients in a food image using pairwise features. They
achieved a classiﬁcation accuracy of 28.2% on 61 food categories which was a subset of
Pittsburgh dataset [151]. Bettadapura et al. [153] used combined 6-feature descriptors
(2 color-based and 4 SIFT-based) and SMK-MKL Sequential Minimal Optimization to
train an SVM classiﬁer. They experimented on a dataset consisting of 3750 food images
of 75 categories (50 images per category) and reported an accuracy of 63.33% on their
test dataset. Interestingly, they incorporated the geological information of where the
food picture was taken so that they could get the information about the restaurant and
then downloaded the menu online. An assumption of their work is that the food image
must be one of the items in the menu. Rahmana et al. [154] presented a new method
for generating scale and/or rotation invariant global texture features using the output of
Gabor ﬁlter banks, which provides a good accuracy of food classiﬁcation for a mobile
phone based dietary assessment system. The top-5 accuracy they achieved was almost
100%. However, the experiment was conducted on a special image dataset of only 209 food
images created with controlled environment. He et al. [155] investigated diﬀerent features
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and their combinations for food image analysis and a classiﬁcation approach based on
k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) and vocabulary trees. The experimental results indicate that
a combination of three features, Dominant Color Descriptor (DCD) [156, 157], Multi-scale
Dense SIFT (MDSIFT) [158] and Scalable Color Descriptor (SCD) [156], provides the
best performance on food recognition. Bossard et al. [159] created an image dataset called
Food-101, which contains 101 types of food images. They presented a method based on
Random Forests to mine discriminative visual components and could eﬃciently classify
with an accuracy rate of 50.8%.
In recent years, CNN has been widely used in food recognition and provides better
performance compared to conventional approaches. Bossard et al. [159] trained a deep
CNN from scratch on Food-101 dataset using the architecture of AlexNet model (proposed
by Krizhevsky et al. [160]) and achieved 56.4% top-1 accuracy. In [147], Kagaya et al.
also trained a CNN for food recognition and experimental results revealed that their
method outperformed all the other baseline classical approaches by achieving an average
accuracy of 73.7% for 10 classes. Kawano et al. [161] used CNN as a feature extractor and
achieved state-of-the-art best accuracy of 72.3% on the UEC-FOOD-100 [162] dataset,
which contains 100 classes of Japanese food. They used the pre-trained AlexNet model
as a feature extractor and integrated both CNN features and Fisher Vector [139] encoded
SIFT and color features. Yanai et al. [163] ﬁne-tuned the AlexNet model and achieved the
best results on public food datasets so far, with top-1 accuracy of 78.8% for UEC-FOOD-
100 dataset and 67.6% for UEC-FOOD-256 [164] (another Japanese food image dataset
with 256 classes). Their works showed that the recognition performance on small image
datasets like UEC-FOOD-256 and UEC-FOOD-100 (both of which contained 100 images
for each class) can be boosted by ﬁne-tuning the CNN network which was pre-trained on
a large dataset of similar objects. Myers et al. [165] presented the Im2Calories system
for food recognition which extensively used CNN-based approaches. The architecture
of GoogLeNet [166] was used in their work and a pre-trained model was ﬁne-tuned on
Food-101. The resulted model obtained a top-1 accuracy of 79% on Food-101 test set.
10.1.3 Convolutional Neural Network
Over the last few years, due to the advancements in the deep learning, especially in
the convolutional neural networks (CNN), the accuracy of image classiﬁcation has been
increased drastically. This is not only because larger datasets but also new algorithms and
improved deeper architectures [166]. CNN is also known as LeNet due to its inventor [167].
It mainly comprises convolutional layers, pooling layers and sub-sampling layers followed
by fully-connected layers. The very ﬁrst architecture of CNN [146] takes as input an image
and applies convolution followed by sub-sampling. After two such computations, the data
is fed into the fully connected neural network, where it performs the classiﬁcation task [146].
The main advantage of CNN is the ability to learn the high-level eﬃcient features and
in addition to that, it is robust against small rotations and shifts. Signiﬁcant progress
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has been made on this basic design of CNN and it has been extended by increasing the
number of layers [168], size of layers [169] and better activation function (e.g. ReLU [170])
to yield the best results on various challenges related to object classiﬁcation, recognition
and computer vision.
In this study, we employ the GoogLeNet [166], a deep network consists of 22 layers
constructed based on the architecture of CNN. GoogLeNet is an eﬃcient deep neural
network architecture, which has a new level of organization called Inception Module.
Such module basically acts as multiple convolution ﬁlter inputs, which are processed on
the same input. It also does pooling at the same time and all the output results are
then concatenated. Fully-connected layers are being replaced with parallel convolutions
that operate on the same input layer. An Inception Module in GoogLeNet consists of
several convolutions and a max pooling operation and there are nine such modules in a
GoogLeNet architecture. The 1×1 convolutions at the bottom of the module reduce the
number of inputs and hence decrease the computation cost dramatically. It also captures
the correlated features of an input image in the same region. Where as, image patterns
are responded by 3×3 and 5×5 convolutions at larger scales. Feature maps which are
being produced by all the convolutions are concatenated to form the output [166]. Using
Inception Module allows the network to take advantage of multi-level feature extraction
from each input. It allows increasing number of units signiﬁcantly without an uncontrolled
blow-up in computational complexity. The resulted networks are usually 2-3 times faster
than similarly networks without inception architecture.
10.1.4 Transfer Learning and Fine-Tuning
In this study, we employ an important machine learning strategy, named transfer learn-
ing [171]. Common machine learning algorithms usually address isolated tasks. While,
transfer learning attempts to change this concept by developing methods to transfer
knowledge learned in one or more source tasks and use it to improve learning in a related
target task [171]. The goal of transfer learning is to improve learning in the target task
by leveraging knowledge from the source task. Pratt is the ﬁrst who came up with
the concept of transfer learning and proposed the discriminability-based transfer (DBT)
algorithm [172] in 1993. DBT uses an information measure to estimate the utility of hy-
perplanes deﬁned by source weights in the target network, and rescales transferred weight
magnitudes accordingly. Research on transfer learning has attracted more and more atten-
tion since 1995 in diﬀerent names: learning to learn, knowledge transfer, inductive transfer,
multi-task learning, knowledge consolidation, context-sensitive learning, knowledge-based
inductive bias, meta learning, and incremental/cumulative learning [173, 174, 175].
In practice, we don’t usually train an entire deep CNN from scratch with random
initialization. This is because it is relatively rare to have a dataset of suﬃcient size that
is required for the depth of network required. For instance, the GoogLeNet was initially
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Figure 10.1 – Image samples of Food-5K dataset.
trained on ImageNet [176], a dataset containing over 1 million natural images categorized
in 1000 classes. Instead, it is common to use the weights of an existing CNN pre-trained
on a very large dataset (e.g. ImageNet), as either an initialization (ﬁne-tuning) or a
ﬁxed feature extractor for the task of interest. The ﬁne-tuning strategy [177] ﬁne-tunes
the weights of a pre-trained CNN by continuing the backpropagation. It is possible to
ﬁne-tune all the layers of a CNN or to some higher-level portion of the network while
keeping some of the earlier layers ﬁxed (due to overﬁtting concerns). This is motivated
by the fact that the earlier features of a CNN usually contain more generic features (e.g.
edge detectors or color blob detectors) that should be useful to many tasks but later layers
of the DCNN becomes progressively more speciﬁc to the details of the classes contained
in the dataset. In this study, we also applied ﬁne-tuning on a pre-trained GoogLeNet
model to build our food image classiﬁers.
10.2 Datasets
First, we created two image datasets4, named Food-5K and Food-11, used for the
experiments on food/non-food classiﬁcation and category recognition respectively. Both
datasets are split into three subsets, for the purpose of training, validation and evaluation
respectively. In addition, another Instagram Food/Non-Food Dataset (IFD) created
by [148] was used in our experiments to evaluate the performance of our model on
food/non-food classiﬁcation. Details of the three datasets are given as follows.
Food-5K dataset contains 2’500 food images and 2’500 non-food images, resulting
in a total of 5’000 images. The food images were selected from existing and publicly
available food image datasets, including Food-101 [159], UEC-FOOD-100 [162] and UEC-
FOOD-256 [164]. The food images were selected in such a way that they could cover
4The datasets are publicly accessible in http://mmspg.epﬂ.ch/food-image-datasets.
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Figure 10.2 – Image samples of Food-11 dataset.
a wide variety of food items. This may help to train a strong classiﬁer that can detect
food images with a wide variety. In addition, those images in which food in not even the
main portion of image content are also considered as food image. For non-food images,
we randomly selected 2’500 from existing image datasets consisting of general non-food
objects or humans. These datasets include Caltech101 [178], Caltech256 [179], the Images
of Groups of People [180] and Emotion6 [122]. We tried to cover a wide range of contents
in the non-food images and included some non-food images visually similar to food, thus
increasing the diﬃculty of classiﬁcation task. Every image was visually inspected by us
such that it is distinguishable by a human observer in terms of its belongingness to one of
the two classes: food and non-food. For the training phase, we used 3’000 images (1’500
for food and 1’500 for non-food). The rest of the dataset was equally divided into two
subsets, for validation and evaluation respectively. Figure 10.1 shows some examples of
food and non-food images in Food-5K dataset.
Food-11 dataset consists of 16’643 images grouped into 11 categories, which basically
cover the major types of food that people consume in daily life. We deﬁned the food
categories by adopting and modifying the major food groups deﬁned by United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) [181]. The 11 categories are: Bread, Dairy products,
Dessert, Egg, Fried food, Meat, Noodles/Pasta, Rice, Seafood, Soup and Vegetable/Fruit.
The dataset was mainly collected from existing food image datasets including Food-
101 [159], UEC-FOOD-100 [162] and UEC-FOOD-256 [164]. For certain categories (Dairy
products and Vegetable/Fruit), we downloaded images from two social media sites, i.e.
Flickr and Instagram. For each food category, we tried to include diﬀerent food items in
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Table 10.1 – Categories, example items and number of images in each subset of Food-11.
Category Example items Train Val. Eval.
Bread Bread, burger, pizza, pancakes, etc. 994 362 368
Dairy products Milk, yogurt, cheese, butter, etc. 429 144 148
Dessert Cakes, ice cream, cookies, chocolates, etc. 1500 500 500
Egg Boiled and fried eggs, and omelette. 986 327 335
Fried food French fries, spring rolls, fried calamari, etc. 848 326 287
Meat Raw or cooked beef, pork, chicken, duck, etc. 1325 449 432
Noodles/Pasta Flour/rice noodle, ramen, and spaghetti pasta. 440 147 147
Rice Boiled and fried rice. 280 96 96
Seafood Fish, shellﬁsh, and shrimp; raw or cooked. 855 347 303
Soup Various kinds of soup. 1500 500 500
Vegetable/Fruit Fresh or cooked vegetables, salad, and fruits. 709 232 231
Total 9866 3430 3347
order to increase the diﬃculty of recognition. Apart from this, only those images whose
main content is food of that particular category were selected. The concrete example food
items in each category and the number of images for each subset are listed in Table 10.1.
Figure 10.2 shows example food images of the 11 categories.
IFD dataset was built searching results for #tag “food” in Instagram, being manually
annotated with food and non-food labels. The dataset consists of 4’230 food images and
5’428 non-food images. In [148], the food/non-food classiﬁcation experiments conducted
on IFD dataset resulted in a maximum accuracy of 95.1%. We use this dataset in our
experiments to evaluate the performance of our model and compare with the classiﬁcation
results in [148].
10.3 Experiments and Analysis
This section describes the experiments on food/non-food classiﬁcation and food category
recognition carried out using the datasets we created. In the experiments, we use
Caﬀe [135], one of the most popular frameworks for deep convolution neural network.
A pre-trained GoogLeNet model is applied and ﬁne-tuned using our dataset for both
food/non-food classiﬁcation and food categorization. In particular we provide details on
how the reﬁnement of the model was achieved.
10.3.1 Food/Non-food Classiﬁcation
Food/Non-food classiﬁcation, or food image detection, is one of the initial and important
steps for image-based dietary assessment. To classify food and non-food images, we use
a pre-trained GoogLeNet model5 and ﬁne-tuned it using the training subset of Food-
5https://github.com/BVLC/caﬀe/tree/master/models/bvlc_googlenet
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Table 10.2 – Accuracy of food/non-food image classiﬁcation on evaluation set of Food-5K
for the two ﬁne-tuning conﬁgurations.
Iteration # 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000
Last 2 layers 0.953 0.983 0.972 0.970 0.979 0.980 0.978 0.979
Last 6 layers 0.987 0.976 0.974 0.975 0.992 0.981 0.983 0.982
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Figure 10.3 – Results of food/non-food classiﬁcation obtained on evaluation set of Food-5K.
5K dataset. Fine-tuning process takes a pre-trained model, adapts the architecture,
and resumes training from the already learned model weights. When ﬁne-tuning a pre-
trained GoogLeNet model, we can choose the layers the parameters of which should be
updated. Based on the existing GoogLeNet, we set the base learning rate to 0.01 using
a polynomial learning rate policy. Besides, the maximum number of iterations is set
to 10000. Then we set up two conﬁgurations to ﬁne-tune the GoogLeNet model, with
one only updating the parameters of the last two layers and the other for the last six
layers. The overall classiﬁcation accuracies (on evaluation set) of the two conﬁgurations
for diﬀerent iterations are shown in Table 10.2. In most cases especially for higher number
of iterations, higher accuracy is achieved on the second setup of ﬁne-tuning i.e. the last
six layers of GoogLeNet model. Therefore, we kept using the setup of ﬁne-tuning the
last six layers in the remaining experiments. Figure 10.3 shows the detailed results of
food/non-food classiﬁcation on the evaluation subset of Food-5K by ﬁne-tuning the last
six layers of GoogLeNet. In the results, the sensitivity, or true positive rate, indicates the
rate of correctly detected food images. While, the speciﬁcity, or true negative rate, refers
to the rate of correctly detected non-food images. From Figure 10.3, a maximum accuracy
rate of 99.2% was achieved on evaluation dataset at iteration #7000, with sensitivity and
speciﬁcity of 99.4% and 99.0% respectively. This means only 8 images out of the whole
evaluation set (1000 images) are incorrectly classiﬁed. Figure 10.5 shows the 8 incorrectly
classiﬁed samples for iteration #7000. Some non-food images classiﬁed as food are highly
similar to food images and those food images classiﬁed as non-food images are either
ambiguous or containing a very small region of food. Figure 10.4(a) shows the confusion
matrix of food/non-food classiﬁcation on our own dataset Food-5K.
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Figure 10.4 – Confusion matrix of food/non-food classiﬁcation results on two diﬀerent
image datasets: Food-5K and IFD.
To further evaluate the performance of our ﬁne-tuned classifer on food/non-food
classiﬁcation, we ran our classifer on the other two datasets: Food-11 dataset created
by us, and Instagram Food/Non-Food Dataset (IFD) by Kagaya et al. [148]. For both
datasets, we tested our classiﬁer at iteration #7000. For Food-11 dataset, we ran the
food/non-food classiﬁer on all the 16’643 food images and 16’127 of them were correctly
detected as food images, resulting in a detection rate of 96.9%. Note that there are only
food images in Food-11 dataset so the accuracy is just the rate of correctly detected
food images. For IFD dataset [148], we evaluated our classiﬁer on randomly selected 500
food and 500 non-food images. The classiﬁcation result is shown as confusion matrix in
Figure 10.4(b). Among all the 500 food images, 474 (94.8%) were correctly classiﬁed as
food, while 488 (97.6%) out of 500 non-food images were correctly classiﬁed as non-food.
This resulted in an overall accuracy of 96.4%, which is slightly higher than the maximum
accuracy of 95.1% obtained in [148]. In this regard, the performance of our classiﬁer
obtained on ﬁne-tuning a GoogLeNet is promising.
10.3.2 Food Image Categorization
In the second experiment, we used Food-11 dataset to train and evaluate a CNN classiﬁer
on food image categorization. The food images in Food-11 have been categorized into 11
classes and Table 10.1 shows the number of images in each category for training, validation
and evaluation. The task for the second experiment is to classify each food image into
one of the 11 categories. For this purpose, we again applied the pre-trained GoogLeNet
model6 and ﬁne-tuned its last six layers on the training set of Food-11. We used a base
learning rate of 0.001 with the same polynomial policy. To evaluate the performance of
categorization, we use three metrics: (i) overall accuracy Acc., (ii) F-measure F1 [182],
and (iii) Cohen’s kappa coeﬃcient κ [183]. Specially, the Cohen’s kappa coeﬃcient is
6https://github.com/BVLC/caﬀe/tree/master/models/bvlc_googlenet
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Figure 10.5 – Misclassiﬁed food and non-food images in Food-5K dataset.
a numerical evaluation of inter-rater agreement which takes into account not only the
observed classiﬁcation accuracy but also the accuracy that any random classiﬁer would
be expected to achieve, namely, random accuracy. It is especially useful in evaluation of
classiﬁcation when the quantities of images in diﬀerent classes are unbalanced.
Figure 10.6 shows the overall accuracy, F-measure and Cohen’s kappa coeﬃcient of
food categorization on the evaluation subset of Food-11. The maximum accuracy of 83.5%
is achieved at iteration #4100, where we also obtain the maximum values of F-measure
and kappa coeﬃcient of 0.911 and 0.816 respectively. The high value of kappa coeﬃcient
(0.816) indicates that the trained classiﬁer performs signiﬁcantly better than any random
classiﬁer. Due to time constraints, we had to stop evaluating the results on the evaluation
dataset after iteration #5000, as the accuracy on the validation dataset did not show
any signiﬁcant improvement. The confusion matrix of the recognition result at iteration
#4100 is shown in Figure 10.7. Among all the classes, Noodles/Pasta, Rice and Soup
result in the best accuracies, higher than 95%. This is because the food images in these
categories have their respective common characteristics in either shape or color and are
therefore easier to be identiﬁed. However, one notices that some types of food images
are error-prone, e.g. Bread, Egg and Meat, the accuracies of which are lower than 70%.
Those types of images are usually of highly mixed food items in our dataset, namely
high intra-class variation. For instance, category Egg contains boiled egg, fried egg and
omelette, which are highly diﬀerent in appearance. Besides, many of those images have
the main food mixed with other food items, e.g. meat with salad. Interestingly, one also
observes that Dessert and Soup are the two target classes to which other food images
are mostly misclassiﬁed. In 7 classes (Bread, Dairy, Egg, Seafood, Meat, Fried food and
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Figure 10.6 – Performance of food categorization on evaluation set of Food-11 dataset.
Vegetable/Fruit), more than 5% of their evaluation set are incorrectly classiﬁed as Dessert.
This might because Dessert is the category that has the most mixed items in our dataset,
and that many of them could be visually similar to other food. Besides, more than 4%
of images in Bread, Dessert, Meat and Seafood were misclassiﬁed as Soup. By checking
some of images misclassiﬁed as soup, we found most of them have round-shaped elements
such as plate or round bread. In our dataset, most Soup images also have the similar
round-shaped plates or containers. According to the confusion matrix in Figure 10.7, we
list the top 10 incorrectly classiﬁed class pairs and show two example images for each in
Figure A.9 in Appendix A. By observing the incorrectly classiﬁed images, we ﬁnd that
incorrect classiﬁcations are mainly due to the following two reasons: (i) Images within a
single food category may contain various types of food items in very diﬀerent appearances,
or an image may contain mixed food items, known as high intra-class variation; (ii)
Images across diﬀerent classes may share similar appearance, shape or color, namely high
inter-class similarity. Considering the fact that each image category in Food-11 dataset
contains diﬀerent food items with certain varieties, and that the size of our dataset is not
considerably large, the results obtained are promising.
10.4 Discussions
Prototype Android Food Recognizer Using the classiﬁers trained in our experi-
ments, we developed a prototype Android mobile app demonstrating the food image
classiﬁcation and categorization processes. The application takes as input an image
captured from camera or selected from photo gallery, uploads the image to a dedicated
server, and triggers the classiﬁcation core on the server. The server ﬁrst executes the
food/non-food classiﬁer on the image and determines whether or not the image is a food
image. If the image is not detected as food image, the application returns “non-food”
to user. If yes, the second classiﬁer for food categorization is executed such that the
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Figure 10.7 – Confusion matrix of food recognition. Values of the matrix are in percentage.
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Figure 10.8 – Workﬂow of a food classiﬁcation system for dietary assessment.
user will receive a predicted label of the food image. The user can then manually check
if the classiﬁcation result is correct, and if not, provide the correct label by choosing
from a predeﬁned list of food categories or creating a new food class. Therefore, such an
application also oﬀers a potential to collect new food images and ﬁne-grained classes from
users. The workﬂow of such a food image classiﬁcation system and several screenshots of
the mobile application are shown in Figure 10.8 and Figure 10.9 respectively.
Privacy Implications Several issues remain with such a dietary assessment system,
among which privacy implication is signiﬁcant. Using wearable or egoistic camera may not
only reveal private information about the user him/herself, but also accidentally violate
the privacy of other people being shot by an “invisible” device. In practice, such privacy
implication should be properly addressed. Possible solutions include secure protection of
image ﬁles or removal of sensitive parts from image with the privacy protection algorithms
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Figure 10.9 – Screenshots of prototype Android app for food image classiﬁcation.
proposed in the thesis.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explore applying a pre-trained GoogLeNet for the tasks of food/non-
food image classiﬁcation and food image categorization. To this end, we ﬁrst constructed
two image datasets from publicly available image datasets, social media and our mobile
cameras. We then trained two classiﬁers for the two tasks respectively by ﬁne-tuning the
last six layers of a GoogLeNet model. Evaluation results of the classiﬁers performed on the
evaluation sets show the best accuracy of 99.2% on food/non-food image classiﬁcation and
83.6% on food categorization respectively. Based on the trained classiﬁers, we developed a
prototype Android application demonstrating food image classiﬁcation and categorization
processes. The mobile application communicates with a dedicated server where all images
are uploaded on and classiﬁed. The classiﬁed result is returned to user so that the user
can check its correctness and afterwards take measures to either accept the result or
manually correct it; in this regard, such type of application is also seen as a food image
collector to enrich the quantity and categories of an existing food image dataset.
For future work, we aim at integrating contextual information to improve the accuracy of
food classiﬁcation and compare it with other diﬀerent architectures such as AlexNet [160],
VGG [184] or ResNet [185]. We will also work on the estimation of food items quantity
and weight in order to ﬁnally estimate their nutritional value. Last but not least, we will
take into account privacy implications of using such an approach for dietary assessment,
as a great amount of sensitive information other than food may be released from those
images. We plan to investigate eﬃcient solutions to enable both privacy and usability,
namely, privacy-preserving dietary management.
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11.1 Thesis Summary
In this thesis, we investigate novel solutions to protect image privacy, with a particular
emphasis on the online photo sharing environment. To this end, we propose not only
image encoding algorithms but also architecture designs to enhance visual privacy in
photo sharing. Moreover, we explore the potentials and additional impacts of using daily
images captured, edited or shared by people in other three relevant applications beyond
privacy.
First, we propose and study two image encoding algorithms to protect visual information
in image, within a Secure JPEG framework. The ﬁrst method scrambles a JPEG image by
randomly changing the signs of the quantized DCT coeﬃcients corresponding to predeﬁned
image regions. The second method, named JPEG Transmorphing, allows one to protect
arbitrary image regions by applying any type of regional obfuscation, while secretly
preserving the original image regions in application segments of the obfuscated JPEG
image. Both algorithms are JPEG backward compatible, meaning that the protected
image is readable by any legacy JPEG decoder in its visually protected form. Only with
a special decoder and a correct secret key, the original image can be recovered. Both
objective and subjective experiments were conducted to evaluate the performances of the
two protection algorithms with respect to their storage overhead, reconstruction quality,
privacy protection capability or pleasantness.
Particularly, the JPEG Transmorphing, designed with a completely new philosophy
from any existing privacy protection scheme, presents a high ﬂexibility and usability
compared to the other distortion-based schemes. JPEG Transmorphing allows one to
apply any personalized obfuscations in image regions, while still preserving the reversibil-
ity in the protected image, even with lossy transformations applied. We conducted
a subject experiment to inspect the privacy protection capability of several regional
obfuscation methods against person recognition. Experimental results indicate that a
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regional obfuscation of image visual information can well preserve the privacy of the
obfuscated person, unless the “attacker” has access to considerable prior knowledge about
the protected person that highly relates to the context information disclosed from the
unprotected regions. Among all obfuscations under evaluation, visual masking shows
the optimal performance compared to the others, such as JPEG Scrambling, P3 and
blurring and pixelation. Thanks to the proposed JPEG Transmorphing algorithm, any
type of regional visual masking can be applied in a reversible manner. Therefore, the
JPEG Transmorphing method could also provide a better level of pleasantness than
other distortion-based approach from both observer and user’s perspective. This fact
has been proven in another subjective experiment based on crowdsourcing. To conclude,
JPEG Transmorphing proved to satisfy all the requirements expected for an ideal privacy
protection scheme outlined in the beginning of the thesis (Chapter 1).
In the second part, we investigate the design of two architectures for privacy-preserving
photo sharing. In the ﬁrst architecture, named ProShare, a public key infrastructure
(PKI) integrated with a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is applied
to enable an eﬃcient and secure sharing of images protected by Secure JPEG algorithms.
In ProShare, a photo is securely encoded by a Secure JPEG protection algorithm with a
secret key and then securely kept on an untrusted service (server, cloud, etc.). Meanwhile,
the secret key is encrypted by CP-ABE with a user-deﬁned access policy. With the help of
the PKI, users can share ABE private keys between each other and only those privileged
users who possess ABE private key associated with right attributes are able to recover the
original image. We implemented and demonstrate the correct and eﬃcient functioning of
the ProShare architecture based on both iOS and Android mobile platforms.
The second architecture is named ProShare S, designed in a completely diﬀerent
mechanism compared to ProShare. In ProShare S, a photo sharing service provider
helps users make photo sharing decisions automatically based on their past decisions
made in diﬀerent contexts. The sharing service takes into account not only the content
of a user-posted image, but also the context information about the image capture and
a prospective requester. The decision making is achieved by a classiﬁer analyzing the
above semantic and contextual information. To validate the ProShare S architecture,
we conducted a user study on 23 users along with extensive performance evaluations.
Experimental results reveal a promising accuracy of the prediction model with a minimum
burden from users.
As the last part of the thesis, we research into three relevant topics in regard to daily
photos captured or shared by people, but beyond their privacy implications. In the
ﬁrst study, we adopt the idea from JPEG Transmorphing and propose an animated
JPEG ﬁle format, named aJPEG. aJPEG “simulates” the GIF, but preserves its animated
frames as APPn markers in a “cover” JPEG image, which encodes a selected default
frame. The aJPEG format proved to oﬀer smaller ﬁle size and higher image quality than
conventional GIF, and therefore could serve as a better alternative to GIF. In the second
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study, we attempt to understand the inﬂuence of popular image manipulations applied
in online photo sharing on evoked emotions of photo observers. The study reveals the
fact that image manipulations indeed impact people’s evoked emotion, but such impact
is also dependent on image content. By learning from image features such as color and
texture, we train and evaluate a regressor that can accurately predict the emotions of a
manipulated image given input as the original image and a desired manipulation. In the
last study, we target on the problem of dietary management using daily photos captured
by people. To this end, we employ a deep CNN model, the GoogLeNet, to perform
automatic food image detection and categorization. Promising results obtained in both
tasks provide us with signiﬁcant insights in design of automatic dietary assessment system
based on multimedia techniques, e.g. image analysis.
11.2 Future Directions
Several limitations of our studies still remain. In the proposed JPEG Transmorphing
(Chapter 5), we only focus on the encoding method itself by assuming knowing the
sensitive image regions to protect or the existence of techniques that can automatically
detect and identify private ROIs. At most, we apply a simple face detector to detect
face regions in image. Yet, identiﬁcation of the privacy-sensitive regions in image is a
research topic that needs particular eﬀorts. Substantial research has already been devoted
in it using diﬀerent computer vision and pattern recognition techniques including the
recent deep learning networks [43, 41, 42]. We envision a promising future of private
ROI detection in image using deep learning techniques in combination of various context
information, e.g. time, location and device.
When applying JPEG Transmorphing to protect image privacy, we only consider visual
information in image, which might be inadequate as metadata associated in image may
also reveal privacy. However, it is not diﬃcult to achieve the protection of image metadata
using a similar approach as JPEG Transmorphing by means of secretly hiding metadata
along with Transmorphing data in image. In addition, we consider only single level
information protection and sharing, in both protection algorithms and photo sharing
architectures. It would be interesting and challenging to achieve multi-party photo sharing
using the proposed approaches, namely, disclosing diﬀerent versions of the same image
content to diﬀerent entities depending on their privileges.
Recent years have also seen a boom on video or animation sharing on social networks.
Most common requirements for privacy protection of image content will still apply for
video content, such as low overhead, low complexity and backward compatibility with
existing video coding algorithms. However, due to diﬀerent natures of video and animation
content and coding schemes applied, they may raise new requirements and challenges. In
the next step, we also plan to extend our encoding algorithms and architecture to enable
the privacy protection for video content.
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In the study of context-dependent privacy-aware photo sharing architecture ProShare S
(Chapter 7), most image semantic features are manually annotated by our subjects, which
is impractical when being applied in practice. Also, results of the study are generated on
the data of only 20 eﬀective subjects and they were put in a hypothetical environment
and provided their sharing decisions upon the artiﬁcial questions we asked. These are
mainly due to the lack of access and control of a popular social network. Therefore,
integrating necessary automatic feature extractions and putting greater number of users
in a realistic social networking environment will serve as our future work. This will
further help us understand users photo sharing behaviors with respect to privacy concerns.
Furthermore, we will investigate more sophisticated machine learning and even deep
learning approaches to understand the privacy values of user-posted media content, and
take into account more contextual information, to build more accurate and secure privacy
protection mechanism in online photo sharing.
Last but not the least, privacy is a highly complex issue in the scenario of social media,
due to the fact that information is being created and shared extensively within a large
user graph. Our current study mainly focuses on the privacy issues associated with the
media content itself, without taking into account the implications from the complex user
connections in a networked environment. We call it content-centric approach. We believe
not only the media content itself but also other information about the user (friends, proﬁle,
comments, or even friends’ content etc.) may compromise user’s privacy. Therefore,
future research for privacy protection can be carried out in a user-centric approach by
taking into account both media content and other information associated to user.
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Figure A.1 – Screenshot of an HIT on AMT for subjective experiment on face recognition
(Chapter 4).
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Figure A.2 – Screenshot of an HIT on AMT for subjective experiment on license plate
recognition (Chapter 4).
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Figure A.3 – Evaluation images of the six identities in subjective evaluation of diﬀerent
privacy protection methods (Chapter 5).
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Figure A.4 – Screenshot of an HIT on AMT for subjective experiment on pleasantness of
visual privacy protection methods (Chapter 5).
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Figure A.5 – Application screenshots.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure A.6 – Screenshots of ProShare S Android application used for user study in
Chapter 7: (a) login page, (b) main page showing all photos, (c)-(f) image semantics
annotation, (g) contextual sharing decision questionnaire, (h) protect and upload image.
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(a) Desktop app (b) Mobile Android app
Figure A.7 – Screenshots of two prototype applications for aJPEG conversion and playback
in Chapter 8.
Figure A.8 – Screenshot of a questionnaire on Microworkers for emotion evaluation of
image manipulation in Chapter 9.
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10.9% of Bread  Dessert 9.5% of Dairy  Dessert
6.9% of Egg  Dessert 6.9% of Seafood  Dessert
6.5% of Bread  Fried 6.0% of Dessert  Dairy
5.3% of Meat  Dessert 5.2% of Fried  Dessert
5.2% of Fruit  Dessert 4.9% of Meat  Soup
Figure A.9 – Top 10 class pairs that are misclassiﬁed in food image categorization
experiment in Chapter 10. The percentage refers to the proportion of images in evaluation
set for a particular category. The symbol  stands for “incorrectly classiﬁed as”.
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